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CHAPTER FIVE 
c.op. I 
The United States: From Sleeping Giant to Superpower 
The emphasis of American discussion of foreign affairs during the interwar period 
changed markedly in the first year of the United States' participation in World War Two. 
Whereas the arguments of the 1930s had centered around the battle between isolationism 
and internationalism in their broadest definitions, analysis of international affairs during 
and after the war put increased emphasis on specific plans for incorporating the United 
States into a global system. Generally speaking, the United States' entry into the war 
banished talk of whether America should exercise influence abroad and replaced it with a 
discussion of how best to do so. As a result, a myriad of proposals for American 
contributions to global security developed throughout the transformational years of 
conflict, the emergence of the Cold War and beyond. While the 1930s had posed no small 
number of challenges for American thinkers and policymakers, the period from Pearl 
Harbor to the conclusion of the Korean conflict demanded even greater focus and 
flexibility from American thinkers . 
The hurdles spanning the United States' entry into the war, the struggle to outline 
a plan for the postwar world, the deterioration of Soviet-American relations and the 
outbreak of war in Korea echoed the drumbeat of crises which confronted Britain during 
the late interwar period. As the newly preeminent democratic power, the United States 
fow1d itself in much the same position of responsibility as Britain during the previous 
decade. Determination not to repeat the mistakes of Baldwin and Chamberlain - to say 
nothing ofthe catastrophe of December 7, 1941- spurred a robust debate over foreign 
policy means, though the virtual disappearance of isolationism as a stream of thought 
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generated a new consensus regarding political ends. The result was a rich analysis of 
international relations concepts, particularly collective security, with later attempts to 
reconcile power balancing to the rejuvenated global organization of the United Nations1. 
To a certain extent, American wartime discussion of international affairs 
· continued to center on the same subjects as that of the last years of peace. Two days 
following the Pearl Harbor attack, Walter Lippmarm wrote a letter discussing the 
formation of "commonwealths", a term generally synonymous with Clarence Streit's 
Atlantic federation, and proposals for similar regional or global organizations. He noted 
that none formed either strictly through conquest or strictly through negotiation had long 
existed, and pointed to the downfall of the League as evidence of the flimsiness of purely 
negotiated political constructs. He then criticized the idea that any kind of world or 
regional federation might arise on the model of the United States' transition from 
confederation to federation. The United States, Lippmann noted, previously had a long 
history of common allegiance, specifically to the British crown, and Americans were 
accustomed to thinking of themselves as a unit. While encouraging Anglo-American 
cooperation as the cornerstone of stability, he specifically rejected Clarence Streit's ideas 
in Union Now as unworkable due to the lack of any historically rooted framework 
between the nations proposed to become involved2. Considering that Streit's plan 
involved the inclusion of such disparate states as Canada and Finland, in addition to the 
1 The term "United Nations" could trace its origins to tbe very beginning of active American participation 
in the war. It first appeared in a combined declaration by the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and 
China on January I, 1942. Visson, Andre. The Coming Struggle for Peace. The Viking Press, New York, 
1944, p. I. 
2 Blum., p. 41 1. 
vast colonial holdings of Britain and France ranging from West Africa to Singapore, 
Lippmann's critique seems to have merit. 
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The debate over alternative forms of global organization continued apace and 
spread into the pages of The American Journal of International Law, which maintained 
its status as a premier forum for discussing such matters. Most of the same writers from 
the interwar period continued their contributions during and after the war years. Clyde 
Eagleton had the first word on the subject in 1942 with his article "Organization of the 
Community of Nations". He argued that the emergence of new political forces in the 
twentieth century had necessitated a reconsideration of the basis of international law, 
which would need to embrace the new reality or "abdicate" its role. Eagleton traced these 
changes, specifically the growing interdependence of peoples and states in the modem 
era, to the industrial revolution. Due to the increased importance of worldwide trade 
links, the international community would now require "not merely the negative function 
of law and government in affording . . . protection but also the positive function of 
advancing the welfare of members of the community". According to Eagleton, war had 
become so destructive that international law needed to adapt to control it, or else consign 
itself to irrelevance. He argued that international law as it existed in the interwar period 
had not been strong enough because individual states did not believe that they needed to 
go beyond merely obeying the law; they ignored the imperative to uphold it through 
action. In the wake of this failure, the author argued that international lawyers would 
need to impress upon citizens and statesmen the idea that they must choose between a 
wQrld dominated by strongmen or one under the aegis of international law upheld by the 
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community. If the later is to prevail, an organization must emerge to "support and 
maintain" it3. 
Eagleton took up the discussion of sovereignty later in the article, arguing that 
humanity may be on the verge of entering a new era in which an international community 
would emerge to protect human rights following the sovereign state' s failure to do so. 
The transformation of this community from an abstraction to a real force would require 
sacrifices from individuals and states. All would need to "contribute his share of the 
effort and, if need be, ofblood to uphold the law of the community. Peace means 
government, and a government which does more than merely restrain the aggressor from 
the use of force; if peace is to be substituted for war, then it must be able to secure 
justice4." Like Smith Simpson the previous year, Eagleton cited the report of "The 
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace", and repeated its recommendations. 
These included the renunciation by states of "the claim to be the final judge in their own 
controversies with other nations" and the replacement of war by "international tribunals" 
(mirroring the language used for many years by Norman Angell), the abandonment of 
"aggressive" arms, and the acceptance of free trade. This would require the formation of 
such institutions as an international court and police force5. 
Such "limitations on national sovereignty" would, according to Eagleton, require 
the fonnation of a "powerful international government", which he envisioned as growing 
from a revived organization on the League model. Eagleton specifically rejected the 
3 Eagleton, Clyde. "Organization of the Community of Nations". The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 36, No.2 (Apr. , 1942), p. 23 0. 
4 Ibid. , p . 233 . 
5 Ibid. , p. 234-235. 
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direct formation of a broad federation on the model proposed by Clarence Streit in Union 
Now, which he ruled out as unlikely based on the evolutionary rather than revolutionary 
history of global organization6. Thus, Eagleton had begun the wartime debate in 
International Law with a ringing endorsement of the eventual diminution of state 
sovereignty and the salvation of international law by extending its scope and power under 
the control of a powerful international organization. 
In October of the same year, Eagleton contributed another editorial on the subject 
to International Law in which he began with the proclamation that "There has never been 
an opportunity better than that which now lies before us for building up international 
law." He cited the increasing interdependence among states, alluded to in his previous 
article ' s recommendation of free trade, as a powerful force driving an expansion ofthe 
international legal framework. In a passage which could have come from The Great 
lllusion, Eagleton remarked that global interdependence 
has wrecked the independence of the individual, and has 
made him dependent upon thousands of persons, in far 
comers of the world, of whose very existence he may be 
unaware. The efficiency and reliability of those persons 
who produce, who buy and sell , who transpmi and deliver 
now means prosperity or even life to him 7. 
Once again attacking the prewar case of the isolationists, Eagleton repeated his argument 
that states would need to yield some of their sovereign rights so that their political 
independence would not conflict with their close economic ties . Fmihermore, because 
6 Ibid., p. 235-236. 
7 He continued: "His dependence is not confined to those who are within the confmes of his own nation. 
His prosperity, his very livelihood, depends directly or indirectly upon persons and agencies beyond hi s 
own frontiers and beyond the control of his own government." Eagleton, Clyde. "Forces which wi ll Shape 
the Rebuilding oflntematioual Law". The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Oct. , 
1942), p. 640 . 
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war had become so total in its intensity and global in its scope, neutrality could no longer 
serve as a basis for state policy. To ensure peace, states would need to commit to halting 
all outbreaks of war and invest an international organization with the appropriate powers 
f . 8 o contamment . 
On the opposite side of the ledger, Edwin Borchard continued to oppose all such 
internationalist planning. The United States ' entry into the war had done nothing to 
change his opinion regarding the merits of minimal American involvement in world 
affairs. The Yale professor first discussed the belief, so emphatically stated by Eagleton 
and others, that the power of international law must be vested in some sort of 
enforcement organization. He responded to the assertion that such an organization would 
make the world more peaceful as "not only without foundation in the world of facts, but 
if pursued, can lead only to further disappointment and disintegration of human society"9. 
While Eagleton foresaw a reduced role for the sovereign state in a postwar world, 
Borchard maintained that it would remain the primary unit of world politics. Again in 
contrast to Eagleton, Borchard hoped to remind his readers that international law 
occupied but a small and relatively unimportant niche in world affairs10. 
As in his writing ofthe interwar period, Borchard argued that the common 
analogy between individuals living under municipal law and states in the international 
state system had no validity because states, no matter the restrictions placed upon them 
8 
"Aside from moral principle or civic obligation, each state must as a matter of sheer self-preservation 
attempt to prevent war anywhere.", and "the law must have behind it a physical strength sufficient to stop 
the war-maker. .. This means nothing less than a powerful international government, able to overcome the 
war-maker and to do justice in the face of resistance." Ibid., p. 641 - 642. 
9 Borchard, Edwin. "The Place of Force in Intemational Law" . The American Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 36, No.4 (Oct., 1942), p. 629 . 
10 Ibid., p. 630. 
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by law, remained infinitely more powerful than individuals. Thus, Borchard remained 
committed to his vision of civil discussion and conciliation as the only basis for 
generating international harmony. The threat of force against recalcitrant members of the 
international community undermined the basis for "intelligent cooperation". In a virtually 
verbatim repetition of his argument from the interwar period, he wrote, "The whole effort 
to 'enforce peace', a contradiction in terms, rests in a confusion of mind, and will, it is 
believed, continue to end in a morass of failure. It marks the road to war, not peace 11." 
Clearly, Borchard remained consistent in his views despite the tectonic shift that had 
occurred since the publication of his article on the subject exactly one year previously. 
In December 1942, theAPSR published a lengthy article on the subject of power 
and international organization by the famous German-Jewish political scientist John H. 
Herz. The article, broad ranging and complex, addressed several issues from a nuanced, 
realist perspective. As a result, "Power Politics and World Organization" deserves careful 
consideration in the context of this study as a means of comparison with other prominent 
realists such as Morgenthau and Carr. Herz began by addressing the shift, spawned by the 
disillusion of interwar liberalism, toward a consciousness of power to the exclusion of 
other concerns. This resulted in ridicule of "any attempt to discuss international relations 
in terms of a possible evolution toward a more integrated stage"12. Though this allusion 
to collective security foreshadowed his discussion of the idea later in the article, Herz 
began in a starkly realist tone. Firstly, he noted that power had indeed constituted the 
I! Ibid. 
12 Herz, John H. "Power Politics and World Organization". The American Political Science Review, Vol. 
36, No.6 (Dec., 1942), p. 1039. 
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ultima ratio of modem international relations, drawing a conclusion similar to Carr in 
that regard. He warned that any power which attempted to replace power dynamics with 
"humanitarian" ideals "would merely play into the hands of its competitors and thus 
weaken and eventually destroy itself'. Therefore, those seeking to reform the 
international system would need to begin with an appreciation of the importance of 
power13 . Significantly, this analysis did not refer to such action taken collectively, yet it 
did evoke the idea that in a world of pacifists, one knife-wielding man will rule. This 
logic, as noted, formed the basis ofNorman Angell's argument against pacifism and 
unilateral disarmament, indicating another convergence between Angell and an easily 
identifiable realist. 
Secondly, Herz discussed the link between the primacy of power and the genesis 
of power balancing. In a system of competition, either one competitor would dominate all 
the others, or units would need to strike a balance whereby they could "exist side by 
side". Herz then added an economic layer to his analysis. He noted that the oft-discussed 
interdependence of the modem world tended to undermine the balance-of-power dynamic 
as it marked a shift away from the drives toward self-sufficiency that previously 
characterized the old balance thinking. Contrary to Angell, however, Herz warned that 
this would breed more conflict rather than peace. Because no large state could any longer 
view itself as self sufficient and secure, Herz predicted states would compete for 
resources in the new interdependent world: 
13 Ibid., p. 1040. 
Thus the growing interdependence of the nations of the 
world led to the contrary of what ' internationalists ' had 
hoped its result would be; instead of making for peace and 
world order, it brought a struggle of powers to dominate the 
world in order to be secure from the world. The trend 
toward world domination or hegemony of a single power is 
but the ultimate consummation of a power-system 
engrafted upon an otherwise integrated world14• 
This is indeed the precise opposite of what internationalists such as Angell 
preached. Rather than becoming encouraged to collaborate and trade in a world where 
autarky no longer represented a real policy, states would compete to dominate a world 
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from which they could no longer fashion self-sufficient pockets of isolation. The obverse 
of internationalist arguments, Herz' approach necessarily rejected any belief in a world of 
plenty. In the world Angell envisioned, states did not need to compete against each other 
due to the ample availability of resources. In fact, Herz specifically stated his belief that 
any previous era of abundance had passed15 . More ominously, Herz suggested that the 
continued transference of conflict from smaller to larger units could presage the downfall 
of humanity. With increasingly large units contending for dominance, the scope of 
conflict would become so titanic that the human race risked destroying itself16 . Indeed, 
while he predicted the ultimate defeat of the fascist gambit for world domination, Herz 
also foresaw the continued primacy of power in the future, potentially resulting in the 
realization of his dire prophesy for mankind. 
14 Ibid., p. 1041. 
15 Ibid. 
16 
"History, so far, has not meant progress toward less war and conflict and more peace and harmony, but 
only the transfer of competition and strife from smaller to ever larger social groups. The perpetuation of 
this system on the world-level not only would mean that the bottom is out of our civilization . .. but might 
well signalize the decay of man as a race. Unable to escape the vicious circle of mutual fear, insecurity and 
conflict for power and to eliminate the life-and-death struggle from the societies formed by his own kind, 
the 'victor over Nature' may tum out to have been but another among Nature's abortive attempts to create a 
species capable of survival." Ibid., p. 1042. 
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Although Herz' examination of global affairs had displayed a pessimistic and 
power and conflict-oriented perspective to this point, he split from the stark realism of 
Carr by arguing that alternatives promoted by internationalist liberals had their own 
inherent logic and advantages that might obviate the anarchic quest for power. He 
criticized peace advocates and organizations such as the League for putting the cart 
before the horse in their advocacy of disarmament as a means for securing global 
security. Attempting to compel states to reduce their level of power while doing nothing 
to curtail the overall system of power competition meant that their efforts became subject 
to extreme skepticism by states that were highly reluctant to undertake disarmament in an 
anarchic world. Evoking the security dilemma, Herz noted that any violation of such a 
compact by one power could lead to disaster for the others. Conversely, disarmament 
could succeed if the establishment of a "firm security system" preceded attempts at the 
d . f 17 re uctwn o arms . 
Herz, then, did not reject the possibility that states could eventually escape the 
imperative to build and protect their level of power, adding an important layer of 
complexity to his realist stance. The means oftransitioning from a world of anarchic 
competition to one of organized global governance, he argued, would determine whether 
such a shift would ever occur. Herz therefore sought to examine possible avenues by 
which the international community could engineer such an evolution. In another 
demonstration of the appeal and broad consideration enjoyed by Streit's "Federal Union" 
proposal, Herz began with a discussion of this concept by name. He said, interestingly, 
17 Ibid. , p. 1043-1044. 
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that Streit's proposal did not constitute a utopian scheme because such transfers of 
allegiance from smaller to larger political units had taken place in the past (from feudal 
lords to the state, for example) without ushering in utopia. They merely changed the locus 
of power. Simultaneously, he cautioned, "Nothing short of an ideological and spiritual 
revolution would be required in order to eradicate 'nationalism' from the minds [sic] in 
favor of 'world patriotism 18. ' " Herz did not envision this as a likely outcome. 
Herz' willingness to contemplate the possibility of Streit's proposal becoming 
reality without rejecting it outright as an impossible or undesirable dream is surprising 
considering his membership in the realist camp. Even more interesting, however, is his 
highly reasoned embrace of collective security. He described a functioning collective 
security system as a middle path between an "impracticable" supra-state government and 
"ineffectual obligations" to refrain from aggression. Staking an undeniably power-
conscious position, Herz explicitly described such a system as working "through 
collective sanctions against the use offorce19" . Playing into the worst fears of 
isolationists, Herz recognized that making a commitment to collective security would 
expand the scope of war, replacing the "right" to make war with a "duty" to do so in the 
event of aggression. This, he hoped, would "eliminate total wars by the threat of a still 
more total one, since each state resorting to war or other violence would have to face a 
world-wide coalition, with the result - so it is hoped - that the very threat of such 
opposition would deter it from starting such a venture20" . Though he recognized the 
18 Ibid. , p. 1045. 
19 Ibid., p. 1046. 
20 Ibid., p. 1047. 
arguments of collective security opponents who warned that such a policy would only 
result in the application, or possible application, of even greater force than ever 
previously considered, Herz interpreted this as a worthwhile price to pay for the 
possibility of deterring aggression with the specter of overwhelming power. 
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The value of collective security, Herz believed, stemmed from its potential to 
break the "vicious circle" of modem interstate politics wherein insecurity generated 
conflict, the threat and presence of which lead to more insecurity. He called collective 
security the "adaptation of the balance-of-power principle to modem conditions". By this 
he meant that collective security logic recognized the inability of modem great power 
conflict to remain localized. Because such conflicts, as demonstrated by the two World 
Wars, expanded to embrace all the great powers, each had an interest in ensuring that 
· such wars never erupted at all, since in the absence of collective security "these would 
ultimately have to take part in an attempt to reestablish the balance anyway. Therefore, 
each of them would seem to have more interest in preventing such 'unorganized' wars 
than in its own right to make, or abstain from, wars whenever it pleases21 ." Therefore, 
the consideration that modem conflicts between great powers tended to become global in 
nature meant that great powers had a supreme interest in preventing all conflict rather 
than in attempting to isolate themselves, as this had proved impossible. 
Herz also disagreed with critics of collective security regarding the impossibility 
of identifying aggressors. In addition, he rejected the counterargument that collective 
security would require the impossibly difficult formulation of contingency plans for 
21 Ibid. 
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every possible permutation of conflict outbreaks. This would not be necessary, he argued, 
because although aggressors might score some early victories, they would never 
overcome all the other states in the system arrayed against them22. Like Angell, Herz 
believed the main problem facing the overhaul of global security lay in convincing a 
critical mass of great powers to recognize the imperative of creating a collective security 
system, regardless of how remote one's own state might be from the zone of conflict. 
This idea, however, Herz endorsed as "based on a realistic appraisal of such facts as the 
changed nature of war and the universalism of the mechanism of power competition ... 
there are 'no islands anymore. " ' He condemned attempts at isolation or appeasement as 
self-destructive means of empowering aggressors and potential threats, and deferring the 
moment of conflict while ensuring that it would occur in the worst possible 
circumstances. As a result, he reasoned, "turning from power politics to collective 
security, therefore, means the adoption of a more rational scheme of international 
relations23 ." 
Herz warned in the event that states did not embrace collective security, the 
impetus to generate and protect one' s own power would continue to dominate and would 
lead to his previously considered world in which domination, rather than power 
balancing, would emerge as the primary goal of great powers. This would result in 
"recurring world-wide wars on a probably accelerate scale". Yet, Herz remained 
reserved: "The establishment of collective security .. . would by no means herald the 
22 
"If all states are ready to participate in sanctions, even after the immediate victim of aggression has been 
overrun, permanent success of the aggressor seems scarcely possible." Ibid., p. 1048. 
23 Ibid., p. 1048-1049. 
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millennium. It would have to take shape in an atmosphere still full of suspicion, since 
competing powers, just emerging from a life-and-death struggle, would still exist at its 
start." A transition period would therefore be necessary, and the new collective security 
system would need to find some substitute for force in the international system. He 
concluded that the postwar years, even in an optimal scenario, would "be an age of 
relative fallibility, not of accomplished rightfulness"24 • 
Herz' article provides an invaluable opportunity to examine how support for 
collective security developed within the realist stream during the war years. The author's 
continuous attempts to couch his analysis in the language of power, and his appreciation 
for the increasing amount of force at the disposal of modem great powers, validate his 
realist bona fides. Aside from his criticism of Streit's Atlantic federation proposal, which 
he argued would require an unlikely ideological revolution, Herz' article is devoid of 
moral considerations and focuses strictly on power dynamics. These, he maintained, had 
rendered the old logic of power balancing and isolationism obsolete. The former had 
succumbed to the increasing intensity and scope of warfare, which threatened to consume 
humanity unless the propensity for great powers to conflict could somehow be arrested. A 
reliance on power balancing with its attendant risk of great power conflict offered only 
the promise of destruction in an era of increasingly destructive wars. Isolationism, 
meanwhile, would only make this problem more severe for any states that employed it as 
a policy. Herz deprecated isolationism due to his appreciation of the interconnected 
nature of the world based on a recognition that the previous and ongoing great power 
24 Ibid., p. 1050-1052. 
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conflicts had involved all the first-tier states, despite attempts by many of them to remain 
in isolation. As a result of this process of elimination, Herz suggested the world could not 
but place its hopes in the promises of collective security. Utilizing the logic that each 
state had an interest in avoiding increasingly destructive and universal conflicts that 
would lead either to mutual destruction or the predominance of only one power, Herz 
made a compelling realist argument for Woodrow Wilson's "utopian" vision. 
Famed Civil War historian Allan Nevins also offered criticism of the formerly 
preeminent isolationist view in the first year of America's participation in World War 
Two. His book, America in World Affairs began - like so many others- with an 
examination ofthe Founding Fathers' statecraft. Calling an avoidance of alliances a 
"fixed principle of American policy", Nevins nonetheless rejected the assertion that the 
United States had traditionally pursued isolationism. Nevins argued that isolationists 
frequently misquoted Washington's Farewell Address, noting that while the first 
president warned that the United States should avoid "artificial ties in the ordinary 
vicissitudes of[European] politics", Washington said nothing about "natural ties growing 
out of grand considerations of national interest, or concern for the progress of 
democracy", suggesting that these motivations for forging ties with Europe were 
acceptable to him25 . 
Contrary to what Nevins viewed as Washington's balanced approach to world 
affairs, he argued that modem Americans had turned isolationism into a "fetish" to the 
exclusion of forging "common sense" policies which recognized the United States ' role 
25 Nevins, Allan. America in World Affairs. Oxford University Press, New York, 1942, p. 13-14. 
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in "an interdependent world". Instead, "they have erected John Adams' s and Jefferson' s 
warnings against foreign embroilments into a towering barrier." An active foreign policy, 
according to Nevins, may have done much to help avert the impending outbreak of war 
instead of simply functioning as a road to foreign "entanglement"26. Nevins cited 
historical precedent for this conclusion, echoing Lippmann's analysis that the United 
States had long benefited from Britain's mastery of the seas and London's role in 
containing European conflict. He believed the alignment of American and British 
interests continued into the modem era, requiring mutual support between Britain and 
America. Both states maintained an interest in the protection of Canada, the 
"independence and integrity" of China, the maintenance of Australian security and the 
exclusion of foreign meddling in Latin America27 . Thus, while he diverged from 
Lippmann's interwar argument that the difference in Britain and the United States' 
primary interest precluded close cooperation, Nevins and Lippmann alike perceived an 
essential harmony between the Anglo-Saxon powers. 
With this in mind, Nevins turned to an assault on the logic of the isolationists in 
explicit terms. After recounting their arguments that the United States could best serve 
the world by providing a shining example of democracy and economic success, Nevins 
replied, 
26 Ibid., p. 15. 
In all this there is some force, if more of sophistry and 
tendentious thinking; and it is easy to understand why, after 
the defeat of the League, such ideas gained ground. They 
were supported by selfishness, timidity, and inertia. The 
stay-at-home policy was easier, cheaper and at first blush 
27 Ibid., p. 54, 59-60. 
safer than the bold policy of aiding in world-organization. 
Isolationist tendencies were supported also by the old smug 
America-is-better-than-Europe sentiment28. 
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According to Nevins, these facile reductions had been crushed by the United States' entry 
into the war. Its failure to engage in his preferred policy of active engagement overseas 
had allowed the threat of conflict to grow until America's potential enemies believed they 
could successfully challenge the United States. Nevins concluded, "The faith of those 
who maintained that collective security offered the only certain path to peace, that 
America must join other nations in stopping war at the source ... that faith was 
vindicated29." America in World Affairs thus provides another example of the growing 
appreciation for collective security among the American academic elite during World 
War Two, as well as the internationalists' increased willingness to assail the logic of their 
erstwhile isolationist foes of the interwar period. 
The Apex of Conflict 
As the fortunes of war began to shift definitively toward the Allies during 1943, 
the intellectual attack against America's interwar policies and the ideas that lay behind 
them continued. One of Quincy Wright's contributions to International Law added to the 
quickening shift toward a focus on the postwar world. He began by casting doubt on the 
idea that the "United Nations"' (used here to refer to the Allies, not the as yet uncreated 
international organization) unity of purpose and "vigilance" would not survive the end of 
28 Ibid., p. 79. 
29 Ibid., p. 125. 
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the war without a unified commitment to some higher purpose30. Before detailing his 
vision of the future, however, Wright could not resist the opportunity to heap scorn on the 
interwar policies he had long condemned. He rejoiced that isolationism had been 
thoroughly discredited, calling the various Neutrality Acts "the last gasp of American 
isolationism"31 . Conforming to the argument ofHerz, Wright also maintained that power 
balancing could not yield security in the modem era, as the power of blitzkrieg and the 
refinement of total war made great power conflict too destructive to contemplate, while 
economic interdependence made the case for comprehensive peace overwhelming. He 
warned, however, that democracies had proven too fond of peace to maintain their 
military preparedness, or to threaten "war sufficiently in advance to frustrate the activities 
of the potential aggressor"32. 
As a remedy, Wright indicated his support for the creation of an international 
police force as a corollary of erecting a future collective security organization. Such a 
force would devote itself to obeying orders issued by the organizational council, and its 
permanence would avoid the problem posed by democratic states' reluctance to maintain 
large standing armies necessary to thwart aggression at a moment's notice. Air power, 
having demonstrated its puissance in the current war, might suffice in this regard, thereby 
paring the reduction of sovereignty an international police force would imply to a level 
acceptable to most states. Endowing the future collective security organization with the 
ability to enforce its own decisions without relying on the goodwill and contributions of 
30 Wright, Quincy. "National Security and International Police". The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Jul. , 1943), p. 500. 
31 Ibid., p. 502. 
32 Ibid. 
member states, as the League had done, would form part of a series of "checks and 
balances" which would prevent the resurgence of obsolete and dangerous balance-of-
hink. 33 powert mg . 
368 
Following John Herz' powerful article of December 1942, the APSR returned to 
the subject of postwar global governance in the following year with an article by the 
German democratic leader-in-exile and New School lecturer Arnold Brecht. He began by 
expressing the apparent truism that "universal feeling" had accepted the idea that an 
"international government" would emerge in the aftermath of World War Two and that 
the United States would take an active role in shaping it. Suggesting the prevalence of 
this view, at least among his fellow academics, he called the twin ideas a "fundamental 
platform on which all men of good-will can meet"34. According to Brecht, the attitude of 
the United States had extremely serious implications, "To preserve the peace of the 
world, to save civilization [my emphasis] , and to develop higher social standards, the 
United States should certainly brace itself to overcome narrow isolationist feelings and 
show its good intention to cooperate in the establishment oflnternational Govemment35." 
Brecht, however, did not embrace the widest interpretation suggested by the 
vague term "international government". Instead of foreseeing the emergence of a global 
state in the near term, or the long term as did Clarence Streit, Brecht advocated a more 
textured international system which would enable the United States to honor its 
constitutional heritage while actively participating in world affairs. He maintained that 
33 Ibid., p. 503-504. 
34 Brecht, Arnold. "Distribution of Powers between an International Government and the Governments of 
National States". The American Political Science Review, Vol. 37, No.5 (Oct. , 1943), p. 862. 
35 Ibid., p. 864. 
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the United States should not compromise its sovereignty by yielding the power to declare 
war to an external body, although the American government could indulge in narrowly 
constructed alliances designed to mitigate specific threats. More generally, Brecht 
·proposed the formation of multiple regional federations that could respond to contain 
aggression instead of a global collective security system or a world state. He thus 
envisioned a world of multiple, overlapping layers formed by regional security 
organizations. This, Brecht posited, would allow unique regional attributes to become 
pieces of a fabric ofcooperation rather than a stumbling block for global governance. A 
world court and compulsory arbitration as well as disarmament would be components of 
this scheme36. 
Brecht's proposal provides an intriguing means of addressing the flaws that 
doomed the League. Arguably, the belief held by many Europeans and Americans that 
the Sino-Japanese and ltalo-Ethiopian conflicts did not concern them contributed 
significantly to global inaction against fascist aggression and served to undermine the 
Geneva organization. Brecht's patchwork quilt of regional federations sought to 
circumvent this type of thinking by ensuring that any mandated response to aggression 
would fall only to the states most connected to the resolution of potential conflicts. His 
vision of regionalism could conceivably have led to the formation of blocs with similar 
interests and styles of diplomacy rather than forcing diverse states to coexist with 
difficulty in a global organization. Alternatively, it also contains several flaws. Firstly, 
neighboring states frequently have the most intractable disputes, and grouping 
36 Ibid. , p. 865-866 and 870. 
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antagonistic rivals in the same regional bloc would hardly contribute to stability. 
Secondly, it did not address the wide disparities of power within regional groups and 
what might occur when small powers cannot restrain a preponderant regional power. In 
such an eventuality, only a global response by the great powers would suffice. One need 
only turn to the Sino-Japanese War to see a realization of this oversight. Thirdly, Brecht 
did not consider what might occur if a great power assailed a small state in another 
region, as Italy did in 1935. Potential regional federations in various parts of the 
developing world would be unable to repulse an attack mounted by an overseas great 
power, and such a conflict would force the other great powers to act on an ad-hoc basis 
without the benefit of established procedures such as those enumerated in the Covenant 
or the later UN Charter. Each state would once more face the dilemma of suddenly 
having to determine the true nature of its interests with no guarantee that the outcome 
would prove any different from during the interwar period. 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Brecht's vision ofregional federations 
would suggest the manifestation ofHerz' prediction ofthe possible transference of power 
from smaller to larger units. While Brecht' s organizations imply the endurance of state 
sovereignty, the possibility of one regional grouping making war on another did not 
appear in Brecht's analysis. Considering the possible shift of responsibility which might 
occur from states to the regional bodies created to facilitate smooth functioning within 
the group, this could result in the type of mammoth conflicts between increasingly large 
and powerful sovereignties that Herz believed had the power to destroy humanity. While 
this goes beyond the analysis penned by Brecht, the possibility of inter-bloc warfare 
371 
rather than intra-bloc struggles seems a logical next step. While these two articles in the 
APSR demonstrate that while fondness for international governance had indeed grown 
significantly in the wake of American entry into the war, there remained a pronounced 
diversity of opinion regarding the character of a potential postwar peace settlement. 
Walter Lippmann remained one of the foremost analysts of foreign affairs 
throughout the war years. In June 1943 he wrote a letter to the editors of The Nation that 
described his idea that all the states on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean comprised a 
single defensive area, and that an attack on one of them would necessarily involve all of 
them in hostilities. While Lippmann supported cooperation between the Atlantic states, 
the USSR and China, he did not believe in resurrecting League structures. According to 
him, such commonwealths arose around the nucleus of a single state strong enough to 
provide protection, not merely from negotiation between equals. He then reasserted that 
the idea of the United States serving as a model for world government had no basis, as 
the United States did not create a federation from scratch but rather "perfected" an 
existing union already created under the British aegis37. In a letter to Quincy Wright the 
same year, Lippmann wrote that he did not believe that collective security under a 
Covenant-style document would succeed. Instead, he believed that a continuation of the 
anti-Axis alliance, bound by the common interest in suppressing Germany and Japan over 
the long term, would present the best hope of security in the postwar era38 . 
In an interesting aside, Lippmann also turned an eye toward the past in a note to a 
member of the Czechoslovakian government in exile working in the United States that 
37 Blum, p. 439. 
38 1bid., p. 444-445. 
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summer. Lippmann wrote that the real issue of the Sudeten crisis was that of the nature of 
the German regime. While not all border disputes worldwide represented a threat to 
global security, the Sudetenland dispute did, due to Hitler's aggressive, conflict-oriented 
policy, or as Lippmann called them, "the known purposes ofNazi Germany". He 
concluded, "When Chamberlain professed to believe that the German designs on 
Czechoslovakia were a purely local problem, he was refusing to believe the evidence 
which was perfectly clear to other British statesmen like Churchill and Eden39." 
During 1943, Lippmann also advanced his general outlook on the current and 
future shape of international affairs in his book US Foreign Policy: Shield of the 
Republic. In the introduction, he compared foreign policy to a balance sheet, with 
obligations and resources to meet them on opposite sides of the ledger. He criticized the 
United States and its citizens for having accrued many obligations during the decades 
since the Spanish-American War without also generating the resources to meet them. 
Although the United States had become increasingly central to global politics, the 
American people refused to make the physical and moral commitment to honor the 
implicit and explicit commitments they had made. Lippmann blamed this on a "blinding 
prejudice - that concern with our frontiers, our armaments, and with alliances, is immoral 
and reactionar/0." 
In yet another demonstration of the preoccupation writers of this period displayed 
with analyzing the present through the lens of the past, Lippmann argued throughout the 
39 Ibid., p. 442. 
40 Lippmann, Walter. U S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic. Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 
1943, p. 7-8. 
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book that the isolationist view of American foreign policy history rested on a gross 
misinterpretation of the Founding Fathers' words and the record ofthe nineteenth 
century. He relied on numerous historical examples to support his assertions. For 
instance, to rebut the isolationist claim that European powers could never meddle in the 
affairs of the New World, Lippmann pointed to the installation of the Emperor 
Maximilian in Mexico by France during the 1860s. He asserted that this illustrated two 
uncomfortable facts for which isolationist doctrine had no answer. Firstly, that a foreign 
power had, in fact, installed a foreigner to rule one of the United States' neighbors. 
Secondly, that without the acquiescence of Britain, France could never have so 
intervened. Lippmann used this point to support his most fundamental argument: that the 
United States and Britain have had a de facto alliance since 182341 . Largely reprising his 
argument of 1937 from "Rough-Hew Them How We Will", Lippmann referred to the 
belief that America had no enduring alliances as "The Persisting fllusion " in the heading 
of one chapter of his book. The author argued extensively that Washington and London 
had been inextricably linked since the advent ofthe Monroe Doctrine, as the hallmark 
American policy relied heavily on British naval dominance to keep potentially hostile 
European powers confined to the continent. Fortunately or unfortunately, circumstances 
conspired to make the latent harmony between Britain and the United States invisible to 
most Americans42 . 
41 Ibid., p. 22-23 . 
42 He attributes the American people's failure to recognize the longstanding ties to Britain to two factors . 
Firstly, that the Monroe Doctrine had been challenged only once, during the Maximilian Affair, and that 
this had been easily overshadowed by the U.S. Civil War. Lippmann also argues that the lack of a strong 
naval power to challenge the United Kingdom on the seas made most Americans take Anglo-American 
cooperation for granted in the absence of a formal treaty between the two powers. Ibid., p. 30-32. 
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Having paid suitable heed to the Founding Fathers and the supposed isolationist 
heyday of the nineteenth century, Lippmann again recounted his analysis of America' s 
experience in World War One, beginning with his argument that Wilson recognized the 
inherent threat a German triumph would pose to the critical Anglo-American relationship. 
He then suggested that the isolationist backlash of the interwar period stemmed from 
Americans' inability to come to grips with the realist logic ofthe United States' 
participation in the war and the resultant belief that all had been for naught. Instead of 
making the argument that entry into the war would preserve the Monroe Doctrine, Wilson 
chose "instead to base his decision upon the specific legal objection to unrestricted 
submarine warfare and upon a generalized moral objection to lawless and cruel 
aggression," with the result that Americans never really understood that they were 
fighting for their own self-interest43. 
Lippmann made his argument regarding World War One quite explicit in 
subsequent pages. He noted that the United States did not merely enter the conflict due to 
submarine warfare. During 1915 and 1916, this strategy elicited only protests from the 
United States. Not until it had become so successful as to threaten the starvation of 
Britain did the US government conclude that submarine warfare constituted a casus belli. 
Neither did the United States fight to preserve democracy, as the overthrow of the Kaiser 
did not constitute an essential American war aim. Regarding collective security, 
Lippmann argued that while the United States did not enter the war to create the League, 
voters would have embraced its creation if Wilson had simply argued that it would 
43 Ibid. , p. 32-34. 
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protect the gains America had reaped from victory44 . Here, then, modem readers can see 
a man who isolationists would lump into the "idealistic" camp eschewing the idealistic 
mantra of Wilsonian liberalism and basing American involvement in World War One, 
and implicitly its ongoing involvement in the Second World War, on the national interest 
of maintaining exclusive Anglo-American control ofthe Atlantic. This, according to his 
earlier points, represented the only true defense of the western hemisphere and the 
Momoe Doctrine. Certainly, this is a realistic argument originating from an 
internationalist writer. 
Next, Lippmann returned to his balance sheet metaphor to condemn isolationists. 
He noted that isolationists in general never sought to reduce American commitments such 
as the obligation to the Philippines or defense of the Momoe Doctrine and the Open Door 
in China. Yet, they sought to reduce the United States' ability to meet these commitments 
by opposing armaments and rejecting alliances with friendly powers that could assist the 
United States in upholding its obligations: 
They argued that only by doing nothing to save our present 
allies from defeat would we be able to stay out of war. .. 
They took this view because they felt confident that [the] 
continental United States could not be invaded, and they 
chose to ignore as a disagreeable anomaly the fact that 
American obligations extended to South America and to 
islands 7000 miles west of California. Isolationism, in other 
44 
"The United States did not go to war because it wished to found a League of Nations; it went to war in 
order to preserve American security. And when the war was over, the nation would almost certainly have 
accepted in some form or other the scheme of the League of Nations if President Wilson had been able to 
demonstrate to the people that the League would perpetuate the security won for them. Mr. Wilson failed to 
make this demonstration. He failed because in leading the nation to war he had failed to give the durable 
and compelling reasons for the momentous decision. The reasons he did give were legalistic and moralistic 
and idealistic reasons, rather than the substantial and vital reason that the security of the United States 
demanded that no aggressively expanding imperial power, like Germany, should be allowed to gain the 
mastery of the Atlantic Ocean." Ibid., p. 35-37. 
words, was based on a failure to appreciate the long-
established trans-oceanic commitments ofthe United 
States45. 
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Lippmann finally turned to matters of the present and future, beginning with an 
interesting parallel with a notable counterpart. As we have seen, Norman Angell argued 
that the primary interest even of avowedly pacifist states and governments was not peace, 
but security, for any state would fight to defend itself rather than submit to conquest in 
exchange for peace. Lippmann made a virtually identical argument, calling the idea of 
peace as the supreme national interest an "absurdity" and a "grave error". Lippmann 
preferred to shift the focus from peace to security, remarking, "A nation has security 
when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if 
challenged, to maintain them by war46." Lippmann then discussed the Wlisonian idea that 
states could unite by consent under the League umbrella without coercion as the thirteen 
colonies had done under the Constitution. The author noted that a minority had not shared 
this "Wilsonian" view, but instead favored an alliance of at least some of the great 
powers as the nucleus of the League. Lippmann indicated his agreement with these 
thinkers, and proceeded to detail the inapplicability of the analogy between the US 
Constitution and the League which influenced him to believe that an alliance between the 
WWI victors would have been necessary to ensure peace47• 
45 Ibid., p. 45-56. 
46 
"Ifthe logic of peace as the supreme national ideal leads to absurdity, then it must be a grave error to 
think and say that peace is the supreme end. For national ideals should not express amiable but 
unconsidered sentiments. They should express the serious purposes of the nation, and the vice ofthe 
pacifist ideal is that it conceals the true end of foreign policy. The true end is to provide for the security of 
the nation in peace and war ... A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests 
to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war." Ibid., p. 51-50. 
47 Ibid. , p. 71-75. 
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This conclusion again demonstrates the tendency to conceive of collective 
security and power balancing as occurring in tandem. Although Lippmann did not reject 
the idea of collective security, he envisioned an alliance of certain great powers as 
forming a type of inner core within a broader global organization. This concept displays 
similarities with that advanced by some of the British liberal realists who believed that 
some combination of Britain, France, the US and USSR could mark the first step toward 
a regeneration of collective security. Lippmann differed by endorsing the creation of a 
great power alliance and a collective security body simultaneously. His refusal to reject 
collective security out of hand may have stemmed from his view that the great powers 
shared such numerous and close connections that they would all eventually become 
involved in any conflict which originally involved only some ofthem48. He did, however, 
continue to reject the idea of regional or global federative structures, maintaining that the 
sovereign state was practically "unalterable"49 . 
In the next paragraph, Lippmann returned to a discussion of alliances, which he 
clearly emphasized over all other forms of organization for security. The essence of 
security, he argued, involved states rejecting isolation and "becoming members of an 
adequate combination. If they are entirely successful, the adequate alliance to which they 
belong will either be unchallenged, and they will have peace without fighting for it, or it 
will be invincible and they will have peace after a victorious war. To be one against the 
48 
"The fact of the matter is that the principal military powers form a system in which they must all be at 
peace or all at war. This is not a new and recent development in human affairs ... it has been the condition of 
American life since the European settlement of the New World. It is nothing but an illusion, fostered by the 
false reading of history, which has led so many ot think that America has ever been able to stay out of any 
great war in which there was at stake the order of power in the oceans which surround the Americas." Ibid., 
p. 97-98 . 
49 1bid., p. 106. 
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many is the danger, to be among the many against the one is security50." He therefore 
criticized British attempts at isolation, calling it a policy "we could not afford to follow". 
Lippmann, therefore, demonstrates that even while certain realists such as Herz 
advocated collective security from a power-centric perspective, enthusiasm for such a 
policy was not universal. Although Lippmann did not reject the League or its principles 
in general, he certainly preferred to rely on traditional alliances even within a collective 
security system. This suggests another sort of layered thinking different from that 
proposed by Brecht. Lippmann' s construct implies a reliance on a dual system of 
collective security with ironclad alliance commitments between likeminded great powers 
as a failsafe device in the event that the collective structure failed to function as intended. 
Whereas Brecht favored overlapping regional organizations operating on the same model, 
Lippmann promoted redundant organizations that did not adhere to the same logic. Herz, 
on the other hand, seemed to prefer straight collective security. The multifarious debate 
between ideas such as these amidst the height of global conflict indicates that a stark 
distinction between collective security and power balancing did not have universal, or 
even widespread appeal. It also demonstrates the extent to which the debate over systems 
for organizing global security cut across schools of thought in international relations. The 
realist Herz and the liberal Wright both rejected power balancing, while Herz' fellow 
realist, Lippmann, embraced the concept as having been an historically more reliable 
model than collective security. Though many of the arguments made by these writers 
reflected their stances from the interwar period, the increased acceptability of 
50 Ibid., p. 106. 
internationalism generated a considerably broader and richer discussion of security 
paradigms during the war years. 
Toward an Allied Victory 
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As the power of the Allies crested and their military fortunes improved, victory 
for the United Nations (at this point still another name for the numerous states arrayed 
against the Axis) became increasingly certain. Although many of the war's most costly 
battles occurred during the final years of the conflict, 1944 and 1945 saw foreign policy 
scholars and theorists turning even more attention to postwar security matters. Debate 
during this period became increasingly brisk and witnessed considerable variance 
between flashes of optimism and a growing appreciation for the implications of modem 
warfare, underscored by the advent of atomic weapons. 
Professor James Shotwell published another book during this period to argue in 
favor of collective security. Its title, The Great Decision, suggests the realization 
common to many writers that humanity and the discipline of international relations stood 
at a momentous crossroads and that the upcoming postwar settlement would have 
extreme consequences for the future. The course of WWII convinced Shotwell that 
collective security was more important than ever, particularly because the Second World 
War had proved even more destructive than the first. As he argued, even before the 
revelation of the atomic bomb, "From now on all war will be total war and therefore the 
preparation to meet it will also have to be total. This means that so long as the war system 
lasts it will not only denature the economic life of nations but will endanger all the 
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freedoms within them51 ." The effects ofthe two World Wars, he argued, had 
demonstrated that warfare itself was no longer a tool of state policy because its effects 
had gone beyond human control52 . His thoughts suggest the analogy of Frankenstein's 
monster having turned on its creator, and contradict the Clausewitzian creed that war is a 
mere appendage of politics. Indeed, Shotwell explicitly expresses this sentiment on the 
subsequent page, invoking Norman Angell to emphasize the futility of modem warfare53 . 
Having established the acute danger of modem warfare to the continuance of 
civilization, Shotwell turned to a discussion of why and how to best ensure the 
maintenance of peace in the future. He wrote that the blessings of freedom have been 
most highly developed in states that are the most geographically secure from attack, such 
as the United States and Britain. States that needed to provide large military 
establishments for their security have been more militaristic and less free. Therefore, he 
argued that because security and peace lead to increased liberty, the freedom-loving 
states of the world have it in their mutual interest to secure peace for themselves and 
others by acting in concert to prevent aggression. This was particularly true because 
"science" (i.e. the modem era) had made geography increasingly irrelevant for states that 
desire to maintain isolationism54. For Shotwell, the collective interest in global security 
51 Shotwell, James. The Great Decision. MacMillan, New York, 1944, p. v. 
52 
"If war is no longer a directable and controllable instrument of national policy, then it should be 
renounced. By a supreme paradox, the very extension of war to cover all the activities of life and to 
threaten all lives in the warring countries, is the chief reason for the otherwise almost incredible conclusion 
that the time has come to get rid of war itself." Ibid., p. 11. 
53 
"If, while the soldier is achieving his goal, the nation behind him is traveling, perhaps unconsciously, in 
another direction, then this oldest of all the instruments of politics should be discarded as inadequate and 
outworn. As a political device, war has become as capricious as a machine gun out of control, raining death 
and destruction on combatant and civilian alike. The conclusion is not unlike that of ... Sir Norman Angell." 
Ibid., p. 12. 
54 Ibid. , p. 88-89. 
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and the national interest in maintaining peace and freedom were one and the same. 
Democratic states could only ensure the safety of their frontiers and their systems of 
government by engaging internationally. 
Having earlier rejected the possibility of managing the international system 
through power balancing or by remaking the globe into a single super-state as 
impractical 55, Shotwell asserted that collective security on a model similar to the League 
provided the best hope of future tranquility. He did not, however, maintain extravagant 
hopes for the quick success of a renewed League, because, as he asserted, politics 
remained a matter of sentiment as much as practicality. In addition, as he had argued 
earlier in this book, the realist doctrine of armaments and power balancing had the length 
of human history behind them while collective security remained a novel concept. As we 
have seen, Lippmann's lack of faith in the previously unsuccessful concept of collective 
security encouraged his advocacy of power balancing as a secondary measure. But again 
Shotwell relied on the argument that this could not ensure peace, as threats from any 
quarter threatened global instability and thus could no longer be tolerated56. Shotwell 
nevertheless continued to defend state sovereignty, and proposed the creation of a system 
which would promote peaceful behavior and good global citizenship while preserving the 
integrity of state power. He suggested that a collective security system would serve to 
make this more feasible, as it would rely on the "conference method" in which states 
55 Ibid., p. vi. 
56 
"Nowhere in any country, including the United States, can the individual be wholly safe from attack 
when militarist nations are permitted to plot against the peace of the world. Pearl Harbor has made this fact 
sufficiently clear. The only real solution for the problem of security is to erect a quarantine against 
aggression by cooperative agreement between peace-loving nations; to create the machinery for the 
prevention of war and to make it work." Ibid., p. 94-95 . 
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could discuss their differences publicly and minimize any threat they might pose to 
peace 57 
It was through recognizing the failure of this very concept, however, that Shotwell 
finally turned to discuss the great decision he mentioned in the title. Though he admitted 
that the League and its conference model had failed before, he placed the blame squarely 
on the fascist powers that had actively sought its destruction. Though the League had 
been "too slow and undecided in the face of the rising storm of demagoguery", to accept 
that the failure of collective security was inevitable "would be surrendering everything to 
Fascist and Nazi ideology. Either we have to perfect the conference method as the 
outstanding instrument of peace, or we have to prepare for a third World War." The 
failure of international law in the past, Shotwell maintained, did not prove the bankruptcy 
of the law but rather underscored the need to create more effective methods for its 
enforcement. 
In summation, he maintained that mankind must find some way to make the 
machinery of diplomacy function toward peaceful ends. In the modem era, the 
alternatives are unthinkable, as the destructive power of war as it had currently 
developed, and would develop, threatened to destroy civilization. Even if this did not 
occur, the amount of effort required to maintain a modem war machine would necessitate 
the conversion of a critical mass of industry to war production, undermining individual 
quality oflife and threatening the spread ofmilitarism58 . For Shotwell, then, a renewed 
attempt to utilize the structure and logic of the League represented the best hope for 
57 Ibid., p. 96-97 and 108. 
58 Ibid. , p. 108-114. 
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humanity to steer a middle course between the fantastical dream of abrogating state 
sovereignty or continuing on the path of embracing military establishments which posed 
an increasingly greater threat to civilization itself. 
More support for the general principle of collective security came from University 
of Illinois professor Clarence Berdahl in the pages of the APSR, though he provided few 
details regarding the type of collective organization he preferred. His article also 
addressed the tension between realism and idealism as he sought to argue, as so many 
others had before him, that the two offered complimentary rather than contradictory paths 
to security. He began with an attack on the concept of anarchy, asserting that it had been 
rendered untenable by the outbreak and events of the Second World War. Only active 
participation in collective security could break the vicious cycle of great power conflict in 
an anarchic world59. The inability to recognize the link between suppressing conflict 
worldwide and ensuring American security had led to the failure of past attempts to 
mobilize support for collective security. Even in 1944, Berdahl lamented, some still 
maintained that American policy served only to support British interests, "as though we 
could possibly have let England fall and the British Navy surrender and yet ourselves 
hope to survive". Making his argument as explicit as possible, he wrote, "What I am 
trying to say is that the 'idealistic' motive of saving the world is thoroughly involved in 
the 'realistic' motive of saving the United States; one is actually as realistic as the other; 
59 
"On the whole, however, the inexorable course of events begun at Pearl Harbor, if not at Dunkirk, seems 
finally to have persuaded us as a people that anarchy does not pay internationally any better than nationally 
or locally, that if we do not wish to be represented on the battlefields we would better be represented in 
institutions that may somehow make recourse to the battlefields less necessary." Berdahl, Clarence A. "The 
Leadership of the United States in the Postwar World". The American Political Science Review, Vol. 38, 
No. 2 (Apr., 1944), p. 237. 
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neither is realistic without the other60." He criticized American participation in interwar 
affairs as half-hearted, and spent much of the remainder of the article extolling the virtues 
of"full participation". In one ofthe few details regarding the shape ofthe collective 
organization he envisioned, Berdahl warned that regional organizations would backfire 
on the United States, as it would only confirm the suspicions of America' s neighbors that 
Washington sought to dominate them. Furthermore, such a structure would only inspire 
more isolationist sentiment by reinforcing the belief that America's only interests lay in 
the western hemisphere61 . 
Another article in the APSR, written by Walter Sharp, also condemned the dead 
letter of isolationism in 1944. Sharp went a step further than Berdahl and Brecht, 
however, and proposed transferring Congress' power to declare war to a new 
international organization as a means of ensuring that the renewed mandate for collective 
security would function automatically. In addition, the need to automatically adhere to 
economic sanctions would also result in the reduction of Congress' power to regulate 
commerce. Such steps would also necessarily bring an end to the doctrine of neutrality, 
the great fear of interwar isolationists such as Borchard, Beard and Moore. Though he 
rejected the formation of an international police force or army as impractical, Sharp 
endorsed the formation of an international court62 . For all this to function, however, 
Sharp recognized the necessity of harmony among the great powers. "If they split apart", 
60 Ibid., p. 239. Berdahl cited quotations from Secretary Stimson to this effect, "' In the new international 
world .. . the basic idea is that war anywhere is of concern everywhere'" and Secretary Hull, who remarked, 
'"The promotion of peace, in no matter what part of the world, is of concern to all nations."' 
61 1bid., p. 241-247. 
62 Sharp, Walter R. "American Foreign Relations Within an Organized World Framework". The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 38, No. 5 (Oct., 1944), p. 932-936. 
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he warned, "the whole system will break down. At best, the world will then revert to a 
new balance of power situation, with the maintenance of peace a precarious thing indeed; 
at worst, another conflict on an inter-continental scale may be anticipated63 ." 
In the same issue, professor and future president of Columbia University Grayson 
L. Kirk echoed this sentiment, and published an article that indicated the prevalence of 
certain other ideas previously advanced by other authors, notably Walter Lippmann. 
Kirk's article began with an analysis of Anglo-American relations that followed 
Lippmann's account nearly to the letter, restating the view that supposedly traditional 
American foreign policy had developed in a world secured by the British Empire and its 
mighty fleet. Like Lippmann, Kirk also concluded that this fortunate set of circumstances 
had generated America's profound distaste for traditional forms of statecraft64 . The salad 
days of American isolationism, however, had been irretrievably lost: "Our involvement in 
two major wars within a quarter-century is a striking evidence that our world of the past 
has disappeared and that disaster may attend any effort on our part to insist that it still 
exists65 ." He noted, however, that American public opinion had finally embraced the idea 
that the national interest extended beyond the narrow confines of the western 
h . h 66 em1sp ere . 
According to Kirk, the new era of international relations would require 
collaboration between the great powers, including the British Empire. Such cooperation 
would remain necessary even in a future dominated by a global collective security 
63 Ibid., p. 936-937. 
64 Kirk, Grayson L. "Postwar Security for the United States". The American Political Science Review, Vol. 
38, No.5 (Oct., 1944), p. 945-946. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., p. 949. 
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organization. Though he viewed collective security as a step in the right direction, Kirk 
remained cognizant that a conflict between great powers would result in a third world war 
regardless of which security paradigm prevailed. Thus, political cooperation would 
remain of more importance than the structure of any future international organization 67. 
Happily, the three great powers could be expected to take the lead in resolving disputes in 
their areas of primary importance, such as the United States in the new world and the 
USSR in Eastern Europe. Such a regional structure would allow the future international 
organization to act more quickly. The author offered the example of a dispute between 
Romania and Bulgaria being easily mediated by Moscow68 . Such a plan, notably, 
suggests the creation of spheres of influence rather than collective security, and illustrates 
the short-lived era of good feelings which prevailed among certain authors during the 
zenith of the American-Soviet alliance. Kirk's analysis also contained another flaw; 
though he recognized that small states "are at the mercy oftheir larger neighbors69", his 
vision of benevolent moderation and regional dominance by the magnanimous great 
powers did not suggest what might occur in a conflict between a great power and a minor 
one. Regardless, Kirk concluded, "One thing, moreover, is clear. The days of indifference 
and improvisation have gone; the days of planned security are here70." 
The AAAPSS devoted an issue to the subject of postwar affairs in the summer of 
1944, entitled "Agenda for Peace". Two articles from this collection relate to the themes 
of this study, authored by famed Norwegian parliamentarian Carl Hambro and 
67 Ibid., p. 951. 
68 Ibid., p. 952. 
69 Ibid., p. 948. 
70 Ibid., p. 955 . 
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Philadelphia businessman and philanthropist Samuel Fels, founder of the University of 
Pennsylvania Institute of Government that bears his name71 . Hambro focused mostly on 
the importance of education in fostering a peaceful international climate, remarking, "as 
long as educators in practically every country believe it is their duty to teach their pupils, 
'My country, right or wrong,' there will always be wars. 72" This placed him alongside 
Norman Angell in emphasizing the importance of ideas and education in international 
affairs. For his part, Fels focused on collective security, for the first time (among the 
sources cited in this study) utilizing the term "United Nations" to refer to the future 
postwar international organization rather than the anti-Axis alliance. He called the United 
Nations the best hope of controlling humanity's propensity for conflict, and delineated 
ten steps he believed would limit future opportunities for conflict. These included 
entrusting the UN with the responsibility to prevent war and granting it the power to use 
force in doing so, making service to the United Nations the primary task of state 
militaries, placing the UN in charge of all weapons production worldwide, and allowing 
the defeated powers to join the UN at a later date73 . 
With regard to the partial or total absorption of state armed forces into the 
structure of the United Nations, Fels cited the historical precedent of amalgamating 
armies privately organized by aristocrats into state militaries: "Before ducal armies were 
71 http://www.fels.upenn.edu/history, accessed 17 November, 2011. 
72 Hambro, C. J. "How to Win The Peace". Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, VoL 234, Agenda for Peace (Jul. , 1944), p. 119. Hambro also noted that education itself could 
foster divisions between states, referring to a point of contention between the United States and Canada: "If 
one would compare, for instance, the version of the War of 1812 as taught in the schools of the state of 
New York and the state of Illinois with the version of the same war as taught in the neighboring provinces 
of Quebec and Ontario, one would refuse to believe that it could be the same war on the same continent" 
Ibid., p. 122. 
73 Fels, SamuelS. "We Can Abolish War". Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, VoL 234, Agenda for Peace (Jul., 1944), p. 127-129. 
388 
absorbed by those of the state, men were unable to contemplate nations untroubled by 
civil war. A similar elimination of national armies outside their borders would make the 
area of peace world-wide." Thus the UN should be allowed extensive control of state 
militaries, and states must not be allowed to be the judge of their own cause74. According 
to Fels, organizing world military power on a global rather than a national basis would 
extend this precedent, and "free the world for all time from the hoary threat and the 
needless waste of battle and sudden death 75 ." 
Predictably, Edwin Borchard did not accept any of this reasoning. Remaining true 
to his frequently expressed principles, Borchard continued to excoriate collective security 
in a 1944 article that recapitulated virtually every point he made in International Law 
since his article of July, 1933. In keeping with his previous description of war as a 
disease and not a crime76, Borchard complained "It thus seems likely that the punitive 
theory of 'peace enforcement' will again be tried, as against the more profound effort to 
deal with war as a disease . . . which must be treated with psychological understanding by 
a concert of nations looking not for 'criminal' nations but for that physical distress which 
evokes demands for change77 ." Once more, Borchard tied the concept of "peace 
enforcement" to the belief in a parallel between municipal and international law, citing a 
finding ofthe New York Bar Association to this effect. He argued yet again that the 
differences between the power of an individual living in a centralized state and the power 
74 Ibid., p. 129. 
75 Ibid., p. 131. 
76 Borchard, Edwin. "Neutrality and Unneutrality". The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, 
No. 4 (Oct., 1938), p. 778, 
77 Borchard, Edwin. "Flaws in Post-War Peace Plans". The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 
38. No. 2 (Apr. , 1944), p . 284. 
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of a state on the international stage rendered such comparisons frivolous 78 • He 
condemned what he called a "force system", a substitute term for collective security, as 
"a war system. Its mere existence forecloses security and proves the absence of security." 
The whole concept of enforcement had no place in a world of sovereign nations, and 
attempts to impose more legal strictures into political affairs risked the destruction of 
what modest progress had been made over the years toward introducing legal 
mechanisms in international affairs 79• 
All of these points had appeared in Borchard's previous writings. He reprised yet 
another of his arguments by continually maintaining that states could not lend the weight 
of law to simply upholding the status quo, and that the "epithet" of "aggressor" had no 
place in the international legal lexicon. Furthermore, he once again insisted that the idea 
of sanctions involves "a whole flood of evils" and was "a device never heretofore 
dreamed of by statesmen really believing in peace"80. The only adaptation of his 
argument to the dramatic changes in international affairs that had taken place since 1941 
took the form of his call for the establishment of a global political organization to wait 
until after a level of cooperation has been reached that would prompt states to seek 
organization, rather than having it forced upon them. His conclusion, however, was a 
familiar one: collective security, he warned, was a "presently unachievable rainbow" and 
the quest for it "has produced an unprecedented assault on international law and helped to 
make international relations well-nigh hopeless81". In a world tom asunder by war and 
78 Ibid., p. 285. 
79 Ibid., p. 285-286. 
80 Ibid., p. 287-288. 
81 Ibid., p. 289. 
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facing remarkable new challenges, Borchard's writings of the war years displayed a 
remarkable ability to remain steadfast in support of his deeply-held beliefs regarding the 
nature of international relations. Against the backdrop of increasing support for collective 
security that manifested itself in the writings of many other authors of the late war period, 
Borchard appears as a latter-day king Knute amidst the rising tide of fervor for a global 
security organization. 
Frederick Schuman returned to the discussion of international affairs in early 
1945 with another article in the American Political Science Review. It provided an 
interesting interpretation of the Federal Union idea with an emphasis on Streit's concept 
of enforcing international law at the individual rather than the state level. Schuman's 
explication of this theory provides important insight into this piece of logic so essential to 
the world federation ideal, as well as another example of wartime criticism of state 
sovereignty. The author began by drawing a parallel with the past and remarked that the 
debate about post-WWII international order reflected that which had occurred at the 
conclusion of the Great War; both involved a discussion of means rather than ends82. 
The end, of course, was that of global peace. But before considering any of the 
proposed means of securing this goal, Schuman embarked on a short detour into the 
critical subject of international and municipal law. He complained, like Borchard, that 
plans for international government tended to ignore the differences between making law 
for members of a society and making law for members of the international state system: 
"That two things utterly dissimilar should have come to be widely regarded as one and 
82 Schuman, Frederick L. "The Dilemma of the Peace-Seekers". The American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 39, No. 1 (Feb., 1945), p. 12. 
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the same thing is doubtless a tribute to the anthropomorphic deification of the nation-state 
in modem times83 ." In addition to the dramatic difference in the level of power possessed 
by states and individuals, Schuman noted the additional factor that states enjoyed the 
support oftheir citizens, making enforcement of international law against states doubly 
difficult. To support this conclusion, Schuman drew upon various remarks by America's 
founders that compelling obedience by force against states is a poor idea and a recipe for 
disaster84. 
Returning to the analysis of schemes for achieving global security, Schuman 
rejected the creation of a single world state or the creation of a federation in which 
individuals would possess dual citizenship between their homeland and some sort of 
global sovereignty as impossibilities. He believed that a federation of states without the 
creation of such dual nationality offered the best possibility of success. This federation 
would create global law focused not on states, but on individuals. "Within its designated 
area, it would prevail over national or municipal law in cases of conflict" involving a 
world court to adjudicate disputes. In this way, international law would be executed 
against individuals- ostensibly the leaders or the potential leaders of states -rather than 
against the states themselves. This would negate the challenge of corralling a wayward 
state and deescalate the risk of war, "the armed coercion of individuals defying federal 
authority is a wholly different process from the armed clash of states. In the difference 
83 Ibid., p. 16. 
84 1bid., p. 17-18. 
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lies the measure of the progress away from anarchy and toward government which 
federalism represents85." 
State sovereignty represented the natural stumbling block to such a paradigm 
shift. If his preference for an international court to pass judgment on wrongdoers 
suggested the author' s low regard for sovereignty, his words provided ample 
confirmation: "in this name [of sovereignty] the human adventurers along the valley of 
war have turned their faces back to the unholy altar of anarchy." He called sovereignty a 
"sinister deity with shining brow and feet of clay86" . Though Schuman clearly preferred 
to see the demise of complete sovereignty, his usual pessimism, or perhaps acute realism, 
led him to the realization that such an outcome would not follow in the wake of the 
Second World War thanks to "narrow possibilities accruing from decisions already 
reached87". 
Future stability, therefore, depended on cooperation between the great powers. 
Schuman included Great Britain in this exclusive group, resulting in a vision of the future 
in design and constitution virtually identical to the one Grayson Kirk presented in the 
APSR the previous year. Collaboration between the relatively few great powers offered 
the greatest hope of peace and would, Schuman maintained, distinguish the coming 
postwar era from earlier periods when a multiplicity of great powers existed. "What is 
important and immutable is that America, Britain, and the Soviet Union will together rule 
85 Ibid., p. 20-21. 
86 Ibid., p. 22. 
87 
"The politics of the months and years ahead will be rigidly delimited by the narrow possibilities accruing 
from decisions already reached. There will be no world federation after World War II. There will be no 
world state. There will be no world order based on an association of sovereignties, keeping the peace 
through the coercion of states by all other states; for an association so founded and so dedicated can neither 
succeed nor endure." Ibid. , p. 24. 
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the world or, failing this, will make the world a vast arena of rivalry and conflict88." 
Should the great powers act in unison, no combination of other powers could stand 
against them, and if they conflicted with each other, no possible combination could 
maintain peace. 
Therefore, "The unity of the Three is the foundation of the only temple of peace 
which can now be built." If they cannot come together at the heart of the new 
international organization, "the new League will be no more effective than the old." 
Making binding commitments between the big three would be indispensable. If they are 
free to cooperate on an ad-hoc basis, "their relations will differ in no significant respect 
from what they were in the 1930s89." Such cooperation would require each ofthe major 
powers to respect each other's security demands within a recognized area. Decrying this 
as "immoral" or "power politics" undermined the critical basis of cooperation. An 
ironclad alliance between Washington, London and Moscow had become imperative. 
Schuman compared this proposed alliance between the great powers to the Congress of 
Vienna, which despite the criticism it received, he argued, maintained peace between the 
great powers for approximately forty years. He concluded with the remark that such an 
accomplishment in modem times would be a great success, "the highest service to 
mankind"90. 
Schuman' s article demonstrates, as do so many other works of this period, an 
intriguing blend of realism and idealism. His distaste for sovereignty, the foundation 
88 Ibid., p. 25. 
89 Ibid., p. 26-28. 
90 Ibid., p. 28-30. 
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stone of state power politics, remained eminently clear throughout "The Dilemma of the 
Peace-Seekers". Yet Schuman's realism, demonstrated by his 1934 article proposing a 
great power alliance to contain the Third Reich, ultimately shone through. Although he 
personally favored the rejection of sovereignty and the formation of some sort of loose 
federation based on a new interpretation of international law applied to individuals rather 
than states, he admitted this remained outside the realm of possibilities. Thus, he retreated 
to his earlier position of support for great power collaboration. This itself reflected a 
duality of thought. On one hand, Schuman drew upon an appreciation for realist 
conceptions of power to argue that a concert of Britain, America and the USSR need fear 
no external assailant and would be able to maintain peace in their respective spheres of 
influence. Conversely, he placed an emphasis on international cooperation that was 
evidently liberal in nature. This type of conceptual enlightened self-interest on behalf of 
the major powers is, again, difficult to categorize with reference to the supposed 
dichotomy of liberalism and realism. 
While the simultaneously optimistic and pessimistic Schuman admitted that 
sovereignty would persist in the postwar world, more evidence of the concerted assault · 
on the concept emerged in another APSR article two months later. While based on a 
theoretical analysis of the subject rooted in Locke's discourse on the state of nature, 
Hunter College professor Margaret Spahr' s "Sovereignty Under Law" encapsulated 
numerous modem perspectives on the undesirability of strict national sovereignty. The 
author began by investing sovereignty with a dual definition of authority within one' s 
territory and equality among states, even those that had highly unequal amounts of 
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power. To this she added a third component, that of "liberty", which she called "the well-
nigh insuperable obstacle in attempts to organize sovereign states into a system of 
international law and order." This extended even to freedom from the judgment of an 
impartial tribunal involving questions of whether states had fulfilled their freely 
contracted obligations to one another91 . 
Turning to the analysis of Hobbes and Locke, Spahr noted that the author of 
Leviathan did not extend his condemnation of the state of nature to a rejection of 
interstate anarchy, but beginning a heavy reliance on James Shotwell ' s The Great 
Decision, she quoted Shotwell's words that in the modem era '"absolute, unqualified and 
unchecked sovereignty is a conception of anarchy. "' Going a step further, she 
approvingly quoted the words of another author who wrote,'" When Total War is the 
price ofTotal Sovereignty, the price is too high92. " ' Spahr continued with her survey of 
contemporary anti-sovereignty thought with a lengthy quotation from the late Wendell 
Willkie regarding the conflict between the profession of the Republican and Democratic 
parties to uphold sovereignty while promoting a global security organization, which 
Willkie thought contradictory and reflective of'" cowardice",93 . 
Spahr argued that this contradiction between sovereignty and cooperation existed 
only if Hobbes' broad definition of sovereignty were applied to states. On the other hand, 
a Lockian appreciation for the distinction between '" liberty"' and '" license'" would 
91 Spahr, Margaret. "International Affairs: Sovereignty Under Law: A Possible Redefinition of Sovereignty 
in Light of Locke's Theory of Liberty." The American Political Science Review, Vol. 39, No.2 (Apr. , 
1945), p. 350-351. 
92 The latter words derive from Princeton professor Edward Samuel Corwin' s 1944 work The Constitution 
and World Organization. Ibid., p. 351-352. 
93 Ibid. 
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harmonize the desire to maintain the independence of states with the goal of forcing them 
to adhere to a modicum of responsible conduct. Regarding Locke's distinction between 
freedom and deleterious recklessness, Spahr inquired, "Why should we not make a 
similar distinction between·'sovereign independence' and 'Hitlerism?'" She noted that 
Shotwell had done just that in The Great Decision when he argued that "'No civilized 
nation is free to do whatever it wants to without regard to the rights of other nations ... 
Every government knows that it is a member of a community of nations with well 
recognized rules of conduct, and it is subject to the obligations in order to be entitled to 
the advantages of this membership94. "' 
Spahr finally connected this concept with Locke's Second Treatise on Civil 
Government, and its provision that mankind can only prevent freedom from leading to 
self-destruction by the provision of"'an established, settled, known law, received and 
allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong"', as well as the need 
for impartial judges and enforcement mechanisms to put power behind such laws95 . Spahr 
concluded with a lengthy quotation of Locke, leaving readers with the clear implication 
that a replication of his balance between freedom, justice, and the enforcement thereof on 
the international level would create for states the same felicitous combination of freedom 
and security enjoyed by ordinary citizens in states. Thus, in addition to providing yet 
more evidence of the zeal for moderating or abrogating the concept of sovereignty that 
flourished in the closing years of World War Two, Spahr's analysis- or recitation- of 
Locke's words suggest her own approval of international law, an international court to 
94 Ibid. , p. 352-353. 
95 Ibid. , p. 354-355. 
397 
adjudicate disputes, and an international police force to enforce its rulings. Her attempt to 
bring Locke into the modem international sphere, then, appears to constitute yet another 
endorsement of radically revising the Westphalian ideal of state sovereignty. 
In the last months of the war, Clyde Eagleton published a full exposition of the 
modernist, internationalist creed in his book The Forces That Shape Our Future. He 
immediately addressed the importance of interdependence, and the United States' unique 
relationship to the emergent phenomenon that connected the world through the industrial 
revolution. "The United States," he wrote, "felt the effects ofthis conflict between rugged 
individualism and economic interdependence more slowly than did many other peoples", 
but were coming to comprehend its meaning in the wake of the Second World War. To 
Eagleton, this meant that, "We are beginning to see that the succession of wars and 
economic disasters is not entirely due to the stupidity of others, and to understand that 
there is something deeper at work96." The same was true of the international community 
as a whole, which had been brought to recognition of interdependence by the Great 
Depression and by improved rapid communications technology97. Resultantly, "even if 
we should wish it, we would not be permitted to live alone. Other peoples depend upon 
us, and they will not permit us to exclude them from the great resources which 
geographical luck has placed within our boundaries98." 
96 Eagleton, Clyde. The Forces That Shape Our Future. New York University Press, New York, 1945, p. 9. 
97 Ibid., p. 22. Interestingly, this preceded to an investigation of trade in the next few pages that closely 
reflected Norman Angell's analysis of 1912. In it, Eagleton described the division oflabor and the 
numerous exchanges that needed to occur to facilitate a delivery of milk from a New York dairy farm to a 
home in New York City. This description was very similar to Angell ' s illustration of raw materials 
~roduction and refinement from the original version of The Great Illusion. 
8 Ibid., p. 26. 
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The web of international trade and communication links had become so critical, 
Eagleton argued, that it demanded a legal system for its protection. He called the "now 
despised balance-of-power theory . .. a step in this direction", followed by the collegial 
Concert system which moderated conflicts largely without war. The League had been 
another phase in the evolution of this system, and "What is needed now- and again it is 
no long jump, but the logical next step- is to make the law against war effective99." 
Again, the forces of modem technology had effected an overwhelming change in the 
dynamics of international relations for, without restraint, modem warfare threatened to 
become "totalitarian, universal and permanent". The totality of modem war, and the 
importance of ordinary citizens and workers to the war effort, had conspired to create a 
situation in which none could remain immune to the threats posed by conflict. Neutrality 
had therefore become "clearly obsolete" because war had become by nature so 
destructive, widespread and difficult to localize that it consumed "state after state like 
lava from a volcano"100. 
Injecting a dash of morality into his argument, Eagleton claimed that "In 
principle, an attitude of neutrality is immoral; it is the duty of a good citizen to prevent 
the use of force, and to uphold right against wrong. But, aside from this, the development 
of war into its modem character has wrecked neutrality as a practical possibility, and 
forced us into consideration of altematives101 ." Thus, while pausing to argue that 
neutrality was not conscionable, he remained mostly rooted in the concept that neutrality 
99 Ibid., p. 27-28, 
100 Ibid, p. 30-40. 
101 Ibid., p. 41. 
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had become impossible due to the march of technological progress. The economic 
demands of modem total war, in addition, had become so extensive that they threatened 
to subsume the whole economy and destroy it so utterly that war had become a threat to 
the very survival ofhumanity102. Furthermore, America's traditional geographic 
advantage of remoteness from sources of danger had been eroded by airpower, and the 
United States could no longer afford to ignore European politics. He referred to 
isolationism as "wishful thinking" 103. 
Though Eagleton rejected what he called the popular idea of establishing an 
international police force, he envisioned a stark shift for American foreign policy: "We 
don't like alliances, but we shall be dependent upon them; we refuse commitments, but 
we shall have to make them104." He pivoted to use ofthe analogy of municipal and 
international law, remarking that as with violence in state society, humanity may hope to 
limit war and punish such outbreaks as may occur within the international state society, a 
direct contradiction of isolationist authors who argued precisely the opposite. The fust 
step in Eagleton's plan would naturally involve the creation of ironclad international 
law105 . Though he believed in the impracticability of creating an international police 
force, he recognized that some sort of international reaction to aggression must be 
planned and enabled to act immediately without waiting for a judgment to be passed on 
102 Ibid. , p. 54-55 and 91-92. 
103 
"At the beginning of our history, we were full of reaction against and dislike for Europe, from whose 
tyrannies and privilege we had fled, and we would have nothing to do with her; today; whether we like it or 
not, our destinies are inextricably tied in with those of Europe - only a glimpse at the past three decades is 
proof enough. Once upon a time we could be neutral, but we know now that no one can escape modem 
war. The world has crowded in upon us, bringing frictions and dangers of all sorts, and upsetting the 
formerly solid foundations of our foreign policy." Ibid., p. 95-96 and 99. 
104 Ibid., p . 100 and 104-105. 
105 Ibid., p. 104-107. 
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the identity of the aggressor. The force must act like a policeman in separating the 
disputants and leave it to a court later to adjudicate which side was at fault. Brimming 
with optimism, Eagleton exclaimed, "There will be great difficulties, numerous problems, 
but Americans have always been able to make their dreams come true; if they really want 
an international order strong enough to control war, they can have it106!" Echoing the 
analysis offered by Spahr, Eagleton wrote that by relinquishing the freedom to make war, 
states would gain freedom from the fear of war. He described this as analogous to the 
individual who gives up his rights to do as he pleases in order to gain the security of 
1. . . . d 107 1vmg man orgamze state . 
Eagleton next described the form he believed an international organization would 
take. It would be universal, but subdivided on regionallines108. Most importantly, it 
would possess greater enforcement capabilities than the League, which had seen its 
reasonable arbitration mechanism ignored due to Geneva' s failure to persuade member 
states to enforce the decisions it might make. Presumably, enforcement would become 
the task of the vague force structure Eagleton had already discussed. However, for this 
scheme to function effectively, states would above all accept and honor binding 
obligations to use force in the event of a breach of the peace. This would allow the new 
organization to steer a middle course between ineffective voluntary commitments and an 
overpowering world police which would undermine state sovereignty109. The author thus 
revealed that he continued to view an international police force as impractical and, more 
106 Ibid. , p. 116. 
107 Ibid. , p. 118-119. 
108 Ibid., p. 121-123. 
109 Ibid, p. 140-151. 
401 
importantly, undesirable. His interpretation suggests creating a mandatory response by 
state militaries in the event of conflict. He expressed his hope that such a system would 
not be "too radical or strong to be feared and rejected by nations at their present stage of 
thinking. If it is too much for acceptance by Americans and others, it will be a sad 
fl . th . . 11" 110 " re ectwn upon eu mte 1gence . 
Eagleton attached great importance to the survival of the "United Nations", again 
used in this context to refer to the wartime alliance rather than the international 
organization inaugurated later that year at San Francisco. He believed that the bonds of 
alliance between the Allied powers would provide fertile territory for the growth of 
postwar global governance. These hopes for goodwill were reliant upon the text of the 
Moscow Declaration, in which the Allies pledged that, "they will not employ their 
military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in 
this declaration and after joint consultation111 ." Though the author doubted the 
possibility of forging an alliance with the Kremlin, he wrote that it would be best to avoid 
facing the USSR in a balance-of-power system. Rather, it would be "much better to be 
able to think of her as a fellow member in a general international system than to think of 
her as either ally or as foe 112." 
A corollary of this conclusion was Eagleton's fear that even if the victors of the 
war formulated an alliance among themselves, a rival bloc would eventually emerge to 
challenge it. Universality would be crucial113 . Therefore, the Allies should make defmite 
110 Ibid., p. 151. 
111 Ibid., p. 154. 
112 Ibid., p. 157. 
113 Ibid., p. 161. 
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commitments to one another regarding their postwar conduct and continued close 
association while they retained the close working relationship fostered by the war114. 
Finally, Eagleton recognized the importance of the contemporary debate over the 
question of sovereignty, but declined to issue his own ruling on the subject, remarking 
that nobody could proclaim an answer with absolute confidence. He remained agnostic, 
writing that certain forms of control might best fall under international bodies, and others 
should be retained by state governments according to best functional practices115 . 
The Birth of a New Era, or Cold Dawn? 
Expressing a dominant optimism about the future of global organization and 
security, the American academic elite witnessed the end of World War Two with 
considerable satisfaction. Internationalists had reason to express approval: though the 
destruction of the previous four years had been severe indeed, America' s wartime 
experience had hopefully banished the shibboleth of isolationism, and for the first time in 
the 20th century the world's great powers seemed to be working in a spirit of harmony. 
This, of course, had much to do with the utter, comprehensive defeat of the great powers 
that had begun the war and the concomitant reduction of the exclusive club's membership 
to that of the dominant Allied nations. With the establishment of the United Nations in 
July 1945, global cooperation seemed the order of the day, and with the hindsight gained 
from the disastrous train of events that had unfolded since the auspicious signing of the 
114 
"While the wartime psychology of cooperation and willing sacrifice is still with us, we should commit 
ourselves by definite pledges and by positive acts of justice and friendship to continuation of this joint 
effort and organization for the permanent purposes of peace." Ibid., p. 163. 
liS Ibid., p. 174. 
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Kellogg-Briand Pact, internationalists placed their hopes in the idea that Americans and 
their allies had finally learned the value of international cooperation. Even power politics 
had been safely domesticated. International Law contributor Herbert W. Briggs noted 
that power calculations had been turned to the benefit of the nascent United Nations -
now the name of a concrete organization rather than shorthand for the dozens of Allied 
powers. The ideal of sovereignty, he wrote, had always conflicted with the disparities 
between small and large powers. Happily, the United Nations had dealt with this matter 
by entrusting the enforcement of global security to the states that actually possessed the 
necessary strength to moderate conflict: the United States, the Soviet Union and the 
British Empire116. With the promise ofharmony among the victors of World War Two, 
the future was bright. 
This optimism did not long endure, or perhaps had never been shared by all. 
Withirl months, deep fissures had already begun to appear in the facade of Allied 
solidarity. In Aprill946, scarcely a year since the demise of Hitler, even internationalist 
writers such as University of Wisconsin professor Pitman B. Potter had begun to express 
serious reservations about the direction of great power relations. Writing in International 
Law, Potter warned that the west's diplomacy with the Soviet Union might be undergoing 
a transformation that would render it much like Anglo-German relations of the interwar 
years117. The subtext of this analysis needs no explication. Potter thus began his 
investigation for "The Alternative to Appeasement", the title ofhis article, in the hope of 
116 Briggs, Herbert W. "Power Politics and International Organization". The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 39, No.4 (Oct., 1945), p. 664-666 and 678. 
117 Potter, Pitman B. "The Alternative to Appeasement". The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 
40, No. 2 (Apr. , 1946), p. 394. 
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extracting the lesson of British failures to inhibit German expansion and prevent the 
outbreak of the late war. He began with an attempt to demonstrate the propriety of 
reasonable conciliation, denying that Germany had no legitimate demands in the wake of 
Versailles, and calling rejection of the idea that "peaceful change" was sometimes 
necessary "an untenable ... dangerous" point of view. Sounding much like Edwin 
Borchard, he commented that many who opposed supposedly peaceful change 
unnecessarily disparaged the possibility of achieving stability "through the processes of 
inquiry, discussion and consent". Opponents of appeasement, he complained, often acted 
with equal intransigence and contributed to diplomatic impasses in equal measure to 
• • . 118 
reviswmst states . 
Despite this criticism of defending the status quo too staunchly, Potter revealed 
himself as no friend of appeasement in general. He noted a profusion of problems with 
the approach that had become all too clear in the years since 1936. These drawbacks 
included a lack of justice toward the losing states, and the probability that "the making of 
concessions becomes a headlong capitulation". Also, the demands of states reflect their 
interests, not law. As a result, the desire to make demands of neighbors might cascade 
from one state to the next, undermining the entire status quo and creating "a general 
collapse of international morale, leading to that very outbreak of war which it was sought 
to avoid, especially if the aggressive state is willing, as is likely to be the case, to go that 
far 119". With these flaws given consideration, Potter rejected the substitution of 
118 1bid., p. 394-395. 
119 Ibid., p. 396. 
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preventive war against troublesome states120. Standing up to appeasement with bluster 
might cause the potential aggressor to back down if he was only bluffing, but might also 
lead down the path of mutual recriminations with a high potential to spark a war121 . 
The world community, then, found itself on the horns of a dilemma. Appeasement 
must be abandoned, but such a rejection must include a repudiation of preventive war as a 
means of reducing tensions and calming potential aggressors. Conversely, opposition to 
unreasonable demands must include "a refusal to give any aid, economic or other, so long 
as the aggressive state maintains its unreasonable demands or its antisocial actions". 
Thus, Potter concluded, a "firm but quiet" attitude toward resolving the matter must be 
expressed, buttressed by a capable level of military power to contain the threat if 
necessary. An escalating spectrum of reprisals may be undertaken if confronted with an 
expansionistfait accompli. Most importantly, echoing Arnold-Forster' s analysis of the 
previous decade, Potter maintained that emphasis must be placed on the process as well 
as the outcome122. Potter, therefore, essentially advocated negotiation from a position of . 
strength vis-a-vis the potential adversary, in this case the Soviet Union. Such a stance fit . 
squarely within the realm oftraditional statecraft and offered nothing revolutionary. His 
warning, however, in particular its reference to the USSR, demonstrates that only a few 
short months after the climax of what many interpreted as great power cooperation, the 
American academic elite was awakening to the realities of early Cold War conflict. The 
120 He called preventive war, "unduly extreme, unnecessarily extravagant, almost a counsel of despair ... it 
is the typical hasty ' solution' proposed by the military 'mind."' Ibid. , p. 396. 
121 Ibid., p. 397 . 
122 Ibid., p. 397-398. 
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heyday of tripartite great power harmony, if it ever existed, had already come to an 
abrupt end. 
The Swiss William Rappard reappeared in the pages of an American j oumal with 
a 1946 publication in the APSR. He considered some of the challenges posed by the 
organization of the United Nations and addressed certain gaps that remained in Brecht's 
APSR article of 1943. From the outset, the longtime League advocate emphasized the 
great power dominance of the UN, including the witty quip that "The United Nations 
Organization is an essentially American product, as the jeep or the atomic bomb123 . "' He 
also discussed at length the extent to which Europeans had lost their previous dominance 
of global politics, contrary to previous assertions by other authors that Great Britain 
would remain a major power in the postwar world. He described the UN primarily as an 
organization of the victors "united to protect themselves and, only quite incidentally, the 
rest of the world against any possible new aggression124". 
Rappard also argued that the UN was highly hierarchical, as it "places the five 
Great Powers above the law laid down for the others". Addressing the important 
contemporary discussion of sovereignty, he suggested that the ability of the Security 
Council to decide on matters of war and peace significantly compromised the sovereignty 
of the many small states not represented on it. In return there were few, if any, ironclad 
guarantees of their security against aggression by one of the five permanent Security 
Council members or by a power supported by them 125 . In this way Rappard addressed a 
123 Rappard, William E. "International Affairs: The United Nations as Viewed from Geneva". The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 40, No.3 (Jun., 1946), p. 545. 
124 Ibid., p. 548. 
125 Ibid. , p. 548-549. 
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concern that Brecht's vision of strictly regional security organizations ignored. For 
Rappard, however, this possible flaw in the UN system had its advantages. He noted that 
had the Covenant of the League offered unrestricted action to the great powers, or as he 
called it the "impunity of all dangerous aggressors", it might have gained ratification in 
the US Senate and consequently prevented World War Two. For this reason, he called the 
immunity of the great powers a blessing in disguise, particularly if it heralded the death 
knell of American isolationism126. 
Edwin Borchard's preferred candidate for the presidency, the socialist Norman 
Thomas, published an intriguing book in 194 7 which demonstrated that serious 
differences had emerged between the author and his arch-isolationist supporter. Appeal to 
the Nations contains an enlightening account of Thomas' journey from isolationism to 
internationalism in view of his socialist perspective. In the introduction, Thomas related 
that he adhered to the isolationist perspective prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, recounting 
his belief that America "could best serve her sons, and in the long run the world, by 
keeping out of war". Operation Barbarossa only reinforced this perspective, he said, as it 
led him to believe that the European war offered the continent only a choice between 
dictators. After the Japanese attack on Hawaii, he came to the conclusion that the global 
conflict, "left us, I felt, only a choice between circles ofhell", the worst of which was the 
potential victory of fascism. He therefore advocated "critical support" for the war while 
d d o 0 kl "bl 127 eman mg peace as qmc y as poss1 e . 
126 Ibid., p. 551. 
127 Thomas, Norman. Appeal to the Nations. Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1947, p. xi-xii. 
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In the aftermath of World War Two, Thomas proclaimed isolationism a thing of 
the past as it clearly no longer meant security for the United States due to the creation of 
the atomic bomb and the destruction of Europe's balance of power. Elaborating on the 
second of these points, Thomas provided an insightful critique of power balancing and 
certain alternatives as platforms for organizing global security. Thomas believed that the 
European balance of power, "which, rather than on the outgoing friendliness of Great 
Britain and the power of its Navy- Walter Lippmann to the contrary notwithstanding", 
had preserved American isolation. Inter-European squabbling, above all, had kept the 
United States safe from attack128• In the context ofthis study, it is worth considering that 
Thomas' belief is not incompatible with Lippmann's point regarding the importance of 
Britain's naval supremacy. Lippmann never explicitly denied that European power 
balancing played an important role in America' s ability to remain in relative isolation. He 
had only argued that Britain's ability to prevent strife in Europe from spilling over into 
the New World contributed significantly to American security. For Lippmann, London's 
role in preserving and containing the European balance, not British hegemony, was of 
signal importance. 
Regardless, Thomas rejected the possibility of establishing postwar American 
policy on the basis of power balancing. The reduction of all European powers save for the 
USSR had destroyed the world balance of power, which he interpreted as a strictly 
multipolar phenomenon rather than a possible interpretation of great power relations in a 
128 Ibid., p. 2-3. 
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bipolar world129• Having rejected the vision of the nascent Cold War duopoly as a 
balance-of-power system, Thomas analyzed the current state of global affairs. He also 
indulged in criticism of the principle of sovereignty, defending nationalism as a principle 
but condemning "the absurdity implicit in sovereignty which puts national states above 
the morallaw"130. He also offered a strikingly incisive analysis of why the promise of 
postwar great power cooperation, envisioned by so many only a few short years before, 
had come to naught. Although a common threat could unify powers with otherwise 
disparate interests, "the more complete the victory, the greater will be the disunity over 
the division of spoils or the reordering of the world 131 ." The Marxian origin of such a 
conclusion is undeniable, echoing many socialist and communist denunciations of the 
First World War and its outcome. Yet, it also offers a plainly realistic approach to the 
nature of international relations in which states that had endured a singularly destructive 
and costly war would consequently adopt a selfish, mutually suspicious and defensive 
mentality. Among the authors in this study, only the socialist, formerly isolationist 
Thomas provided such a straightforward explanation for the postwar retrenchment of the 
two surviving great powers into a posture of mutual suspicion and conflict. 
Yet, like so many other analysts ofthe period, Thomas never adhered to a 
singularly realist or liberal perspective at any point. Considering what he perceived as the 
inability of the UN to address contemporary sources of if,lstability, he noted the threat to 
collective security posed by the organization's weakness in the face of great powers' 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid., p. 26 . 
131 Ibid, p. 27. 
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potential willingness to defy it. He cited the "present high degree of military preparedness 
in all countries" as proof that the United Nations' members were setting the organization 
up for failure 132. As an alternative, he considered the formation of a federal world 
government along the lines of Clarence Streit's proposal, calling the idea a theoretically 
promising but practically impossible one. He based this conclusion on the deep 
differences which remained between states, and on the unsuitability of "Our current and 
highly imperfect democracy, heavily colored by elements of imperialism" as a basis for 
"the union on which a sure and lasting peace depends 133". 
Though he believed that the United Nations might not successfully restrain 
aggressors, Thomas criticized "self-proclaimed 'realists"' who advocated preventive war 
against the USSR. He based this criticism on their failures to articulate how the United 
States would administer an occupation of the Soviet Union after the prophesied American 
victory, or how Washington could command any moral status in the world after utilizing 
the atomic bomb to obliterate Soviet cities in a preventive attack. Considering the 
dilemma addressed by Potter, Thomas also condemned the possibility of employing an 
appeasement policy with regard to the Soviet Union: 
132 Ibid., p. 33. 
133 Ibid. , p. 49-54. 
But if preventive war would be a monstrous folly, so would 
be its opposite: the continued appeasement of the Soviet 
Union in 'the spirit of Teheran and Yalta,' once so dear to 
American communists ... except for deliberate aggression 
against the U.S.S.R., appeasement is the surest single way 
to war. Terrible as preventive war would be ... the war into 
which we should probably blunder by appeasement in later 
decades, after the Soviet Union has built up its strength, 
would be even more terrible in its destructiveness134. 
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Thomas' conclusion, however, was starkly different from that of Potter. Whereas Potter 
called for traditional policy formation from a position of relative strength, Thomas 
resolved that "The best- more probably, the only- hope for peace lies in an appeal to the 
nations for general disarmament and the liquidation of all forms of imperialism 135." This 
constituted the appeal to which the book's title referred. Thus, although Thomas' critique 
of American policy undoubtedly contained various elements of realism, such as an 
acceptance of the inevitability of bipolar great powers to conflict with one another and 
the need to avoid appeasement of the USSR, it concluded with an indisputably utopian 
call for disarmament and an emphasis on such a policy as the only hope for world peace. 
Yet another author of the middle twentieth century, therefore, had escaped strict 
categorization according to the liberal-realist dichotomy. 
The year 194 7 also saw the publication of a legendary article: "Sources of Soviet 
Conduct" by George Kennan. The lengthy analysis of Soviet doctrine, in particular its 
focus on the Kremlin's belief in inevitable forthcoming conflict with the capitalist world, 
indicated that whatever aspirations for great power goodwill that might have endured 
among mainstream foreign policy analysts after 1945 had undoubtedly gone by the 
boards136. The large amount of public attention the Foreign Affairs article garnered 
134 Ibid., p. 132-136. 
135 Ibid., p. 163. 
136 
"The first of these concepts is that of the innate antagonism between capitalism and Socialism. We have 
seen how deeply that concept has become imbedded in foundations of Soviet power. It has profound 
implications for Russia's conduct as a member of international society. It means that there can never be on 
Moscow's side any sincere assumption of a community of aims between the Soviet Union and powers 
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provides further evidence of this. Kennan was unsparing in his cynicism, arguing that 
even Soviet signatures on international treaties constituted a series of ruses "to be 
regarded as a tactical manoeuvre [sic] permissible in dealing with the enemy (who is 
without honor)". Any abatement of Moscow's antagonism toward the west would be only 
temporary, and Kennan cautioned, "we should not be misled by tactical manoeuvres [sic]. 
These characteristics of Soviet policy ... are basic to the internal nature of Soviet 
power. .. 137" The Soviets, argued Kennan, believed strongly in the long-term validity of 
their goals, and he compared them to the church in the ability to remain patient and plan 
cautiously for what they believed to be the inevitable triumph of their creed. Therefore, 
the Soviet Union would not ever be frustrated by a single, shocking blow to its diplomatic 
program or the frustration of a particular aim at a particular time. Combating the 
pernicious influence of the USSR would instead require "long-range policies on the part 
of Russia's adversaries- policies no less steady in their purpose, and no less variegated 
and resourceful in their application, than those of the Soviet Union itself. It was in this 
sense that Kennan pronounced the name of his preferred policy: "containment", which he 
reiterated would necessarily be "long-term, patient but firm and vigilant" 138. Though 
Kennan did not describe the specific means by which the United States might execute 
such a policy, "Sources of Soviet Conduct" provides an unmistakable signpost for the 
onset of the Cold War and the beginning of a yet more power-oriented era of American 
foreign policymaking. 
which are regarded as capitalist." Kennan, George. "Sources of Soviet Conduct". Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, 
No.4 (Jul., 1947), p. 572. 
137 Ibid. 
138 1bid., p. 574-575. 
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With Cold War strategizing having received an unofficial green light from 
Kennan, Foreign Affairs quickly followed its publication of "Sources of Soviet Conduct" 
with an intriguing article by former Secretary of State and Secretary of War Hemy 
Stimson. His article, "The Challenge to Americans", seems to evoke the closing 
paragraph of Kennan's piece139 and provides an invaluable window into the subjects at 
the heart of this study. Stimson covered a wide range of topics, but began with an attempt 
to pile more dirt on the grave of isolationism. Harking to the debate of the 1930s, Stimson 
opined that the extent of America's connections to the rest of the world evolved more 
quickly than Americans' attitudes toward the process, and "our refusal to catch up with 
reality during these years was the major source of our considerable share of the 
responsibility for the catastrophe of World War II." Such an attempt to remain aloof from 
the current of world affairs could never occur again140. He called isolationism "self-
defeating" and repudiated "halfway measures". He contrasted his experience in 
government as Secretary of State during a period of "frightened isolationism" against the 
139 Kennan ended "Sources of Soviet Conduct" with the ringing words, "Surely, there was never a fairer 
test of national quality than this. In the light of these circumstances, the thoughtful observer of Russian-
American relations will fmd no cause for complaint in the Kremlin's challenge to American society. He will 
rather experience a certain gratitude to a Providence which, by providing the American people with this 
implacable challenge, has made their entire security as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves 
together and accepting the responsibilities ... that history plainly intended them to bear." Ibid. , p. 582. 
140 The entirety of this passage reads: "First, and most important, Americans must now understand that the 
United States has become, for better or worse, a wholly committed member of the world community. This 
has not happened by conscious choice; but it is a plain fact, and our only choice is whether or not to face it. 
For more than a generation the increasing interrelation of American life with the life of the world has out-
paced our thinking and our policy; our refusal to catch up with reality during these years was the major 
source of our considerable share of the responsibility for the catastrophe of World War II. It is the first 
condition of effective foreign policy that this nation put away forever any thought that America can again 
be an island to herself." Stimson, Henry L. "The Challenge to Americans" . Foreign Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1 
(Oct., 1947), p. 6. 
414 
energy of wartime America, making reference to the "regenerative power of full action" 
he experienced in the latter phase141 . 
Such harsh condemnation of isolationism from an avid internationalist and ardent 
supporter of the Kellogg-Briand Pact should come as no surprise to modem readers. 
Neither should his call for recognition that "The troubles of Europe and Asia are not 
'other people's troubles;' they are ours." Much more surprising, perhaps, is Stimson's 
full statement of what one might call the realist articles of faith on the same page: "we are 
forced to act in the world as it is, and not in the world as we wish it were, or as we would 
like it to become142." Stimson thus rejected, or professed to reject, any claim that he 
hoped to elucidate romantic notions of a utopian future. He continued in this vein, 
warning his readers that international relations always contained the seeds of conflict and 
imploring Americans to discard the notion that global dysfunction would disappear if 
only foreigners would adopt American modes of behavior and thought143 . Alternatively, 
any Americans hoping to hear the former Secretary of War proclaim his new faith in a 
muscular policy of "rollback" would also be disappointed. Stimson referred to the 
concept of eliminating the Communist threat by preventive war as "worse than nonsense" 
and un-American, expressing his disbelief that anyone would credit that notion144. 
Stimson, like Kennan, advocated a middle course that would avoid antagonizing 
the Soviet Union while preventing Moscow from exploiting American goodwill. The 
most important task, however, involved demonstrating that freedom and prosperity could 
141 1bid., p. 6-7. 
1421bid., p. 7. 
143
-lbid., p. 8. 
144 1bid., p. 9. 
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coexist145. He supported the European Recovery Program (the Marshall Plan) as an 
expression of this imperative. This marked an important step away from the realist 
maxim he had just quoted, as he next reminded his audience to remain mindful of "our 
final goal", which he defined as fmding "a way toward the necessary government of the 
whole". He provided the objective of controlling the development of atomic energy and 
weapons as an example of such global governance. His desire for world governance 
became still more manifest with the remark, "we cannot have world government [my 
emphasis] or atomic control by wishing for them, and we cannot have them, in any 
meaningful sense, without Russia." He therefore argued that the United Nations, despite 
its imperfections, represented a manifestation of humanity's hope that the world might 
find some basis for unity: "No misconceived idea of 'realism' should induce us to ignore 
this living hope or abate in its pursuit. We should be foremost among those who seek to 
make the United Nations stronger146." 
Yet Stimson's hopes remained somewhat subdued, as he expressed fear that the 
Soviet Union's veto would make the UN too unwieldy. Stimson suggested that the US 
may find itself forced to act outside the scope of the UN at times, but cautioned against 
doing so too frequently, reiterating that "Both policy and principle bind us to the support 
of the United Nations 147." The author concluded with a warning from recent history and a 
call to action: 
By a long series of mistakes and failures, dating back over 
a span of more than 20 years, we had in 1941 let it become 
145 
"Can we make freedom and prosperity real in the present world? If we can, Communism is no threat. If 
not, with or without Communism, our own civilization would ultimately fail." Ibid., p. 10. 
146 Ibid., p. 12-13. 
147 Ibid. 
too late to save ourselves by peaceful methods; in the end 
we had to fight. This is not true today. If we act now, with 
vigor and understanding, with steadiness and without fear, 
we can peacefully safeguard our freedom. It is only if we 
turn our backs, in mistaken complacence, or mistrusting 
timidity, that war may again become inevitable148. 
Stimson's remarkable article, therefore, addressed a wide spectrum of contemporary 
events and theoretical approaches to international affairs. It also raises more questions 
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regarding the division between realism and liberalism and provides some additional, and 
crucial, insight into the parallel development of collective security and power balancing. 
This article sought fust and foremost to inveigh readers against isolationism, which 
Stimson had opposed throughout his public life. Beyond this, Stimson repeated the 
central tenet of realism in his call for Americans to see the world as it is, and to avoid 
interpreting the present through the lens of any visionary hopes for a better future. An 
immediate reaction to this would suggest that the internationalist Stimson had turned 
away from his days of promoting the utopian idea of outlawing warfare and had become 
a fervent born-again realist. 
The remainder ofthe article, on the contrary, demonstrates Stimson's continued 
adherence to the liberal ideal of global cooperation and even "world government". This, 
consequently, implies a similarity of belief with Norman Angell, who rejected 
categorization as a "utopian" by insisting that his vision of an interdependent world was 
in fact a modem reality. Likewise, Stimson called on his readers to see the reality before 
their eyes: that the inextricably interconnected world and American national security 
required active American participation in world affairs and support for collaborative 
148 Ibid. , p. 14. 
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programs such as the European Recovery Program and a possible global nuclear energy 
regime. Like Angell, Stimson's liberal vision of world harmony (tempered by his 
realization that the Soviet Union was not the most trustworthy of partners) coexists easily 
with his own profession of realism because, for such internationalists, cooperation was 
reality. 
Furthermore, Stimson's attitude toward the Soviet Union and the United Nations 
demonstrated how the intellectual seeds of a western alliance could take root even while 
commitment to a global collective security regime remained strong. The growing 
realization that the Soviet Union would likely present a hurdle to global cooperation and 
potentially western security in the future raised the possibility that collective security 
might fail. Specifically, as noted by Stimson, the threat of a Soviet veto against any and 
all possible collective responses to aggression threatened to undermine the basis of the 
United Nations. In such an instance, Stimson suggested that the United States might need 
to act, not against the UN, but perhaps without its approval. In this article, Stimson 
indicated that the fulfillment of his cooperative vision for American policy and 
international affairs might follow a path that skirted the UN and an obstructionist 
Moscow. Though the author by no means expressed a willingness to abandon the UN, his 
article indicated an emergent search for alternative methods of achieving peace and 
security. Considering the pessimism surrounding the possibility of future collaboration 
with the USSR expressed by Potter, Kennan and even Stimson, this search had taken on 
considerable importance. 
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Collective Security and Power Balancing Under the Sword ofDamocles 
The following year' s January edition of Foreign Affairs contained a concise 
reminder of the increased risk associated with international politics in the modem era. 
Even the title of article penned by New York Times military correspondent Hanson W. 
Baldwin was ominous149. "The MythofSecurity", emphasized Baldwin's beliefthat 
modem technology had rendered defensive war impossible. The logic of defense in the 
military sphere had evolved into one merely of retaliation. "No theory oflimited liability, 
of defensive strategy or tactics, can win the war oftomorrow150." Baldwin' s record as a 
Pulitzer-prizewinning journalist and witness ofthe Guadalcanal and Normandy 
campaigns, among others, imbued his words with no lack of authority151 . More generally, 
he reminded readers that peace and security were not sui generis components of 
international relations, calling the "assumption that we can get peace overnight and 
cheaply- by declaring ourselves in favor of it" a "fallacy". He described the quest for 
world peace as a matter of learning from the mistakes of the past, and despite his 
appreciation for the destructive capabilities of modem war, counseled optimism: "There 
is progress. The United Nations - weak though it may be- is stronger than the League of 
Nations. There is no reason for absolute despair. The scope of modem war and the horror 
of its instruments of devastation are, in themselves, a check upon its inception. Yet no 
nation is ready to build its policy upon that foundation alone152." 
149 http://library.syr.edu/digital!guides/b/baldwin hw.htm, accessed November 22, 2011. 
150 Baldwin, Hanson W. "The Myth of Security". Foreign Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Jan., 1948), p. 253 . 
151 http: //librarv.svr.edu/digital!guides/b/baldwin hw.htm, accessed November 22, 2011. 
152 Baldwin, p. 254. 
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Hamilton Fish Armstrong discussed the alternative to this fear of military action 
provided by the UN. In "Coalition for Peace", he wrote that the founders of the United 
Nations did not seek to outlaw war, but rather obligated members of the organization to 
participate in wars for collective security. Rather than attempting to transcend the 
impetus for conflict, the organizers of the Dum barton Oaks conference sought to ensure 
that any potential aggressor would find a preponderant force in favor of collective 
security arrayed against him. To this point, Armstrong offered merely an illustration of 
the collective security principle. Unfortunately, he noted, all efforts at making such a plan 
into functioning reality had amounted to nothing. As a result, the risk of war in 1948 
stemmed from a lack of means to enforce the Charter153 . This dearth of coordination, he 
lamented, left earnest members of the UN who wished to thwart aggression no better 
prepared to do so than the League had been in the 1930s. This, he argued, flowed 
primarily from the fact that the veto could block action by the Security Council154. Like 
the authors of the previous year, Armstrong had begun to fear that Soviet power within 
the UN would prove the undoing of its promise of collective security. 
To skirt this obstacle, Armstrong suggested that the "embryo" collection of states 
that really wished to uphold the principle of collective security should make a pact 
outside the structure of the UN in which they would publicly commit to defend a state 
facing aggression regardless of whether the UN sanctioned their actions. He wrote, "This 
' coalition for peace' will be open to all members; but only those who are willing to 
prepare seriously for collective action against aggression will join." Demonstrating his 
153 Armstrong, Hamilton Fish. "Coalition for Peace". Foreign Affairs, Vol. 27, No. I (Oct., 1948), p. 1. 
154 Ibid., p. 2-4. 
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desire to remain within the letter of international law prescribed by the UN, Armstrong 
argued that such a pact would conform to Article 51 of the Charter, which upheld the 
right of member states to pursue self-defense through alliances outside the United 
Nations155 . Armstrong suggested two ways in which such a proposal might develop. 
Firstly, members ofthe new "coalition for peace" could affirm their willingness to act if a 
certain proportion ofUNSC members had voted that aggression had occurred (thereby 
avoiding the unanimity requirement imposed by the provision of the veto) or they could 
create a series of regional pacts such as the Treaty ofReciprocal Assistance in the 
western hemisphere or the West European Pact of 1948. Most importantly, all such 
planning must take into account the necessity of denying Moscow any legitimate 
grievance and prompting the Soviet Union's exit from the UN156. 
To this, Armstrong added a dose of realist power balancing, discussing his belief 
that "the present risk of war seems to me to come chiefly from allowing the world to 
continue in a twilight zone where one side assumes that collective security exists and the 
other counts on taking advantage of the fact that it does not ... A prudent course, 
then ... would be to put Stalin on notice that we and others are determined and able to 
meet force with force 157." But, as his willingness to rely on a vote of the UNSC as the 
criterion for determining aggression indicated, Armstrong had hardly abandoned his hope 
for the survival of collective security. On the contrary, he interpreted his call for an 
alliance to balance the Soviet colossus as a step toward ensuring the growth and longevity 
155 Ibid., p. 5. 
156 Ibid. , p. 6 and 11. 
157 lbid. , p. 13. 
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of the United Nations. He wrote that such a coalition "would not merely underwrite the 
safety of those brave enough to risk something in order to gain more for themselves; the 
same act would underwrite the United Nations itself' by protecting the basis of collective 
action from destruction by the Soviet veto threat. Full collective security remained 
Armstrong's long-term objective: "Our action today can be evidence of a hope that the 
full goal can be achieved ultimately, and perhaps the very reiteration of that hope can 
itself bring the day a little nearer. Here is a challenge worthy of the men who will write 
the next chapter in American foreign policy158." 
Armstrong' s Foreign Affairs article reinforced the tendency that had clearly been 
developing for over a year to envision power balancing and collective security as 
complementary rather than contradictory policies. The Soviet Union had, by 1948, 
emerged as the primary antagonist of western foreign policy in general and the most 
likely disturber of collective security in particular. While American writers continued to 
view collective security as generally desirable, they had to confront the troubling paradox 
that the greatest potential threat to the security system they cherished was thoroughly 
embedded in the apparatus for its enforcement. The question that writers such as Potter, 
Stimson and Armstrong implicitly asked, then, was how the United States might maintain 
collective security without relying on the very global organization that had been so 
optimistically created for that purpose. As Stimson, Kennan and Armstrong' s writing 
suggests, their answer involved the creation of a secondary line of defense in the form of 
some type of organization directed against the Soviet Union while maintaining the 
158 Ibid., p. 16. 
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American commitment to the UN. Whether such a formulation would take the form of a 
power balancing alliance among western countries or, a more holistic grouping of states 
that would essentially recreate collective security with the sole exception of the USSR, 
remained open to discussion, though Armstrong's citation of the recent Western 
European Pact indicated that the scale may have been tipping toward envisioning a series 
of countervailing alliances. 
Not all American analysts assented to this reinterpretation of global affairs. The 
banking magnate and former advisor to Franklin Roosevelt, James Warburg, advanced 
quite a different view in a 1948 contribution to the AAAPSS. Though he began with 
another internationalist call to recognize the interconnected nature of the modem world, 
he also refused to blame the Soviet Union alone for the failure to achieve international 
political solidarity. Instead, he argued that the path toward global governance must 
include a positive formula rather than simply a negative one concerning "'How to Stop 
Russia"'159. The challenge, according to Warburg, was how best to guide the inevitable 
transition toward "one world" in a positive direction. He maintained that the only 
possible outcomes of the continuing integration of modem global society were American 
or Soviet domination, or "a world united under world law and governed peacefully on the 
federal principle". Warburg preferred the latter, but he recognized it would prove difficult 
to attain. However, he stated that world federation "is the only acceptable solution", and 
that it would require a change of course in American foreign policy to achieve160. 
159 Warburg, James P. "The United States and the World Crisis." Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, Vol. 258, Looking toward One World (Jul., 1948), p. 112. 
160 Ibid. 
423 
Ruling out certain alternatives, W arburg maintained that doing nothing or 
engaging in a policy of appeasement were not policies the United States could adopt. Yet 
he remained thoroughly unimpressed with Washington's active foreign policy in the 
postwar period, arguing that while the USSR had indeed undermined the United Nations, 
the United States has done likewise through its unilateral interventions in China, Greece 
and Turkey. Regarding these matters, he wrote, "I am not in the least interested in 
defending against false or exaggerated charges those masters of distortion and 
prevarication who sit in the Kremlin. But I am concerned with the fact that we are 
beclouding our own judgment and reason by attributing all our troubles to the Soviet 
Union161 ." 
The two superpowers, the author maintained, were eroding the badly needed basis 
for cooperation in a new world forged by a "technological revolution". Mutual interest 
dictated collaboration rather than conflict162. Until recognition of this fact prevailed,·· 
however, Warburg found himself forced to consider alternatives. Regarding the balance 
of power, Warburg sided with Thomas in proclaiming it a relic of the multipolar past that 
had been destroyed by the emergence of the newly bipolar distribution of power. With 
only two major powers, the room for maneuver among multiple poles that Warburg 
believed necessary for power balancing had disappeared 163 . He remarked, however, that 
American policy toward the United Nations had not taken the appropriate path. In face of 
161 Ibid., p. 116. Ibid., p. 120. 
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"we are in a technological revolution, at least as far-reaching in its implications upon human society as 
the industrial revolution ... This technological revolution has shrunk a world formerly divided by oceans, 
mountains and deserts into one world- one little world in which there can be neither peace nor prosperity 
for any people unless there is peace and prosperity for all peoples." Ibid., p. 119. 
163 Ibid., p. 119-120. 
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what he recognized as the Soviet threat to democracy, he criticized the United States for 
undermining the United Nations through its unilateralism although Americans "have 
nothing to lose and everything to gain from strengthening the United Nations and 
building it into a world government". Indeed, he called for the United States to "throw 
the full weight of our military and economic resources behind a United Nations which we 
openly declare our intention to build into a world government164." This meant cutting the 
level of defense spending and devoting the savings to an expanded recovery program for 
Europe as a means of de-escalating the arms race with the USSR and proving that the 
west offered more promising economic prospects than the communist bloc165 . 
Other writers also incorporated the theme of Soviet intransigence in their analysis 
of world affairs. Edgar Ansel Mowrer, a Pulitzer Prize winning journalist and former 
Deputy Director ofthe Office of War Information during World War Two166, included an 
examination of the Soviet role in weakening the UN in his 1948 book, The Nightmare of 
American Foreign Policy. As the. title suggests, however, Mowrer maintained less hope 
regarding the potential for benign world governance than James Warburg. On the 
contrary, from the outset ofthe book Mowrer emphasized the importance of power, 
"Therefore all politics are power politics. There can be no other kind [italics original]. 
Whether in a city ward, a federal state, a nation, or a world republic, whatever politics 
164 Warburg criticized the Soviet Union for "cynically fishing in troubled waters. It has exploited world-
wide socioeconomic revolution in order to propagate the Communist ideology. It has exploited the 
existence of international anarchy among the sovereign nation-states in order to gain every possible 
advantage for itself. The Soviet Union has obstructed the making of a just peace; the Soviet Union has 
pursued a ruthless course of action; the Soviet Union must not be permitted to expand its sphere of interest 
any further." Ibid., p. 120-121 . 
165 1bid., p. 122-123. 
166The Library of Congress. "Edgar Ansel Mowrer and Lilian T. Mowrer: A Register of Their Papers in the 
Library of Congress" . http: //lcweb2.loc. gov/service/mss/eadxmlmss/eadpdfrnss/2006/ms006028 .pdf 
accessed November 23,2011. 
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exist will be power politics167." This preceded an analysis of international law, which 
Mowrer maintained contradicted sovereignty. Therefore, the League's attempt to rely on 
international law for the maintenance of stability to the exclusion of power fatally 
undermined the organization168. 
With regard to American foreign policy, Mowrer engaged in the now 
commonplace disparagement of isolationism, and like so many others began with early 
American history in an attempt to prove his point. In Mowrer's case, this involved an 
explanation of the Founding Fathers' expansionist, non-isolationist legacy169. He 
believed, like Lippmann, that Wilson's involvement in World War One fit squarely into 
this mold170. His criticism of isolationism reached its peak with his assertion that 
isolationists would prefer to allow threats to reach the United States instead of acting 
against them while their menace could be contained overseas, and his condemnation of 
isolationists for disheartening the democratic European powers in their diplomatic 
confrontations with Hitler171 . He derisively referred to isolationists as a motley crew of 
"pacifists, disarmers, and moral exhorters" who unfairly maligned President Roosevelt: 
167 Mowrer, Edgar Ansel. The Nightmare of American Foreign Policy. Knopf, New York, 1948, p. 3. 
168 Ibid., p. 25. 
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"The policy that they [the Founding Fathers] followed can be described as habitual aloofness tempered 
by selective intervention [italics original]. The aloofuess was never intended to be complete. It certainly did 
not prevent expansion in the Western Hemisphere by purchase, diplomacy, threat of power, and naked 
conquest." Ibid., p. 44. 
170 
"Wilson's will to prevent German mastery of Europe or establish a firm offensive base on the eastern 
shores of the Atlantic was also in keeping with tradition. For so long as America relied on Britain's mastery 
of the seas, it would be folly to permit that mastery to be destroyed." Ibid., p. 46. 
171 
"those who used the phrase ["foreign wars"] had no use for allies and preferred to spread destruction on 
American rather than on alien soil." Ibid., p. 78 and "Peace-loving European democracies, deprived of what 
looked like the last hope of obtaining American supplies (still less, of active assistance) in case of attack, 
saw no alternative to further appeasement of the aggressor countries. Relieved of fear of American 
interference, the intending aggressors pressed their imperialist claims ever harder and wider. Without the 
Nye investigation and Neutrality Acts, there might have been no democratic sellout of Czechoslovakia to 
Hitler Germany at Munich in 1938. Peace at any price led straight to war." Ibid., p. 80. 
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"To paint this incurable champion of peace as a warmonger is a task that could tempt 
only those guilty insulationists [sic] who, enraged at the failure of their prescription, were 
determined against all evidence to prove that it was never properly administered172." He 
later called opposition to the Marshall Plan the last stand of American isolationism 173. 
Having sufficiently savaged isolationism, Mowrer analyzed the Second World 
War and its outcome. Reflecting over the past three years, and typifying the disappointed 
hopes in continued great power cooperation expressed elsewhere in the contemporary 
literature, he remarked that Roosevelt had erred by trusting in continued Soviet 
cooperation. Of the late president, Mowrer wrote, "In planning for peace, he bet the 
future ofthe American people on one card: that the Soviet Union would prefer peace and 
collaboration with the West to armed and ideological expansion. He was warned of the 
risk. He acknowledged the risk. He deliberately took the risk. And he lost174." 
For the present, Mowrer argued that the United States should remain mindful of 
the fact that states sought a balance of power, and that a distribution of power across 
multiple poles generated the greatest stability175. From this simple analysis, however, 
Mowrer shed considerable light on the nexus of power balancing and collective security 
that had formed within American policy since the end of the war. The United States, he 
wrote, had begun to follow both forms of internationalism heralded during the early 
twentieth century. The frrst was the muscular "'big-stick"' policy of Theodore Roosevelt, 
172 Ibid., p. 94. 
173 Ibid., p. 222. 
174 Ibid., p. 144. 
175 Ibid., p. 152. 
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and the second that of President Wilson. Mowrer wrote of the American hope that this 
"double approach" would secure the country's foreign policy aims176. 
Finally, Mowrer explicated the hybrid policy of power balancing and collective 
security that the United States had adopted within the previous two years. Because of the 
inclusion of the permanent member veto in the Security Council, he wrote, the United 
Nations seemed a poor vehicle for the implementation of collective security. Therefore, 
"By a 'clever' interpretation of Articles 51 and 52 ofthe Charter", the United States 
began to create "'regional arrangements"'. Because the veto had made collective security 
impossible, "Americans reluctantly saw that their cherished 'principle of unanimity' 
blocked all effective action, they seized on the possibility of interpreting (or 
misinterpreting) Article 51 as modifying the rest of the Charter177." Resultantly, he 
concluded, "The only universal voluntary organization, the UN, was an unfinished bridge 
leading nowhere178." 
Professor D.F. Fleming of Vanderbilt University authored another probing 
examination of difficulties at the United Nations the same year. "The Soviet Union and 
Collective Security" offered a history of Moscow's experiences in global organizations 
dating to its entry into the League. Fleming characterized the USSR' s appearance at 
Geneva as an attempt to forestall German expansion and aggression as well as to 
ingratiate the Soviet Union into the international community. Fleming characterized this 
as "a total failure, except for the clear record ofloyalty to the Covenant". Despite this 
176 1bid., p. 232. 
177 Ibid., p. 248. 
178 1bid., p. 255 . 
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negative experience, Fleming reasoned, the Soviets had decided that they needed to 
become members of the United Nations if only to ensure that the new organization did 
not act against its interests179. The author noted the high hopes for great power 
collaboration toward the end of World War Two, citing James Byrnes' recollection that 
Stalin had hoped to "'keep a united front" ' with the west at Yalta. By 1948, Fleming 
wrote, "Why the united front broke up is a subject which urgently needs early 
0 0 ° 180 " 
mvest1gat10n . 
Fleming noted that even toward the end of the war, "there was some tension 
before President Roosevelt's death", but suggested that the nature of this tension 
remained unclear. He also remarked that some Americans "were looking forward to a war 
with the Soviets", and that as early as 1946 the British and Soviet representatives "were 
clashing violently" prior to the United States' use of the UN to help expel the Red Army 
from Iran. At the opening of the 194 7 session, Secretary Marshall condemned the Soviets 
for having used their Security Council veto a total of twenty-two times in just two years. 
On the other hand, Fleming discussed the "rising crescendo of sentiment for war .. . 
among powerful groups" in the United States. According to him, "The UN delegates had 
·only to read the papers to know that most of our press magnates were creating the 
atmosphere for war with Russia" and "the delegates must have been aware, also, that 
influential conservatives, particularly ex-isolationists ... sense an opportunity to have, 
after all, the war they would have much preferred in 1941 when they were obliged to 
179 Fleming, D.F. "The Soviet Union and Collective Security" . The Journal of Politics, Vol. 10, No. 1 
(Feb. , 1948), p. 122. ' 
180 Ibid. 
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fight the Right-wing Fascist dictatorships181 ." According to Fleming, then, collective 
security suffered from Soviet intransigence and American hostility toward Soviet 
behavior and the nature of the Moscow regime in general. 
Attitudes toward the UN as an institution also played a significant role. According 
to Fleming, the United States envisioned the UN as a vehicle for democratic management 
of global affairs, whereas the Soviets detested the idea that a coalition of small states 
might somehow restrain their growing power182. Maintaining his equal criticism of both 
superpowers, Fleming suggested that the United States would take the same attitude ifthe 
Soviets had a majority in the General Assembly. But in analyzing the current conflict, 
Fleming remained consistent that "The symbol of the fighting in the UN is the 
controversy over the veto. The Soviets have always sought to make their veto absolute, to 
make it apply even to discussion or presentation of grievances183." However, Fleming 
declared that the veto remained only a symbol of Soviet-American antagonism within the 
UN. While the veto had been intended to ensure no breach of unity among the great 
powers, under the assumption that they would negotiate and compromise on matters as a 
result, the "UN has become a forum in which the Great Powers prosecute each other and 
attempt to impose their will upon each other184." Clearly, then, American academics had 
181 Ibid., p. 123-124. 
182 
"In other words, no decision can be made without the agreement of the Soviet Union. Her leaders 
consider any other course an abrogation of common sense, especially when the majorities are stacked 
against the U.S.S.R. The ability of20 small and weak Latin American states to outvote the U.S.S.R. 7 to 1 
seems to the Soviets very wicked and immoral." Ibid., p. 125. 
183 He continued: "They reason that discussion is likely to lead to action, perhaps against them. They seek 
even to extend the veto to questions of procedure." Ibid., p. 126. 
184 Ibid., p. 127. 
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by early 1948 realized that hopes for American-Soviet amity had been completely 
dashed. 
The following year saw a brief renewal of an older debate. If, as according to 
Mowrer, isolationism was expressing its last gasp during this phase, the stalwart 
isolationist Borchard would not let his ideology die without writing for it a suitable 
eulogy in 1949. It would be, as the Yale professor noted, his last and "valedictory" article 
in International Law before his retirement. Coinciding with the twilight of isolationism, 
Borchard ensured that before he left the academe, isolationism would not go out with a 
whimper. Invoking some recent writing by his mentor John Bassett Moore, Borchard 
denounced American foreign policy in the current era as '" insane"', and suggested that 
readers should take heed, as Moore was one of the foremost authorities on international 
law and policy in America during his lifetime185 . Referring again to the touchstone of 
Washington' s Farewell Address, Borchard condemned contemporary American alliance 
policy (NATO had been formally established in the same month of this article ' s 
publication), and lambasted it for deviating from traditional American statecraft. 
· Remarking that such an extraordinary policy must justify itself with extraordinary 
results, Borchard argued that alliances could do nothing of the sort. He warned that the 
military commitments engendered by alliance policy might bankrupt the United States 
and drag it into war with the USSR. He lamented, "It seems unfortunate that the United 
States no longer has a free hand, which is all that isolationism has ever meant," and again 
185 Borchard, Edwin. "United States Foreign Policy". The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 43, 
No. 2 (Apr., 1949), p. 333. 
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condemned the labeling of any state as the aggressor in the event of conflict186. In the last 
words he would publish on the subject, he concluded: "Although I am opposed to 
alliances, which only increase the risks of politics, I must confess, as a matter of law, that 
the United States is competent to enter into an alliance187." Borchard undoubtedly fit 
Mowrer's description of an isolationist who believed the only flaw with that policy was 
that it was never appropriately applied. However, although he never embraced the new 
political logic of the postwar era, his final words reflected his commitment to America's 
constitutional system rather than bitterness over the tum of events that had taken place 
since 1941. Borchard passed away in 1951, and received a warm obituary from his 
colleague Herbert Briggs. Although it reflected his frequently combative nature, it ended 
with the conclusion that "His recognized erudition, his willingness to tilt a lance for 
causes he held dear, and his kindly interest in younger scholars won him the affectionate 
regards of a host of friends. A great legal scholar and a warmly humane man has passed 
from our rnidst188." 
The year 1950 would prove a seminal one for the two concepts discussed in this 
study. It was the first full year of western collaboration in NATO, a development which 
elicited considerable commentary in the literature and proved to be the culmination of the 
ebbing confidence in the United Nations discussed over the previous several years. 
186 Ibid., p. 334. 
187 Ibid., p. 335. 
188 Briggs also noted that: "Following his life-long friend and mentor, John Bassett Moore, Mr. Borchard 
became a strong partisan of neutrality for the United States prior to both World Wars .. . So imbued did he 
become with the idea that the United States had taken the wrong path in the two World Wars and their 
aftermath that he tended to become polemical against the participation of the United States in efforts at 
collective security, and profoundly skeptical of general international organizations." However, Borchard 
also engaged in legal advocacy for the wrongly convicted and his efforts resulted in legislation addressing 
their plight. Briggs, Herbert W. "In Memoriam: Edwin M. Borchard, 1884-1951". The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 45, No.4 (Oct., 1951), p. 708-709. 
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Concurrently, however, the United Nations earned considerable credibility and attention 
for its role in the Korean War from June 25 onward. As a result, the twin currents of 
collective security and power balancing simultaneously became stronger than ever with 
the United States' first official military alliance with European states and its first military 
action under the umbrella of NATO occurring within just over a year of one another. 
Vera Micheles Dean jumped into the discussion of NATO with her book Europe 
and the United States. Her analysis reflected that of other authors, primarily Lippmann, 
and expressed the power-based, internationalist view of foreign affairs and American 
policy that had become ascendant in the political science literature since the war years. 
After discussing previous centuries of transatlantic relations, Dean noted the 
revolutionary change that had occurred in the American mindsetas a result of World War 
Two. She claimed that America's entry into the war had fmally caused a majority of its 
citizens to view isolationism as an invitation to attack, and that safety lay in containing 
emergent threats overseas. The main revolution in thought, she maintained, had occurred 
with the realization that the United States could no longer rely on Great Britain to 
suppress threats in Europe and keep the seas safe for American commerce. Furthermore, 
the increasing range of modem weaponry, including the atomic bomb, made the United 
States' continental stronghold more vulnerable than ever before189. Continuing with her 
analysis of Anglo-American ties, Dean noted that American foreign policy had assumed 
the role vis-a-vis Russia formerly played by London; specifically by attempting to bottle 
the Russian fleet in the Baltic and Black Seas and acting as Moscow's primary antagonist 
189 Dean, Vera Micheles. Europe and the United States, Knopf, New York, 1950, p. 183-184. 
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in general 190• Only with British power in tatters did the United States find itself forced to 
assume the role of keeping the Russians in their place. 
In the chapter "Arms and the North Atlantic Treaty", Dean adopted a rather 
legalistic and technical mode of analysis, instead of discussing whether the balance-of-
power strategy embodied by NATO better served American interests relative to collective 
security. Interestingly, she noted that considering the rapidity with which Germany 
subdued the Low Countries and France in 1940, any delay in the defense of America' s 
European interests could prove fatal 191• This line of reasoning suggests skepticism of 
collective security under UN auspices for practical reasons, as any United Nations 
approval of the use of force could potentially create such a delay. 
Next, Dean offered a concise explanation for the increasing popularity of power 
balancing in a passage that seems to have summarized the trends in the period literature 
examined in this chapter. Dean wrote that the American government believed that the 
Soviet Union stood in the way of effective United Nations action, by remaining 
obstinately against the cooperative majority comprised of other states that would function 
easily in Moscow' s absence192. With this consideration in mind, Dean's concern 
regarding the impact of a potential delay in defending Western Europe assumes added 
importance. Readers could easily envision a scenario in which, having launched an attack 
against the west, Stalin would use his veto power to block a United Nation' s response to 
his own aggression. The Kremlin, then, had stacked the deck against America and its 
190 Ibid. , p. 185-195. 
191 Ibid., p. 294. 
192 Ibid., p. 304. 
allies. This, according to Dean, had generated a massive loss of faith in the global 
organization: 
When events showed that an international organization is 
not a universal panacea and cannot overnight solve 
problems deeply rooted in world history, a reaction set in 
that proved just as exaggerated as the earlier hopes. People 
in the United States began ... to say that the UN was 
impotent, and to suggest a wide range of substitutes - from 
various regional arrangements outside the UN to the 
immediate proclamation of world govemment193 . 
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Washington's response, of course, had followed the former of these two courses. Dean 
·noted that the United States' commitment to work within the UN "has been tempered" by 
Washington' s predilection to act unilaterally when matters of perceived primary 
importance are at stake, and a desire to avoid having to win approval for American 
policies from the Soviet Union within the United Nations194. 
Regarding Europe in particular, Dean wrote that the primacy of American power 
was reducing Europe' s importance. With the European powers in steep decline, Dean 
predicted that the continent would become only one factor among many in the formation 
of American policy. Simultaneously, she argued, the rapid growth of American power 
would compel the United States to adapt to its new role as a superpower and "will have to 
acknowledge, and learn to exercise, the responsibilities of our immensely enhanced 
power, which places us, whether we like it or not, squarely in the center of the world 
stage" 195 . The outbreak of the Korean War would prove the accuracy of Dean' s analysis. 
193 Ibid., p. 301 . 
194 Ibid., p. 302. 
195 Ibid., p. 335. 
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Others had also continued the examination of what they viewed as the roots of the 
still-emergent Cold War. In a letter written that June, prior to the outbreak of the Korean 
War, Lippmann dated the onset of the Cold War to the Potsdam Conference at the 
earliest, though he believed it most reasonable to place the beginning of the Cold War in 
·early 1946 during the Iran affair (as also suggested by Fleming), and most certainly after 
the proclamation ofthe Truman Doctrine in 1947196. This date notably corresponds with 
the publication of Kennan's landmark article in Foreign Affairs. 
Former Republican Senator from New York and future Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles expressed his opinion on world affairs in his 1950 book War or Peace. He 
warned that the historical record suggested an inevitable war between the US and Soviet 
Union, noting: "Future generations will1ook back with amazement if war is averted. It 
will be an achievement without precedent. Yet that is our task197." Dulles emphasized a 
religious tone throughout this book, with whole sections devoted to the clash between 
Christianity and communism. His comment that "Soviet Communism starts with an 
atheistic, Godless premise. Everything else flows from that premise", typified the attitude 
he displayed throughout the book198. In addition, War or Peace also contained the by now 
boilerplate condemnation of isolationism, and a less common repudiation of overt power 
politics199. 
196 Blum, p. 552. 
197 Dulles, John Foster. War or Peace. The MacMillan Company, New York, 1950, p. 3 . 
198 Ibid., p. 8. Also: "The United Nations cannot suppress or reconcile the difference between the 
materialistic and atheistic philosophy of the Communist Party and the spiritual faith that animates the 
leaders and peoples of the non-Communist states." Ibid., p. 185. • 
199 
"some Americans think of peace as a condition in which our nation is isolated from all external forces 
and lives its own solitary life. To accept this idea is to invite war and defeat." Ibid., p. 17 and "Victors in 
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With regard to collective security and power balancing in particular, Dulles 
believed that an international organization of universal scope was necessary, but that this 
remained a long-term rather than a proximate goal. For more rapid defensive action in the 
short term, he endorsed the creation of regional organizations. Detailing his logic, Dulles 
repeated the oft-cited view that the Kaiser would not have initiated World War One if he 
knew in advance that eventually the vast majority of global power would enter the field 
against him. Dulles made a similar assertion about Hitler and then defended the "North 
Atlantic Pact" on the basis that this alliance would remove any doubt in the minds of 
Soviet leaders regarding the willingness of the western powers to act in unison200 . 
Discussing the interrelation of the United Nations and America' s new forays into power 
balancing, Dulles argued that the North Atlantic Treaty and the Rio Pact provided 
evidence that the Charter was more beneficial to the security of the United States as a 
result of its flexibility rather than its comprehensiveness. Because of the wide purview 
given to states to form regional organizations under Article 51, the Charter granted the 
United States all the leeway it needed to form alliances. Looking elsewhere, he 
continued, "The other suggested form of collective security [my emphasis] pact is 
regional and would bind the nations of the Asiatic-Pacific area by commitments like 
those of the Rio Pact and the North Atlantic Pact 201 ." The conflation by Dulles of 
collective security and the power balancing ofNATO indicates the extent to which the 
ideas had evolved in tandem. That a future Secretary of State and prominent figure at the 
war usually try to carve up the world to suit themselves. Then they say that 'peace' means keeping it that 
way forever. That is both immoral and impractical." Ibid., p. 18. 
200 Ibid., p. 93 and 99. 
201 Ibid., p. 204-205 . 
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top level of American politics would use these supposedly contradictory ideas virtually 
interchangeably provides another example of how they had become viewed as two sides 
of the same coin rather than as competing expressions of power politics and globalist 
idealism. 
The end of 1950 saw a much more concise and less theological examination of 
American foreign policy from the redoubtable realist Hans Morgenthau. In a lengthy 
article he attempted to conduct a survey of numerous issues in present and past American 
foreign relations. Its subtitle, "The National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions", set the tone 
for the entire piece. Going straight to his thesis in the first paragraph and once again 
demonstrating an intense focus on the origins of the republic, Morgenthau wrote that 
Americans "must shed the illusions of their fathers and grandfathers and relearn the great 
principles of statecraft which guided the path of the republic in the first decade and - in 
moralistic disguise - in the first century of its existence202." Morgenthau complained that 
"moral abstraction" had replaced real thought in American politics and constituted "one 
ofthe great sources ofweakness and failure in American foreign policy". Yet beneath 
this there had remained an "instinctive awareness" ofthe United States' true interests, 
particularly in the western hemisphere and defended by the Monroe Doctrine. Knowing 
that the new world could only remain free of European interference if the European states 
feared for their own safety, the US pursued a balance-of-power policy in Europe203 . In the 
Americas, the manifest military inferiority of the natives against which the United States 
202 Morgenthau, Hans J. "The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest vs. Moral 
Abstractions". The American Political Science Review, Vol. 44, No.4 (Dec., 1950), p. 833 . 
203 Ibid., p. 834-835. 
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fought in its westward expansion tended to obscure the power calculations made by the 
United States in securing its dominance of an entire continent204. 
When the US actually embarked on global imperialism with the onset of the 
Spanish-American War, it conceived of this new policy in humanistic terms instead of 
power-political ones. In this way, many American statesmen continued to obscure the 
true nature of the national interest from themselves. This led to a new set of assumptions. 
Firstly, that the US only violated its isolationist principles in a war against a dictatorial 
power. Therefore, most reasoned that the clash between democracy and dictatorship, not 
power politics, provoked the United States to war. Secondly, that this new dynamic could 
only cease to exist with the ultimate victory of democracy and the extermination of 
dictatorship as a form of government around the world. To this nascent strand of moralist 
thinking, then, power politics did not seem the natural state of affairs, but merely an 
accident, as the United States had long been able to avoid them via isolation while 
interpreting its own overseas expansion in humanistic terms. From this flowed the belief, 
typified by Woodrow Wilson, that other states could choose to abandon power-based 
strategic calculations and embrace a moral foreign policy205 . 
The happy confluence of power concerns and moral imperatives did not work in 
Wilson's favor alone. For much of American history, statesmen in Washington tended to 
believe that by coincidence the dictates of strategy and the moral imperative conveniently 
encouraged the same type of policies. This thinking continually obscured the power-
political calculations at the heart of national policy in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
204 Ibid., p. 836-837. 
205 Ibid., p. 838-840. 
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centuries, including Wilson's war policy206 . The interwar rejection ofWilsonianism, 
however, also led to the rejection of the power-political precepts that the late president 
had inadvertently followed. Wilson had, by accident and while adhering to his moralistic 
language, acted in the same manner as the Founding Fathers in an attempt to maintain a 
European balance of power. The difference between the isolationism of the interwar 
period and that ofthe first era of American foreign policy, according to Morgenthau, was 
stark. Twentieth-century isolationists believed that American isolation represented a 
naturally occurring state of affairs, whereas men such as Washington and Jefferson 
realized that "isolation was an objective of policy, which had to be striven for to be 
attained." Morgenthau called the belief that isolation could be maintained without action 
"the very negation of foreign policy207." 
Yet, Morgenthau cited one similarity between isolationism and collective 
security, noting that both thoroughly rejected the notion of power balancing. While 
isolationists insisted that American interests lay nowhere, Wilsonians believed they lay 
everywhere, with the interests of mankind in total. As a result, the debate between the 
two during the 1930s took place in moral terms. When Roosevelt finally aligned US 
policy with its interest in stopping German expansionism, it did so in moral language. 
Again, the moral and the political imperatives seemed to converge. Curiously, "The 
thought that the war might be waged in view of a new balance of power to be established 
206 Ibid. , p. 844-845. For instance, "Wilson's moral objective required the destruction of the Kaiser ' s 
autocracy, and this happened also to be required by the political interests of the United States." This also 
required, however, the restoration of the European balance of power, which was anathema to Wilson. Ibid. , 
p. 849. 
207 Ibid., p. 850. 
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after the war, occurred in the West only to Winston Churchill- and, of course, to Joseph 
Stalin208 ." 
Like Carr, Morgenthau compared statesmen who did not believe in his strictures 
to scientists who did not believe in the laws of science. Those who rejected the balance of 
power were "like a scientist not believing in the law of gravity". Since the end of World 
War Two, Americans had been forced to come to grips with "a new political world" after 
many years of self-delusion and conflation between morality and power. Morgenthau 
concluded that America must choose between two sets of moral principles, only one of 
which operated within the bounds of reality. Calling the moral imperative behind a policy 
of realism that of self-preservation, he concluded that such a policy would remain 
c . 1 . h" ld209 necessary 10r surv1va man anarc 1c wor . 
This article marked the beginning of a very active phase for Morgenthau. The 
following year, he published In Defense of the National Interest, a dense and lengthy 
book that expanded on his analysis from "Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy". The 
first hundred and twenty pages of the book advanced virtually the same argument about 
previous eras of national policy, with the addition of some commentary on the changed 
nature of power politics in the age oftotal war and atomic energy210. The latter portions 
208 1bid., p. 850-853. 
209 Ibid., p. 853-854. 
210 This included the frightening observation that: "Total war of our age has fundamentally altered the 
traditional relationship between political ends and military means. War in the atomic age, fought by both 
sides with all the instruments of modem technology, has become the reductio ad absurdum of policy itself. 
Today war has become an instrument of universal destruction, an instrument that destroys the victory with 
the vanquished. None of the traditional objectives of foreign policy can justify war any more except 
national self-preservation itself; and even then ... the choice is really between two kinds of national 
destruction. If a great nation does not go to war in the face of a challenge to its national existence, it will 
lose it through the creeping dissolution of appeasement and subversion. If it goes to war . .. it may at best 
preserve its freedom from foreign domination, but is likely to lose the substance of what made its national 
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ofthe book engaged in a protracted analysis of collective security and power balancing 
which revealed much about the contemporary realist approach to the two policies. 
Morgenthau continued to believe that the United States' exercise of both, however, 
remained clouded by moral considerations. For instance, theTruman Doctrine was 
expressed not as a means of upholding the balance .of power, but of promoting freedom 
and democracy. Although the policy was correct, in Morgenthau's view, it was not 
expressed in terms of power. Collective security, based in the. morality that all aggression 
is wrong, prevented the consideration of state interest in the exercise of resistance211 . This 
ignored, however, the idea that the partisans of collective security argued that collective 
security was in the national interest because it would ensure that isolated incidents of 
aggression would not inspire others. 
Though Morgenthau relied on a typical realist view of power to interpret world 
affairs, he argued that negotiation had been deprecated too severely as an overreaction 
against appeasement. While he condemned appeasement as the abandonment of national . 
interest without a corresponding gain, he espoused that exchanging one advantage for 
another constituted the essence of statecraft212. Morgenthau argued that achieving a 
life worth living." Morgenthau, Hans J. In Defense of the National1nterest. Alfred A. Kriopf, New York, 
1951, p. 58. 
211 Morgenthau notes, "It is obvious that no statesman could pursue indiscriminately a policy of protecting 
democratic governments everywhere in the world without courting certain disaster. Commitments would 
necessarily outrun resources, and failure would ensue." Ibid., p. 116-119. 
212 
"Appeasement is a politically unwise negotiated settlement that misjudges the interests and power 
involved. We speak of appeasement when a nation surrenders one of its vital interests without obtaining 
anything worthwhile in return. The surrender of Czechoslovakia to Germany by Great Britain and France at 
the Munich conference of 1938 opened eastern and southeastern Europe to German conquest by disarming 
the strongest military power in eastern Europe, and made one of the German flanks secure in case of war 
with the West. In return, Great Britain and France secured Hitler' s assurance that he had no more territorial 
ambitions in Europe. This is indeed appeasement and is indefensible. But for a nation to exchange one 
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negotiated settlement with the USSR, an idea he seemed to support, would require the 
division ofthe world into spheres of influence as the Soviets apparently desired. So long 
as Americans rejected this principle of division, a negotiated settlement would remain 
impossible. A division into spheres of influence met with Morgenthau's approval: "it is 
indeed obvious that from .. . the political history of the human race that the balance of 
power [my emphasis] and concomitant spheres of influence are ofthe very essence of 
international politics. They may be disregarded at the peril of those who choose to do so, 
. but they cannot be abolished213 ." Morgenthau cited the words ofToynbee and Churchill 
to the effect that a spheres-of-influence arrangement with the USSR might prove the only 
means of avoiding continual conflict and degeneration in Europe and around the world. 
Furthermore, both asserted that once spheres of influence had been securely established, 
cooperation between them might yield a more cooperative, functional and comprehensive 
global society214. Clearly, power balancing and the division of the world into rigid camps 
appeared.to Morgenthau as a means of escaping great power conflict. The establishment 
of secure bases of power for Washington and Moscow to exploit, he reasoned, might 
reduce the level of divisive competition elsewhere. 
A subsequent section of the book recommended American rearmament and an 
attempt to peacefully push the Soviet Union out of central Europe with an incremental 
buildup of American forces in NATO states while America maintained its marked 
superiority in nuclear weapons. Thus, the book constituted an explicit appeal to balance 
advantage for another advantage at least as important is as far removed from appeasement as common 
sense is from foolishness, and statesmanship from dilettantism." Ibid., p. 137. 
2 13 Ibid., p. 142 and 155. 
214 Ibid., p. 156-157. 
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of power doctrine. It called for the utilization of both internal balancing involving 
American rearmament and external balancing by revitalizing and rearming America's 
West European allies. It concluded with an impassioned plea to abandon moral crusades 
and the millenarian belief that military victory, if resounding enough, would end the 
constant struggle for power in an anarchic world. The national interest, Morgenthau 
persisted, must ever remain the guiding star of American foreign polic/15 . 
Continuing to address the topic ofUN reform, New York Senator Paul H. 
Douglas published an article in Foreign Affairs explaining his proposed solution to the 
Security Council impasse. Calling the great power veto and lack of a UN-controlled 
"police force" the greatest weaknesses of the UN, Douglas discussed the formation of 
regional pacts designed to protect their members outside the UN framework. The western 
hemisphere took the lead with the pact of Rio de Janeiro, followed by the formation of 
NATO in 1949. In addition to addressing the conundrum created by the Soviets' frequent 
use of their veto power, Douglas suggested these regional pacts would also reflect the 
tendency of states tend to focus on matters closest to their borders216. Like other authors 
who discussed the topic, Senator Douglas emphasized Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
which granted members the authority to conclude their own security pacts outside the 
auspices of the global organization. Douglas referred to this as an attempt by 
"peaceloving [sic] nations to pursue the goal of collective security inside of the United 
Nations while simultarieously working to build practical structures outside the U.N. to 
215 Ibid., p. 241-242. 
216 Douglas, Paul H. "United to Enforce Peace". Foreign Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Oct., 1951), p. 2-3 . 
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obtain its more immediate and more localized realization217." In brief, as had been 
suggested by others, regional pacts such as NATO had been engineered to provide a 
fallback position in the event that Soviet intransigence prevented prompt and appropriate 
UN responses to aggression. 
The Senator also cited certain drawbacks associated with these treaties. Firstly, 
should the emphasis shift completely to such arrangements, the United Nations might 
lose all relevance and become merely a forum for the broadcast of propaganda from both 
sides of the iron curtain. In addition, the regional pacts, while perhaps more robust than 
the UN's promise of collective security, also lacked any means of identifying the 
aggressor and bringing moral sanction to bear on states which violate the peace. 
Therefore, states outside such arrangements would have a reduced incentive to intervene 
in any conflict218. To reduce these risks, the author had submitted the Thomas-Douglas 
Resolution in Congress. Modeled on the "Coalition for Peace" proposal published in 
Foreign Affairs by Hamilton Fish Armstrong in 1948, the resolution sought to provide a 
means of identifying aggressors and encouraging broad participation in a defensive 
response by suggesting that states join a compact whereby they would commit to use 
force against any aggressor identified as such by a two-thirds vote of the General 
Assembly, including three of the veto powers. This, he suggested, would create an "inner 
ring" and "outer ring" of powers in the UN, the former having become party to such a 
217 Ibid., p. 4. 
218 Ibid. 
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pact219 . This mirrored the Shotwell imagery of On the Rim of the Abyss, but identified a 
different goal. 
The State Department opposed the proposal, arguing that the pact might not gain 
wide acceptance, and such a failure would undermine American prestige. Furthermore, 
and more notably, the plan would require the possible deployment of the American 
military to any spot in the world irrespective of the limited nature of the country's 
capabilities. This important consideration, lying at the heart of collective security, 
suggests that, according to Douglas, the United States had actually abandoned collective 
security logic. In addition, the State Department feared that "any such effort might widen 
the rift between the Soviets and the Western world", while the executive branch 
maintained that strengthening the NATO pact would accomplish the same aim with fewer 
risks220. Douglas retorted that states only continued to form so many regional pacts 
because they doubted the ability and willingness of their counterparts to respond to 
threats through the vehicle ofthe United Nations. Until the United Nations reformed 
itself and generated such confidence in its members, "true collective security is halting 
and incomplete. Divorced from enforcement the term itself is meaningless. To give the 
United Nations added determination and strength today is an all-important objective . . . 
because if the United Nations is to survive and develop to meet future challenges it must 
in truth be determined and strong221 ." 
219 Ibid., p. 7. 
220 Ibid.,p. 8. 
221 Ibid., p. 16. 
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The tug of war between collective security and power balancing continued into 
1952 as war raged on the Korean Peninsula. The issue had risen to considerable 
prominence in the academy, and the AAAPSS devoted its entire July issue to the subject, 
which it titled "The National Interest- Alone or with Others?" The first submission came 
from Hans J. Morgenthau, who extracted more mileage from his arguments of the 
previous year in his "Mainsprings" article and In Defense of the National Interest. The 
brief article covered virtually all the same territory, ranging from Morgenthau's 
interpretation of early American foreign policy through the Spanish-American War and 
Wilsonianism. His condemnation of isolationists also made another appearance222 . One 
more novel feature of this article was Morgenthau' s explicit discussion of the 
interconnected state of the world223 . He concluded by interpreting American containment 
ofthe USSR in the same light as its intervention in both World Wars- as a means of 
. . . b 1 f . E 224 mamtammg a a ance o power m urope . 
John Sparkman, a United States Senator from Alabama contributed the next 
article, beginning with another denunciation of isolationism and, by extension, any 
hesitance to fully join with America's allies in defense of American interests225 . The 
222 Morgenthau, Hans. J. "What Is the National Interest of the United States?" Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 282, The National Interest- Alone or with Others? (Jul., 
1952), p. 1-3. 
223 
"in the mid-twentieth century, the interconnectedness ofthe interests of all nations has become so great 
that no nation can really stand alone and take care of its own interests without jeopardizing those very 
interests." Ibid., p. 3. 
224 . . Ibid., p. 5-6. 
225 
"I should have hoped that this issue of 'Alone or With Others' or, if you will, 'Isolationism versus 
Internationalism' had been decided some years ago. I should have thought that America's experience in 
two world wars had forever disabused us of the notion of isolationism. I should have thought that our 
enthusiastic commitment to the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Rio Pact ... 
revealed a clear decision on our part." Sparkman, John. "Foundations of American Foreign Policy". Annals 
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Senator expressed his support for present United States policy, emphasizing the 
importance of American power in shaping the future of postwar international society. He 
remarked, "I believe that our national interest is served by American leadership in 
building collective security and in looking to basic human rights in a world still showing 
the scars of two world wars ... Our strength puts us in the vanguard. That is our 
destin/26." Advising patience and an eye toward the long term, Senator Sparkman 
expressed his belief that morality and wise policy could be melded to create a noble yet 
f~ . c: . 1" 227 e 1ect1ve 10re1gn po 1cy . 
Sparkman's attempt to reconcile power and morality seems a bridge between the 
realism ofMorgenthau and the intensely moral argument of the highly distinguished A.H. 
Feller, who at the time served as the UN's Legal Director228 . He noted the contradictory 
attitudes toward the UN which had plagued the organization since its birth. First, it had 
been derided "as a puny, ineffective creature, crippled by the veto, overridden by an 
antiquated conception of national sovereignty, and incapable of influencing the national 
policies of its member states". Lately, the opposite had become true and UN critics 
loathed the organization "as a monstrous supergovernment, endowed with mighty powers 
of interference in the internal affairs of its members229". Feller discussed this in light of a 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 282, The National Interest - Alone or with 
Others? (Jul., 1952), p. 8. 
226 Ibid. 
227 
"I am for the right admixture of spirit and letter, hope and method, in diplomacy, as in every other 
human activity." Ibid., p. 9. 
228 Mr. Feller indeed had a noteworthy legal career. He had been an associate professor of law at Yale and 
had taught at Harvard Law School. In addition, he served as a special assistant to the Attorney General and 
as general council for the UNRA. Feller, A. H. "In Defense of International Law and Morality". Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 282, The National Interest- Alone or with 
Others? (Jul., 1952), p. 83. 
229 Ibid., p. 77. 
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similar rise and fall in the interest of formulating a world government or federation. The 
idea enjoyed a high degree of popularity during the war, but had since become a subject 
of considerable fear and loathing230. The author described the '"legalistic-moralistic 
approach"' as a "rather lengthy name for what we used to call idealism". In the view of 
its critics, the clash of interests in a world of anarchy could not be suppressed by "legal 
rules and restraints231". 
Feller launched his criticism of these "neo-realist" naysayers by noting that an 
emphasis on legal strictures was not a uniquely American one, but had support among 
other governments as well. He called the "novelty ofthe nee-realistic thesis" its 
proposition that "the extension of the rule oflaw is a positive danger to international 
life." The author suggested that critics of so-called idealism, or the legal approach to 
international relations he supported, condemned idealists for spawning the idea of total 
war due to their frustration that other states had failed to bend to the idealistic will of the 
United States. Feller, on the other hand, suggested that these critics ignored that "total 
war was first proclaimed by Imperial Germany in World War e32." In response to the 
realists' claims that acts cannot be judged along moral lines, Feller replied that such 
statements failed to do justice to Americans or mankind, as throughout history the human 
race had considered political communities bound by at least some moral strictures. "The 
230 
"For years the debating platforms in legislative halls in the United States resounded with calls for the 
elimination or diminution of sovereignty and the immediate establishment of a world federation or world 
government . .. one state legislature after another called for an amendment to the Constitution of this 
country to enable it to join the new order. Now suddenly there is a movement to do just the opposite -to 
amend the .. . Constitution to limit the normal and traditional treaty powers possessed and exercised since 
the foundation ofthis Republic." Ibid. 
231 Ibid., p. 78. 
232 Ibid., p. 80. 
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notion of the inherent amorality of state conduct introduced by Machiavelli", he said, "is 
an aberration and not an immutable truth233" . 
Furthermore, he argued, there existed no contradiction between extant methods of 
diplomacy and an international framework based on a standing organization such as the 
UN and occasional conferences. The condemnation of supposed legalistic formulations 
could best be applied, he maintained, to strictures such as those of the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact, but not the United Nations "which has devoted its energies to precisely what is 
recommended- the solution of awkward conflicts on their merits". He continued in his 
defense of international law, condemning the realists for failing to offer any alternative to 
law beyond "diplomacy" and "national interest", which he criticized as vague phrases 
with no precise meaning beyond what individuals might attribute to them234. 
In contrast, Feller interpreted the national interest as the upholding of 
international law, much as the liberal realists of interwar Britain had. Feller maintained 
that he would never reject acting in the national interest, and called on the legacies of 
Elihu Root, Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt as well as the reputations of Cordell Hull and 
Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg as statesmen who appreciated the link between law and 
power235 . For Feller, the implications of adhering to international law were clear: 
"Without power, a nation may be impotent; without a moral standard respected by other 
233 Ibid., p. 81. 
234 
"What do these mean? 'Diplomacy' is merely a procedure. It has no more substantive content than 
'speaking' or 'writing."' Ibid. 
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"These men were quite clear that the national interest oftheir country could be served, and served well, 
by asserting the influence of the United States for the maintenance and extension of law and justice. They 
were neither so naive nor so unrealistic as to ignore the significance of power in world affairs. They 
realized that the position of a nation in the world cannot be measured only in terms of the size of its armed 
forces." Ibid., p. 82. 
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peoples, it becomes the focus of hostility and fear." He stated his agreement with the 
realists that the United States needed more than a policy consisting of empty slogans. 
However, he derided their calls for "diplomacy" and a policy based on an ill-defined 
"national interest" as empty slogans themselves, maintaining his defense of the 
'"legalistic-moralistic approach'". A policy based on strict considerations of power alone 
would never capture the hearts of a world longing for a new era236. 
He concluded, interestingly, with an acknowledgement of the close ties between 
the United Nations collective security organization and the recently created balance of 
power alliances, noting, "In practical terms, the issue comes down to support of the 
United Nations idea and of the regional organizations which have recently been created 
along the same lines237 ." Thus Feller, like some of the very realists against whom he 
argued, embraced the United Nations and power balancing simultaneously. While his 
emphasis on international law distinguished him from men like Morgenthau who 
maintained their focus on power politics, Feller's embrace of"the legalistic-moralistic 
approach" did not preclude him from lending his support to the alliances created by the 
North Atlantic Treaty and the Rio Pact. His article provides an important piece of 
evidence suggesting the broad support these organizations enjoyed during the early Cold 
War period, and demonstrates yet again that power balancing and collective security, 
236
"At the same time I must state my deep conviction that for the long run, the ' legalistic-moralistic 
approach,' awkward as those words sound, applied sincerely and with a realistic regard for short-term 
limitations, will perforce remain the highroad of a decent and effective foreign policy ... The peoples will 
never believe that true and enduring world peace can be achieved without the eventual creation of a world 
order based on law and morality. In my view, they are perfectly right in their belief. A foreign policy 
devoted to the careful adjustment of power interests by professional diplomats may work for a time in a 
limited sphere, but it will never retain the allegiance of the mass of people who yearn for a better world." 
Ibid. 
237 1bid., p. 82-83. 
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despite the many perceived flaws of the United Nations, both commanded considerable 
popularity among American academics at this time. 
The final article in this issue ofthe AAAPSS carne from C.B. Marshall, then a 
member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff and formerly a journalist and 
Harvard government professor238 . His article, "National Interest and National 
Responsibility" attempted to support the latter concept as a more appropriate measure for 
determining the worth of American foreign policy. He agreed with the importance of 
emphasizing the national interest, and suggested that if all international conflicts could be 
reduced to questions of interest rather than principle, this would lead to a more 
manageable international system239 . Yet, he warned, a focus on national interest raised as 
many questions as it settled. He suggested that anyone could agree on the need to serve 
the national interest, but maintained that this proved easier said than done, for "There are 
many national interests, not just one. The difficulties arise in the conflict of one interest 
with another - for example, in the clash of the interest in peace with the interest in 
preserving national institutions ... 240" 
Marshall concluded, therefore, that "national responsibility" offered a better 
alternative, and promised that the remainder of his article would focus on this subject. In 
reality, the next page focused on a broad condemnation of the Soviet Union and elevation 
of the United States and the western world as a better place in which to live. When the 
238 Marshall, C.B. "National Interest and National Responsibility". Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, Vol. 282, The National Interest- Alone or with Others? (Jul., 1952), p. 90. 
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"it is good to hear people talk about international problems again in terms of national interests rather 
than in the abstractions of world government and world law. Indeed, it would be a blessed thing if all 
differences among nations could be translated into differences of basic purpose and principle. It is unselfish 
to compromise on interests. It is unseemly to compromise on ones principles." Ibid., p. 84. 
240 Ibid., p. 85. 
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author finally returned to his stated subject, he did so by drawing a contrast between his 
ideas and that of the prominent interwar isolationist and University of Chicago president, 
Robert Hutchins, who argued that the United States had been thrust into a position of 
world leadership against its will. Marshall strenuously disagreed with this reasoning, and 
responded that America had not been forced into its new role, but that the course of its 
industrial development into the most powerful state on earth had been responsible for this 
new state of affairs. Though Americans had not been aware of where their dynamic 
national growth would eventually lead, Marshall maintained that this "choice was none 
the less binding" despite its unintended consequences. Thus, he noted a paradox: 
Americans had become proud of their newfound national prowess while sensing that their 
nation had lost some of its free will241 . Modem scholars need only return to Borchard's 
farewell article to witness the acuteness with which some Americans felt this perceived 
loss. 
Marshall suggested that America's national course had changed not only with its 
massive growth in power, but also with the collapse ofthe balance of power in Europe. In 
the past, he argued, the United States enjoyed standing back from the European balance 
of power, as the European balance benefited Americans by ensuring that Europe would 
remain focused on its own problems. This generated among American policymakers the 
idea that their country needed at worst to temporarily intervene as a means of 
reestablishing the balance. Now, according to Marshall, the United States had become so 
powerful that its intervention was necessary to protect all its interests, surrendering its 
241 Ibid., p. 87-88. 
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former freedom in place of a new emphasis on responsibility. In addition, due to 
America's continual involvement it had lost the possibility of making sudden, radical 
changes through temporary interventions in the global balance. Now American policy 
must emphasize the long term242 . To affect this, the author proposed a policy of armed 
strength, alliances, and maintaining strength at "areas of sharp political conflict". 
Marshall noted that this policy involved the paradox of defending the national interest by 
transcending it and focusing on global stability. Responsibility, he argued, mandated 
making sacrifices to organize the western world around a system for the defense of its 
common values243 . This type of policy struck a realist note, advocating meeting strength 
with strength while assuming leadership of an alliance of democratic states. Considering 
this article in conjunction with the others in the Annals' special issue on the national 
interest, "liberal realist" tenets had found a new home among American thinkers. 
Walter Lippmann made an attempt to explain some of the contradictory aspects of 
American history to a foreign audience in his 1952 book, Isolation and Alliances: An 
American Speaks to the British. He reiterated many of his previous arguments, 
specifically that Americans had come to envision isolationism as a naturally occurring 
phenomenon rather than an outgrowth of historical circumstances in European politics. 
This spell had been temporarily broken by the threat of Imperial Germany during World 
War One and finally laid to rest by the events of the Second World War244 • The utopian 
visions to which Americans had clung during their struggles against Germany and Japan 
242 Ibid. 
243 Ibid., p. 89. 
244 Lippmann, Walter. Isolation and Alliances: An American Speaks to the British. Little, Brown and 
Company, Boston, 1952, p. 12-20. 
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had evaporated. Lippmann noted, as many others had by this point, that "they no longer 
arouse the fervor and the ardent hopes of 1918 and 1945." The attempt to apply righteous 
principles for which the world wars had been fought to the postwar settlements had 
proven an exercise in disappointment. Making a utopian peace was much more difficult 
than fighting a war for utopia245 . Most of Lippmann's latest work involved revisiting his 
past arguments, with the addition of one noteworthy piece of analysis regarding NATO. 
The North Atlantic Treaty, he wrote, constituted a formal recognition of the fact that 
Western Europe had no means to provide for its own security. It was a de jure 
0 0 f d fi 0 0 246 recogrutwn o a e acto s1tuat10n . 
The increasingly prolific Hans J. Morgenthau rang out 1952 with a very important 
article regarding international relations theory and praxis in the APSR. Indicating that the 
term "great debate" had already been applied to the interwar theoretical conflict between 
utopians and realists, Morgenthau paired this concept with his mantra of the national 
interest and titled his article "Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest ofthe United 
States". Noting what should by now be clear from the examination of international 
relations literature contained in this study, Morgenthau began, "What separates the 
'utopian' from the 'realist' position cannot be so sharply expressed in terms of alternative 
foreign policies. The very same policies can be and are being supported by both schools 
of thought [my emphasisf47." Thus, he challenged a key component of the supposed 
division between liberals and realists. Morgenthau, however, emphasized a critical point 
245 Ibid., p. 25. 
246 Ibid., p. 45-46. 
247 Morgenthau, Hans J. "Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the United States". The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 46, No.4 (Dec., 1952), p. 961. 
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of departure between the two schools of thought: their interpretations of human nature. 
The utopians believe, he wrote, that human nature is essentially good and human 
behavior malleable, and that conflict stems from mankind' s failure to rationally apply its 
principles. The realist believes in a fundamentally "imperfect" world of conflict which 
stems from aspects of human nature, and that policymak:ers should work with, rather than 
0 thi 248 agamst, s nature . 
With these considerations in mind, Morgenthau began another investigation of the 
intricacies of American policy formation. The concept of "national interest", he wrote, 
cannot have a strict definition, but like the terms "general welfare" and "due process" in 
the US constitution, it possessed a "residual meaning" which could be universally 
understood within context. Such an understanding was of critical importance: "As long as 
the world is politically organized into nations, the national interest is indeed the last word 
in world politics249." Turning to modem organizations such as the United Nations, 
Morgenthau cautioned that their institutional structure prevented them from pursuing any 
policies separate of those of the states that comprised them. Despite minimizing the 
United Nations, however, he maintained, "a world driven by national interest does not 
view the system as neither harmonious nor doomed to conflict. Rather, it assumes 
continuous conflict and threat of war, to be minimized through the continuous adjustment 
of conflicting interests by diplomatic action250." 
248 Ibid., p. 962. 
249 Ibid., p. 972. 
250 Ibid., p. 978. 
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Here, perhaps, readers might see some of the vagueness for which Feller criticized 
the "neo-realists", as Morgenthau suggested that the "national interest" could only be 
understood in a (highly debatable) context and relied on poorly defined "diplomatic 
action" to moderate the clash of interests in an anarchic system. Yet, the powerful realist 
still displayed an appreciation for varying theoretical approaches to world affairs. 
Returning to a previous theme of his writing, he again noted that philosophical concerns 
might coincide with power-political ones and thus a single policy might satisfy both 
simultaneously. Yet, while power-politics continued to dominate, philosophical matters 
remained important, he noted, because while they might not dictate whether a state goes 
to war, for instance, they will likely dictate how the war is fought, to what end, and the 
construction of the peace settlement. Morgenthau offered the example of the ongoing 
Korean conflict, noting that some realists and utopians both supported intervention in 
favor of South Korea, but for different reasons. While utopians backed collective security 
and viewed intervention as a "foregone conclusion", realists might also have come to the 
same conclusion ifthey believed it necessary and within the United States' power to 
th f . h . I . 2s1 protect Sou Korea as a means o servmg t e nat10na mterest . 
Such a parallel between moral and political interests carried certain risks, 
however. Morgenthau argued that being caught between the two paradigms had served 
the Truman administration poorly. It went to war "in good measure" to defend the 
utopian ideal of collective security, then allowed the military to provoke China into 
entering the conflict against realist calculations, and now prevented the American 
251 Ibid., p. 978-979. 
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military from doing its utmost to defeat China based on realist calculations with the goal 
of avoiding a third world war. Invoking an historical analogy, Morgenthau cited the 
paradox of British foreign policy during the interwar period in which it attempted to 
support the League, for a time, while still appeasing the Nazis to avoid conflict with a 
powerful potential enemy252. Morgenthau noted a similar conundrum regarding the idea 
of liberating·Eastem Europe from the Soviet yoke253 . 
Morgenthau concluded that the utopian-realist debate was not about morality and 
immorality, though utopians framed it in that manner. Instead, it was about two types of 
morality in conflict with each other. One standard, the utopian, evaluates abstract 
principles, whereas the realists filter them through the "moral requirements of concrete 
political action, their relative merits to be decided by a prudent evaluation of the political 
consequences to which they are likely to lead254." Therefore, Morgenthau's article 
emphasized not only important events of the period from the perspective of his realist 
vision, but also noted a key component of the liberal-realist debate. According to him, the 
defining characteristics of the two modes of thought could be detected not in form of the 
actions they supported, but instead by examining the motives behind the policies they 
advocated. Consequently, while liberals and realists might coalesce around similar 
policies, they maintained their distinctive outlooks on the nature of mankind and the 
international system, in addition to their disparate emphases on morality and power. This 
252 
"Thus Mr. Truman in 1952 is caught in the same dilemma from which Mr. Baldwin could [not] extricate 
himself in 1936 on the occasion of the League ofNations sanctions against Italy's attack on Ethiopia ... " 
Ibid., p. 980. 
253 Ibid. 
254 Ibid., p. 988. 
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outlook has important implications for the examination of international affairs of this 
period, and possibly in general, from the perspective of the liberal-realist dichotomy. 
Morgenthau's emphasis on national interest inspired a rebuttal in the March, 1953 
edition ofthe APSR. Thomas Cook and Malcolm Moos agreed that concepts such as the 
national interest, the balance of power, and "power politics" had been de-emphasized 
during the interwar period due to "N a'ive belief in the efficacy of professions of good 
will, reliance on weak instruments for effectuating simply noble intentions . .. and 
contentment with lofty exhortations". However, they maintained that American statesmen 
had always relied on their own interpretations of the national interest, despite the fact that 
Morgenthau argued this had frequently been cloaked in an idealistic guise255 . The authors 
also noted that Americans tended to eschew national aggrandizement because they 
conceived of the government and the state as mere instruments for protecting their way of 
life, not as an end ofthemselves256. 
They continued to argue that Hans Morgenthau' s prescriptions were insufficient, 
for deprecating the pronouncements of moralizers could not serve as the basis of a new, 
positive foreign policy. In the postwar period, they suggested, the United States had too 
quickly moved from the extreme notion that the affairs of others were none of its concern 
to the equally extreme reaction that threats abounded everywhere. This served to create a 
rigid national identity opposed to prospective enemies who perpetually lurked "just 
around the corner"257. At the end of their article, the authors renewed the charge which 
255 Cook, Thomas I. and Malcolm Moos. "The American Idea of International Interest" . The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Mar., 1953), p. 28. 
256 1bid., p. 32-33 . 
257 1bid., p. 37. 
459 
Morgenthau sought to defend against - that contemporary realists tended to view policy 
formation as devoid of moral considerations, and called for the redefinition of American 
national interest as "international interest", "For today security and sharing are 
interdependent258." Considering his latest contribution to the same journal, Cook and 
Moos seem to have unfairly maligned Morgenthau as an overbearing realist who 
completely ignored considerations of morality. His article of just a few months vintage 
alone would acquit him of this charge. However, Cook and Moos' article- demonstrated -
once again the preference of many scholars to interpret American national interest as _ 
global in nature, and to rely on the concept of interdependence to support this claim. 
Thus, the two men strike a strong note of continuity with the internationalist analysts 
from both the interwar and postwar periods, indicating the sustained commitment to an 
emphasis on emergent globalization. 
Hamilton Fish Armstrong also published an article in 1953 that offered a defense 
of the idealistic school of thought, as well as of the United Nations and its role in world 
affairs. Fish noted that the importance played by the UN in repelling North Korea's 
aggression underscored the organization's paramount importance in providing security 
for states around the globe259 . In addition to its role as an enforcer of international law, 
Fish also cited New York' s importance as a forum where world leaders could quickly 
learn the policies of their counterparts, though he made no allowance for the possibility 
that it might also become a venue for deception and propaganda260. When deciding 
258 Ibid., p . 44. 
259 Armstrong, Hamilton Fish. "The World is Round". Foreign Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Jan. , 1953), p. 177. 
260 Ibid., p . 191. 
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between NATO and the United Nations, Armstrong firmly favored the latter, stating that 
only an organization with the global scope and capabilities of the United Nations could 
rebuff Soviet aggression wherever it might occur. He argued that the United States had 
. many interests outside the realm ofNATO, and that weakening the United Nations would 
put American foreign policy as a whole at risk, calling continued awareness of the global 
nature of modem international politics the most realistic policy261 . 
While Armstrong suggested employing realist, power-political methods in an 
attempt to generate instability within the communist bloc262, he continued his emphasis 
on morality and high standards of conduct as well as collective security. He called the 
belief that realistic foreign policy relied on power alone and that international 
organizations hampered the application of such power mistaken. Citing the failure of 
Cesare Borgia, "the prototype of Machiavelli's Prince", he remarked, "The world is not 
all toughness and treason, and all those who had higher ideals and applied them with 
success did not win solely by accident263 ." Armstrong defended the United Nations from 
assertions that an international organization could determine matters of right and wrong 
261 
"Only an agency with global authority can meet the challenge of Soviet aggression; only the United 
Nations can provide security as well as peace. If the issue were ever put before us in the sophistical terms 
of conciliation versus force, or if the role of NATO were ever put in terms of reducing the United Nations 
to a glorified UNESCO, then we would have to say: We will not weaken the United Nations' capacity to 
enforce peace. So many of our interests are not covered by the Atlantic organization that our choice must 
necessarily be the larger grouping and the strategy which it makes possible. The men in the Kremlin are not 
making the mistake of thinking that a victory or defeat in one area will not bring them profit or loss in 
another. Let us emulate their realism." Ibid., p. 197. 
262 Fish proposed the interesting possibility of stoking nationalist resentment among the Soviet satellite 
states by, for example, telling the Poles that in the event of a Soviet collapse the United States would 
endorse their re-annexation of Galicia, while at the same time driving a wedge between Poland and W. 
Germany by expressing our belief that Polish expansion eastward would need to be compensated by a 
cession of the German/Polish borderlands annexed by Poland in 1945 to Germany. This would "impale 
Stalin more sharply on the horns of his German-Polish dilemma". Ibid., p. 179. 
263 1bid., p. 199. 
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by asserting that the UN claimed no such mandate. Rather, he lauded its role as a body 
which could adjudicate international disputes based on standards to which all its members 
had assented, and which could mobilize global support for victims of aggression. "That is 
about as practical and realistic a method as can be devised for determining aggression and 
for rallying sufficient force to defeat criminal force", he concluded264. Thus, while other 
authors attempted to situate support for NATO within their continued approval of the 
United Nations, Armstrong continued to adhere to a course based almost entirely on 
collective security. 
The AAAPSS devoted another issue to power balancing in July 1953, entitled 
"NATO and World Peace". The first piece came from the director of Columbia 
University's Institute of War and Peace Studies director and the managing editor of the 
World Politics journal, William T.R. Fox. He compared NATO to power balancing 
alliances of past ages, such as those directed against Louis XIV and Napoleon, as well as 
the Triple Entente265 . Importantly, Fox noted that the structure ofNATO existed within 
the wider forum ofthe United Nations, and was designed to assist its members in 
upholding their commitments to the UN266. While Fox proved happy to place NATO in 
an historical, and hopefully acceptable context, he also noted certain novel facets of 
modem international relations. For the first time in modem history, the number of great 
powers had been reduced to only two. Furthermore, participation in the alliance must be 
264 1bid. 
265 Fox, William T.R. ' 'NATO and Coalition Diplomacy" . Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, Vol. 288, NATO and World Peace (Jul., 1953), p. 114 and 118. 
266 
"Thus we see in NATO elements of traditional military alliance, of military planning among allies in 
anticipation of a specific war, of grand alliance against an expanding aspirant for universal hegemony, and 
of regional security guarantee to buttress a commitment already made through membership in a general 
international organization." Ibid., p. 114. 
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continuous and begin well before the outbreak of conflict due to the technical complexity 
of modem war. Fox also noted, like Lippmann, that the North Atlantic alliance stemmed 
from the recognition that the states of Europe had become so exhausted by war they 
could not attack each other or defend themselves from aggression. This, he suggested, 
made it both imperative and easy for the European states to ally themselves with the 
United States267. 
Another article in this issue of the Annals came from the pen of Owen J. Roberts, 
a member of the US Supreme Court from 1930 to 1945 and the contemporary president 
ofthe Atlantic Union Committee, the successor of Clarence Streit's Federal Union268 . 
Entitled "What Should Follow from NATO", Roberts argued in favor of adding 
additional components to the Atlantic military alliance. In the tradition of Streit's original 
federalist idea, Roberts called for a unified foreign and economic policy for NATO 
members, though he admitted that the United States Constitution in its current form 
would not permit this. He held - in unionist fashion -that granting such additional 
powers to NATO remained imperative, as a large number of sovereign states could not 
organize for defense as effectively as a common entity269. Indeed, Roberts held nothing 
back from his endorsement of the unionist idea: 
I think the salvation ofthe forward-looking people of the 
world lies in integration. I think the time has come when all 
the free people of Western Europe and Canada and 
ourselves can find some instrumentality that will represent 
them all this way. I believe they will be willing to take 
from their respective legislatures certain limited powers 
267 lbid., p. 114-115. 
268 Roberts, Owen J. "What Should Follow from NATO?" Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, Vol. 288, NATO and World Peace (Jul., 1953), p. 139. 
269 lbid., p. 137-138. 
and, in the interest of all, give them to some central 
agency270• 
He continued in this vein, denouncing the United Nations along with the League as 
failures, and reiterating his plea for an immediate, comprehensive overhaul ofNATO. 
Roberts ' article demonstrates the survival of the Federal Union idea that had emerged 
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immediately prior to the outbreak ofthe war, but his article' s status as virtually the only 
expression of faith in the concept at this late juncture indicates that it had been almost 
completely supplanted by support either for NATO, the United Nations, or- as the 
literature suggests - both. 
The 1953 publication of Foreign Policy Without Fear by Vera Dean offers 
modem readers a detailed interpretation of the state of internationalism in the United 
States at the end of the Truman administration. Both with regard to content and the 
timing of its publication, it serves as a useful capstone for this investigation of middle 
twentieth century international relations literature. Dean, a confirmed internationalist, 
took the opportunity to celebrate the increased popularity of her school' s views as well as 
to caution readers against putting too much faith in America's newfound willingness to 
wield its power and influence. Expressing the internationalist credo that "We need the 
rest of the world just as they need us", she warned that despite the United States' status as 
the most powerful state on the globe, it could not simply impose its will on the rest of the 
planet. America, she insisted, must persuade and not merely coerce271 . 
270 Ibid. , p. 138-139. 
271 Dean, Vera Micheles. Foreign Policy Without Fear. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1953, p . 7. 
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Dean spent several paragraphs discussing the concept of power balancing and its 
relationship to the contemporary world. She remarked that Americans had long thought 
of the balance of power as an evil machination devised by the British to maintain their 
prominence in Europe. This led to the belief that power balancing had an "inherently 
evil" connotation. As a result, Americans had also been opposed to the attendant concepts 
of "spheres of influence, special trade arrangements, strategic bases in other countries, 
and so on", and expected other states to "act from altruistic motives", just as the United 
States supposedly did272• Dean proceeded to argue against this outlook, stating that the 
communist world viewed such power politics as natural, and that the United States' allies 
and prospective allies had all operated under the assumption of power balancing 
throughout history. She cited the example of Churchill ' s "percentages agreement" with 
Stalin in 1944. Dean clearly implied in her argument that the United States' failure to 
comprehend the attitude of its allies as well as the Kremlin toward power balancing 
constituted a threat to the American position in the Cold War. Dean also adopted a realist 
perspective toward small states such as Finland, arguing that in the past they had felt 
compelled to side with one of their potential adversaries against the other. She argues that 
if the United States seeks to obviate power balancing, it must seek through the United 
Nations some new policy whereby small states may feel secure from attack without 
bandwagoning273 . This seemed to imply collective security as the only alternative, 
particularly as Dean relied on the example of the ongoing Korean war to illustrate her 
point. 
272 Ibid., p. 10. 
273 Ibid. , p. 10-14. 
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Dean shifted from such strategic calculations to elaborate upon her view that 
promoting economic growth and emphasizing the success of capitalism and democracy in 
the United States provided a useful path toward prevailing against Soviet designs. This 
soft-power appeal to utilizing economic growth and fashioning a positive international 
image found expression in a chapter entitled "America Is a Hell of a Success" - the 
message Dean wished to impress on the rest of the world. She concluded this argument 
with an emphatic argument that the United States must consider how other powers 
viewed its policy, offering a strong appeal against isolationism274. Thus, for Dean, there 
remained an important place in American policy for moral-political calculations, even as 
she defended the supposedly realist notion of power balancing and encouraged her 
readers not to reject that security paradigm out of hand. Further evidence for this came 
from her recommendation that even though the United States had long found it useful to 
make common cause with dictatorial regimes such as those of Thailand and the 
Dominican Republic when it suited Washington' s interest, the United States should 
ensure that other states remained aware of its preference for dealing with fellow 
democracies275 . 
Dean proceeded to assert that a paradox had emerged in the form of American 
foreign policy with regard to international cooperation and its overseas commitments. 
Taking the American perspective that "Our intentions are excellent. We want to make 
274 
"The United States, whether we like it or not, must care about what others think of us. Much as we 
might prefer to have this country become a great power wholly independent of the likes or dislikes of actual 
or potential allies, the stark truth is that the United States would be gravely crippled, perhaps completely 
paralyzed, if in case of war with the U.S.S.R. it could not count on the sympathy and support of nations in 
other continents." Ibid., p. 15-44, quote from p. 44. 
275 Ibid., p. 76-78. 
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sure that the UN will resist aggression wherever it may occur, and that the machinery of 
collective security can be put into action without delay", she warned that the United 
States may sometimes press too strongly for its allies to "'integrate or die"', noting "By a 
curious paradox, the United States, which before 1945 seemed to epitomize national 
resistance to international cooperation, now seems ready to curtail the sovereignty of 
fellow members of the UN to achieve collective security276." Yet, she adhered to her 
internationalist worldview by advocating international control of atomic weapons, as well 
as conventional annaments, calling for the creation of a UN-controlled annl77. She also 
celebrated another sign of isolationism's demise, remarking that Eisenhower's 
nomination over the conservative Senator Taft for the Republican nomination for the 
presidency appeared to deliver the deathblow to isolationism (personified by Taft). 
Although the Republicans attacked facets of American postwar foreign policy, they 
issued assurances that no "reversal" or abdication of superpower status would occur 
under a Republican administration278 . In her conclusion, Dean called for continued 
engagement with American allies in a respectful and collaborative manner, continued 
improvement of the world standard of living and the development of underdeveloped 
regions. The United States could most easily achieve this spirit of cooperation, she 
argued, via the United Nations. Dean concluded, "The most essential of these ingredients 
[of foreign policy] is faith in our own capacity to act democratically. This, and this alone, 
can make us face the grueling tasks of foreign policy without fear279." 
276 Ibid., p. 80-81. 
277 Ibid., p. 177-178. 
278 Ibid. 
279 Ibid., p. 208. 
467 
Moving Sideways? 
The title of Dean's book suggests simultaneous continuity and change in 
American elites' approach to their country's foreign policy since 1933. With regard to the 
former, Foreign Policy Without Fear's emphasis on democratic processes harkened to 
her 1934 article on the emergence ofNazi Germany. More generally, the title reflects 
Dean's attempt to assuage the concerns of her readers regarding the conduct of American 
foreign policy. This suggests additional continuity, as the American public remained ill at 
ease regarding the outside world and the threats it posed, particularly - as noted by Dean 
-with the advent of nuclear weapons. Conversely, World War Two and its outcome had 
prompted a massive change in the United States' approach to foreign policy that was 
reflected in the period literature. While apprehension continued to weigh heavily on 
American foreign policy formation and analysis, the concerns of Americans had become 
·wholly different as a result of the century's most shattering conflict. As previously 
indicated, interwar debate focused simply on whether the United States should pursue 
any real political role beyond its shores. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, however, 
Americans' discussion and fears centered not on whether, but how to engage the wider 
world. 
It is tempting to envision this as beginning early in the war, as evidenced by 
internationalist writing such as that of Eagleton in "Organization of the Community of 
Nations", Alan Nevins and John Herz. Nevertheless, modem scholars must recall that this 
powerful stream of internationalist thought expressed itself continuously throughout the 
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interwar period as well. Their view of an interdependent world in which an engaged 
United States had always played an active role did not come into being with America' s 
entry into the Second World War, but had a lengthy history reaching back many years. 
The American wartime experience did, however, bring American foreign policy and the 
attitude of the country into line with these concepts. The course of events had fmally 
converged with the internationalist view, giving a seemingly new momentum to the logic 
of writers as diverse as Frederick Schulman, Hans Morgenthau, James Shotwell and 
Henry Stimson. During the interwar period internationalists had always to contend with a 
powerful isolationist movement both in academia and among the public. As a result, the 
debate between isolationism and interventionism seemed an intractable one as the United 
States veered between the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the highly disputed Neutrality Acts, 
with neither side gaining an advantage. 
The war indisputably settled this debate by demolishing the isolationists. The 
scholarly literature of the period attests to this fact. During the 1930s, the internationalist 
vision of an interdependent world wherein acts undertaken by states on the opposite side 
of the globe had an important impact on the United States remained highly obscured to 
many Americans. Like the liberal realists of Great Britain, American internationalists had 
to argue that the world they envisioned really existed against another stream of 
scholarship that preferred an alternative vision of the United States as a secure bastion of 
decency in a world of venal, acquisitive powers bent on war. With America' s entry into 
the conflict, isolationists could no longer assert that a benign abstention from partaking in 
the dark arts of power politics would protect the United States. The interwar 
internationalist vision of an America thoroughly enmeshed in a global political and 
economic network had become impossible to ignore. 
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This reality manifested itself in the literature with the profusion of intense and 
virtually automatic denunciations of the folly that had been isolationism. While the 
interwar debate between the two policies had been robust and passionate, it had been the 
isolationists who assumed a high-handed tone of self-righteousness. In 1942, it seems, 
internationalist writers became acutely aware that isolationists could no longer defend 
themselves. What had once been pleas for Americans to realize the implications of a 
globalized world became bold statements of fact after Pearl Harbor. Where Morgenthau, 
for instance, had discussed neutrality in 1939 with careful reference to the example of 
Switzerland and the calm but firm warning that power rather than intent guaranteed 
neutrality, the 1950s saw him empowered to firmly rebuke the same policy he gently 
chided a decade earlier as "the very negation of foreign policy". 
The growing importance of American internationalism was also reflected in the 
sheer volume of articles on the topic in premier academic journals. Whereas the interwar 
period witnessed brisk discussion of the matter in The American Journal of International 
Law to the exclusion of most other journals, the war years saw an increased focus on 
international affairs in other journals such as the APSR. This allowed a chorus of new 
voices such as James Warburg and Margaret Spahr to enter the discussion, all of whom 
supported some brand of internationalist politics. The isolationist camp, by contrast, saw 
no increase in its numbers. That discussion of foreign affairs would increase during an 
earth-shattering global conflict might have little significance in its own right, but the fact 
that no new isolationist writers garnered space in top academic journals amidst an 
explosion of internationalist sentiment provides the strongest evidence of the crushing 
victory of internationalists within the American mainstream. 
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Despite the pronounced conceptual shift that had occurred among American 
foreign policy analysts as a result of World War Two, there remained an important 
element of continuity also reflected by Foreign Policy Without Fear- specifically fear 
itself. Except for a brief moment of optimism immediately preceding the Axis' defeat, the 
idea that storm clouds dimmed the future of global affairs remained inescapable. While 
the locus of debate changed, consensus remained elusive. However, it was this shift to a 
discussion of how to manage American engagement with other powers that prompted the 
revelatory and influential discussion concerning power balancing and collective security 
that dominated the postwar period and that will figure prominently in the final analysis of 
this study. It is therefore possible for modem readers of the periods' scholarly and foreign 
policy literature to conceive of the debate from the perspective of creative destruction. 
Only with the victory of internationalism over isolationism was the analysis of more 
complex topics such as collective security allowed to fully flourish. The Second World 
War, like the first, provided the impetus for a discussion of security instead of simply 
peace. Likewise, the aftermath of World War Two disappointed those who looked 
forward with hope to a new era of stability. The chasm between expectations and reality, 
perhaps, constituted the strongest example of continuity between interwar and postwar 
American foreign policy thought. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Great Britain Confronts the Past and Looks to the Future 
The literature examined in the second and third chapters of this study 
demonstrated the extent to which some interwar British writers wrestled with the 
dominant foreign policy perspective of their time while developing interesting 
alternatives with considerable relevance to the theoretical debate at the center ofthis 
study. The intellectual conflict between the staid brand of appeasement preached by men 
such as Lord Lothian and Wilson Harris, the liberal realists such as Nicolson, Woolf and 
Zimmem, and the harsh critique of E.H. Carr generated a rich literature that is and should 
continue to be of great interest and use to modem scholars of international relations. The 
influence of the interwar period on the formulation of international relations theory has 
been recognized in the secondary literature, as discussed in chapter three, with the fitting 
title of the "first great debate" in the history ofthe discipline. 
Without a doubt, the impetus of this passionate and broad discussion concerning 
the concepts of statecraft came from Britain's awareness of its position, its national 
legacy, and the threats facing it in the decade of the 1930s. As authors of the liberal 
realist school such as Toynbee frequently discussed, Britain and Britons possessed a high 
degree of power that stemmed from their history as a great imperial state. A second 
component of this heritage was the British peoples' recognition that their democratic 
values constituted a cornerstone of their society. Therefore, the defense of Britain meant 
not only the preservation of their homeland but the ideals they held so dear. Such 
sentiment also clearly emerged in the writing of men such as Harold Nicolson and 
Norman Angell, in addition to the numerous references to "civilization" that appeared in 
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British writing on both sides of the debate during the period. Finally, appeasers and their 
opponents alike appreciated, and generally feared, the growing power of antagonistic, 
non-democratic states on the continent. This fear of Germany and, in conservative circles, 
the Soviet Union, contributed strongly to the avid interest displayed by so many of 
Britain's brightest scholars and thinkers of the time. As demonstrated by the thought of 
P.M.S. Blackett, such concerns extended beyond the realm of politically oriented analysts 
rooted in the humanities and into other areas of the academy as well. Together, the 
United Kingdom's position as the preeminent democratic power in Europe, the possessor 
of the world's largest empire, and its proximity to threats from the continent, typified by 
the "air fear", made the necessity of a vigorous debate over foreign policy inescapable for 
citizens of interwar Britain. 
As demonstrated in this study's investigation of American foreign policy thought 
before and after Pearl Harbor, American writers on the subject entertained a mostly 
dichotomous debate between internationalism and isolationism during the years before 
1942, but quickly embarked on a much more complex discussion as the United States 
began to fill the role of an active great power extending its authority overseas. The actual 
exercise of America's power, considerable from the outset and increasingly dominant as 
the war and postwar years progressed, seems to have encouraged an increasingly nuanced 
theoretical debate regarding a wide variety of possible foreign policies. This discussion 
possessed a much more multiform character than that of the interwar period, extending 
far beyond the simple choice between isolation and intervention into various forms of 
organizing for collective security and types of power balancing. 
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Britain saw its fortunes proceed in the opposite direction. Though it valiantly 
withstood the fascist threat and weathered the dreaded aerial offensive that the Reich 
ultimately pressed on London and other British cities, its fortunes had been thoroughly 
reversed by war's end. Whereas it had previously been arguably the greatest power on 
earth since 1815, by 1945 its economic strength had been exhausted. Relying on large 
loans from the United States, its military atrophied. Meanwhile, the vaunted empire 
began to slip from Britain's grasp, notably with the loss of the crown jewel of India in 
1947. Britain's withdrawal from its leadership role in the Balkans prompted the 
declaration of the Truman Doctrine, and other imperial entanglements such as that in 
mandatory Palestine further demonstrated the increasing hollowness of Britain's power. 
By the time it next engaged in a major war with its participation in the Korean conflict, 
Britain had become a subsidiary partner in the American-dominated NATO alliance, and 
could only devote a small contingent to the UN forces in Korea relative to the massive 
armies it had but recently deployed against the German Afrika Korps and in Europe. As 
Britain's importance in world politics began to decline, and the pressure on Britain to 
maintain itself as the strongest democratic power waned, did British intellectuals likewise 
abdicate their role as preeminent analysts of international relations and slide into the 
realm of simplicity as their American counterparts took the lead in strategizing for the 
future? 
Opening Moves 
Even a cursory study of the intense and combative debate that followed in the 
wake ofE.H. Carr's publication of The Twenty Years ' Crisis immediately after the 
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outbreak of World War Two suggests the contrary. As demonstrated by the analysis 
contained in chapter three, Carr's work provoked a considerable volume of commentary 
which indicated the continued focus of British scholars on theoretical questions even as 
their country faced its greatest challenge since the days ofNapoleon. Indeed, when one 
considers that various of the responses to Carr's book, such as the stinging rebuke by 
Leonard Woolf, were committed to paper even as the Luftwaffe first attacked Britain from 
the air and while the Kriegsmarine initiated its attempted U-Boat blockade of the British 
Isles, modern scholars cannot help but appreciate the focus that such thought and writing 
would have required amidst the tumult of 1940. 
While possibly the most enduring and noteworthy aspects of the wartime British 
discussion of international relations theory have already been addressed, the same authors 
also wrote on topics related to British foreign policy in general throughout the early 
phases of World War Two. Unsurprisingly, the inexhaustible Norman Angell quickly 
produced a lengthy and insightful book (previously alluded to in this study) entitled For 
What do we Fight? He advanced a complex argument that he outlined in the opening 
chapter, logically titled "What This Book Tries to Do". Firstly, Sir Norman argued that 
Britain and France entered the war on the side of Poland to uphold the central organizing 
principle of society, which he did not define but which the reader can infer as the primacy 
of law. This, he asserted, had not been applied in international relations until the present1. 
Referring to an important prong of period British thought, he also asserted that Britain 
and France had taken up arms against Hitler to defend the gains of the Enlightenment, 
1 Angell, For What do we Fight?, p. 1. 
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specifically against the divine right of kings, which he saw reflected in the adoration 
which the dictators demanded from their citizens. In the rule and in the aggression of the 
European dictators, Angell detected a counterrevolution against the Enlightenment 
period2. Later in the book, Angell asserted that Germany had fallen to such a low level of 
civilization under Nazi rule that a German victory threatened to drag Europe back into the 
Dark Ages3. 
Angell blamed the rise of fascism on the failure of European states to create a 
collective security system which would have ensured the security of its members and 
therefore undermined the appeal of virulently militarist movements; Furthering this 
argument, and displaying the criticism of systemic anarchy that would color so much of 
the wartime literature in America, he remarked: "The price of international anarchy is the 
increasing surrender by men of painfully acquired rights and freedoms. The continuance 
of actual or latent war between nations must make the maintenance of democracy 
impossible." Angell continued in this vein, arguing that the Allies bore some 
responsibility for the outbreak of war due to their failure to create a system that would 
ensure security, and that winning the war would demand a promise to better fulfill this 
role in the future. To achieve victory, he asserted, London and Paris must secure the 
cooperation and allegiance of other states. This would require proof that their recent 
conversion to the logic of defending victims of aggression (since the German occupation 
of Czechoslovakia in March 1939) had become a permanent fixture of their policy4. 
2 Ibid., p. 1-2. 
3 Ibid., p. 74. 
4 Ibid., p. 2-3. 
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From the beginning, then, Angell sought to attach his dream of interstate 
cooperation, a reduction of international anarchy, and the creation of a robust collective 
security organization to the Allied war effort. Within weeks of the outset of the war, 
while E.H. Carr was likely applying the finishing touches to his epic work, Angell 
expressed the hope that a British victory in the Second World War would give rise to the 
kind of world that had been promised at the end of the first. Like certain of his American 
counterparts, particularly Clarence Streit, Angell envisioned a diminution of national 
sovereignty as a key component of his plan. The best means for France and Britain to 
demonstrate their commitment to postwar European security and solidarity, he 
maintained, would require the formation of a federal union between Paris and London5. 
Furthermore, he argued, they should open their colonial empires to free trade with neutral 
states as a means of demonstrating that the democracies had not begun a fight against 
Hitler merely to protect their privileged trade positions. This led to another point, as 
5 Remarkably, the British government extended such a proposal to France on June 16, 1940 as a means of 
preventing the French government from surrendering while the country's defenses crumbled. It had been 
preceded several days earlier, during the battle for Paris, by a stirring public announcement in which the 
British government promised the French people that, "it takes 'this opportunity of proclaiming the 
indissoluble union of our two peoples and our two Empires. ' It continues: 'We cannot measure the various 
forms of tribulation which will fall upon our peoples in the near future . We are sure that the ordeal by fire 
will only fuse them together into one unconquerable whole. We renew to the French Republic our pledge 
and resolve to continue the struggle at all costs in France, in this island, upon the oceans, and in the air, 
wherever it may lead us ... We shall never turn from the conflict until France stands safe and erect in all her 
grandeur, until the wronged and enslaved States and peoples have been liberated, and until civilization is 
free from the nightmare ofNazidom. That this day will dawn we are more sure than ever. It may dawn 
sooner than we now have the right to expect."' The formal British proposal called for an "'Act of Union' 
between Great Britain and France ... It is suggested that there shall at once be formed an 'indissoluble 
union' between the two nations, with a Constitution providing for joint organs of defense and the joint 
conduct of foreign, financial and economic policies. 'Every citizen of France will enjoy immediately 
citizenship of Great Britain, every British subject will become a citizen of France.' During the present war 
there will be a single war cabinet, and all the forces of the two nations on land, sea and air will be placed 
under its direction." This proposal was ultimately rejected by France; according to some rumors the French 
war cabinet voted 14-10 against union with Britain. Armstrong, Hamilton Fish. "The Downfall of France" . 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 19, No.1 (Oct., 1940), p. 104, 109-110. 
477 
Angell maintained that citizens of the democracies must disabuse themselves of the belief 
that merely defeating Germany would guarantee world peace. This logic did not prove 
itself in the aftermath of the First World War; therefore the democracies needed to 
commit themselves to a restructuring of the international system after the war if they 
wished to avoid recommitting the follies of the interwar era6. 
Taking the extra step toward a European federation would, according to Angell, 
benefit Germany itself in addition to reducing the fear of German aggression among other 
continental states. Angell related the German argument that its position in central Europe 
made Germany uniquely vulnerable, surrounded by potentially powerful rivals and in 
close proximity to the chaotic eastern portion of the continent. Therefore, German 
thinkers claimed, Germany must either subdue its neighbors or risk falling under their 
dominion (as occurred in the era prior to unification in 1871). Angell used this claim to 
argue that a federative structure for Europe would allow Germany to thrive without the 
fear that she might fall under foreign domination or suffer from chaos on her eastern 
frontier, "but no such society exists, experience with the League would seem to suggest 
that it is incapable of existing (according to German critics) and so Germany has to face 
the alternatives which her nature and history present to her: Dominate or perish." A 
. federation of Europe offered an escape from this vicious cycle 7• The author reiterated this 
argument in later portions of the book as well, along with the assertion that a British 
commitment to a European federation would also demonstrate to the United States a new 
6 Angell, For What do we Fight?., p. 4-8. 
7 Ibid. , p. 56-57. 
478 
willingness by Britain to change its previously wrongheaded policl. Angell's 
- commitment to this concept and the amount of consideration he poured into it suggests, 
along with the numerous local organizations dedicated to Streit's "Federal Union" which 
formed in the United Kingdom, that enthusiasm for federative structures emerged 
simultaneously on both sides of the Atlantic during 1939 and shortly afterward. 
Angell subsequently returned to his previously noted condemnation of pacifism, 
relying on an interesting and highly topical analogy to advance his argument. He began 
by once again remarking that security, rather than peace, constituted the primary interest 
of states. Angell's interpretation of France's invasion of the Ruhr and its relevance to the 
pacifist case that appeared in For What do we Fight appeared in chapter three and marked 
the beginning of Sir Norman's analysis of the pacifist question in this book. Next, Angell 
examined a common pacifist argument and quoted Gerald Heard' s claim that German 
aggression stemmed from fear of attack. Heard believed that if Britain unilaterally 
disarmed, Germany would no longer fear it and would therefore not show any disposition 
to threaten the United Kingdom. Angell refuted this argument with specific reference to 
Germany by noting that the Jews of Germany had never constituted a physical threat to 
the Reich, yet that had not stopped the Nazi regime from targeting them with cruel 
methods of persecution. More generally, Angell noted that Africans posed no threat to 
Europeans, but that did not.dissuade Europe from colonizing Africa, nor did it prevent 
8 Ibid., p. 318-320. 
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Britain from becoming engaged against the Boers for reasons that had naught to do with 
the physical security ofthe British homeland9. 
Angell, then, believed that simply acting in a non-threatening manner would not 
protect anyone from the depredations of greedy or warlike neighbors. Self-defense 
therefore promised the only means of achieving security. He made an important 
distinction, however, in describing self-defense as the prerogative of the community of 
nations and not only individual states: "To refuse the community- whether international 
or national the right of force, to demand that law shall be without sanction, is in fact to 
pin our faith on the workability of anarchy. But, broadly, anarchy which might work if 
each were governed by supreme wisdom, asks too much of too many10." Once again, 
Angell demonstrated that while he believed security via pacifism might obtain in a world 
governed by rationality rather than passion, greed, and fear, he by no means advocated 
pacifism in an anarchic world abounding with threats. Angell also addressed the 
argument that violence executed on behalf of the international community presented the 
same problem as violence committed for state interest alone. He likened the latter to the 
personal vendettas such as that of the Hatfields and McCoys, whereas violence done by 
the police against criminals prevented such destabilizing feuds. Similarly, while Italy 
might have felt antipathy toward Britain and France if they had taken action against the 
Abyssinian invasion on their own, harboring resentment against a 52-strong community 
of nations would have been more difficult and less threatening to all. Collective security 
9 Ibid. , p. 84-88. 
10 Ibid. 
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could have obviated the threat of interstate war by not only presenting an unconquerable 
front against aggression, but also by defraying concomitant resentment11 . 
Angell defended the concept of collective security and returned to his argument 
that the Allies could best gamer moral legitimacy by endorsing it in the chapter "What Is 
the Best Defense ofthe Allied Purpose?" In it, he argued once more that the mere defeat 
of Germany would mean nothing if the victors repeated their failure of 1919 to usher in a 
new era of international relations12. After issuing another denunciation of appeasement 
advocates with regard to the Abyssinian crisis13, Angell again demonstrated his inherent 
realism with the assertion that the democratic or autocratic nature of states should not 
matter when the question of upholding the law arose. To support this claim, Angell noted 
that the greatest ideological opponents of the age, Stalin and Hitler, managed to come to 
an agreement regarding Poland when they became convinced that it was necessary for 
their security. Governing philosophy, therefore, should not determine the functional 
worth of a collective security system14, which would offer, "the most effective, the least 
evil way, for the purpose which is the most fundamental of all purposes of living things -
self preservation 15." 
As in his other writings, Angell defended the concept of collective security from a 
variety of challenges with considerable tenacity. The extent to which Sir Norman 
11 Ibid., p. 90-92. 
12 
"The mere defeat of Germany means nothing unless it is followed by some amelioration of the 
fundamental anarchy - absence of law and government - in international relations. When each fights, not 
for freedom as such, but only when his own freedom is endangered, then the enemy of to-day becomes the 
ally ofto-morrow; the ally, the enemy; anarchy and violence without end." Ibid., p. 116. 
13 
"He [Mussolini] and Bono were really doing a work of civilization, explained Mr. Garvin and Mr. 
Bernard Shaw, and scores of other eminents." lbid., p. 118. 
14 lbid., p. 145. 
15 lbid., p. 151. 
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committed to rebutting the claims of the idea's critics- totaling approximately 175 pages 
in this book- illustrates his zeal for Wilsonianism and the League. Regarding the tension 
between collective security and power balancing, Angell addressed the claims of 
"Scrutator" (the nom de plume of The Sunday Times' Sidney Sidebotham) that the 
alliance system sparked World War One and that '"The beginning of wisdom in Europe 
is to realize that this mischief of alliances and counter-alliances is as dangerous now 
[before September, 1939] as in 1914, and is not in the least mended by calling it 
collective security or invoking the name of the League ofNations." To this Angell 
responded that the alliance system of 1914 lacked all the components that distinguished 
collective security. The Entente and Triple Alliance sought to uphold no overarching 
rules regarding international conduct and, more importantly, they were exclusionary in 
nature. They offered security only to their own members against the threat posed by the 
rival alliance. Unlike collective security, they did not offer protection to the putative 
aggressor as well16. Furthermore, Angell quoted a passage from Time & Tide that echoed 
the claim of Carr that the League constituted a balance of power alliance designed by the 
status quo states to maintain their ill-gotten imperialist gains from states who had no 
opportunity to forge maritime empires in the 19th century. Angell replied that the 
presence or absence of the League would do nothing to alter the fact that the fascist 
powers sought to redress the status quo by force 17• 
Along similar lines, Angell again wrote of the erstwhile appeasers ' hypocrisy 
regarding the supposed coercive nature of the League, maintaining the argument from 
16 Ibid. , p. 186-187. 
17 Ibid. , p. 203-204. 
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certain of his other books that collective security would simply further the protection 
established by the Empire. If Britain defended its own territory or that of its colony in 
Kenya, for example, no Briton would dare call such an action "coercion". On the 
contrary, Angell lamented, the defense of an innocent third party elicited jeers from these 
staunch nationalists despite the fact that "Neither is coercion. Germany and Italy have 
merely to refrain from killing other people and they will have nothing to fear from the 
'league against aggression' whether the old or the new18." And, as to the argument made 
by anti-League individuals that collective security would transform all wars into world 
wars, Angell retorted, "if in truth, the aggressor really foresaw that all wars were to be 
world wars, he would not risk aggression. When the whole world is prepared to concern 
itself with the prevention of any war, war will end19." 
This presaged the appearance of the same argument in the realist John J. Herz's 
article, "Power Politics and World Organization", three years later. Sir Norman further 
burnished his realist, or arguably "liberal realist", credentials by embarking on a 
discourse on the importance of power in an anarchic world. Without some constitutional, 
collective system for the management of power, Angell maintained, the drive to ensure 
one's own security by dominating rather than simply balancing rival states pushed 
nations inexorably down the road to war. Ultimately, however, the security dilemma 
would render such quests for dominance fruitless20. The opening of chapter twelve 
18 Ibid., p. 194. 
19 Ibid., p. 210. 
20 
"This writer has always challenged that view [that wars stem from economic considerations] and held 
that the forces which make for war are much more political than economic, are to be found in the need of 
states for power to the point of predominance as the sole instrument of defense - that is to say self-
preservation, survival- in a sphere where no commonly supported law or constitution exists." Ibid., p. 219, 
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renewed this line of argument and again reflected the author's reasoning from other 
works, once more drawing attention to the fact that Imperial Germany's possession of 
even more land and resources than Hitler had demanded prior to the outbreak of World 
War Two had failed to ensure peace, as insecurity amidst anarchy rather than territorial 
conquest underlay the propensity of states to make war on one another21 . 
Angell concluded by remarking that British policy of the interwar period had been 
ineffective due to its inconsistency, neither punishing Germany harshly for its violation 
of international law and the security of its neighbors, nor ensuring the creation of a 
framework that would have precluded the German people's willingness to seek security 
through rnilitarism22. Lastly, he returned to his frequent plea for the common man to 
realize the ways in which international politics had changed from the assumptions of 
previous eras. Only wisdom on behalf of the British electorate would result in the 
realization of a new policy that would ensure escape from the recurring nightmare of 
E nfl. 23 uropean co 1ct . 
Norman Angell furthered his call for Britain to formulate a constructive policy to 
inspire international confidence and win the war with Germany in Why Freedom Matters. 
In addition to his previously noted retrospective comments that a united coalition of 
and "given the international anarchy, national power must in the end defeat itself as a means of defence 
because it must always be competitive and relative: A's security depends on being stronger than B, which 
kills B's security; a fact which will prompt B to return the compliment." Ibid., p. 220. 
21 
"We have the proof of experience that revision of Versailles, even to the extent of restoring Germany to 
everything she possessed in 1914, would not give peace: when she had it, peace was not kept. The supreme 
grievance of every state is absence of security. Until that is redressed, the redress of none other counts." 
Ibid., p. 233 . 
22 
"So we have made the worst of both worlds. If repression of Germany had been carried out thoroughly, 
and her attempts at rearmament jumped on, with energy, we should not be in the present position. If we had 
made the most of the opposite policy of conciliation in the early stages ... we should not now be in this 
present position. We followed neither road consistently." Ibid., p. 324. 
23 Ibid., p. 327. 
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powers could have contained Hitler's Reich, that the USSR could have formed a valuable 
component of such a combination, and his call for continuous collaboration with potential 
and actual allies, this book contained other contributions to the British foreign policy 
argument that had extended into the early phase of World War Two. Angell began by 
asserting that the unwillingness of liberal democrats to trumpet the advantages of their 
beliefs led to the rise of authoritarian ideologies, and pleaded for liberals to offer a robust 
defense of their outlook as a means of mobilizing support for democracy24. After making 
the heretofore-noted criticism of The Twenty Years ' Crisis, Angell reiterated his attack on 
international anarchy, calling on mankind to instead commit itself to the defense of a 
constitutional framework of international law as a means of escaping the vicious cycle of 
interstate conflict25 . 
Sir Norman, seemingly inspired by the outbreak of war to push himself harder 
than ever with regard to his literary output, offered another discourse on the subject of 
alliances, neutrality and collective security in another 1940 publication, America's 
Dilemma: Alone or Allied? Speaking to his transatlantic counterparts and associates, 
Angell discussed the failure of European states to follow proper policies prior to the 
24 Angell, Why Freedom Matters, p. 9-11. On a related note, Angell also decried a deterministic approach to 
the morality of violence. Returning to the common theme of education and public opinion, Angell 
remarked that the formerly dominant ideal of Calvinist predestination had assumed the new form of 
economic determinism, leading to class warfare. These ideas, he believed, had hardened the societies and 
individuals who accepted them into also accepting cruelty and brutality "as something imposed by fate and 
nature, something for which man has no moral responsiblity [my emphasis], which he cannot prevent. The 
doctrine of pre-ordained fate has hardened in much modem writing into an almost oriental fatalism, the 
sense that man cannot use his intelligence and the power of his mind to make his world decent and 
tolerable; cannot do appreciably better than he as done, cannot bring about, without recurrent ferocities, 
hatreds, cruelties and abominations, the changes which every living society must face. The possibility of 
peaceful change [here referring to norms and morays] seems to be rejected as naive Utopianism by 
'realists' who insist that man is the helpless puppet of forces beyond his control." Ibid., p. 35-36. 
25 Ibid., p. 63. 
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outbreak of the war, and called on the United States to avoid committing the same errors. 
Angell, who had lived in the United States as a young man and traveled extensively 
throughout North America, felt adequately qualified to speak to Americans as something 
more than just a concerned foreign observer. He began this book by discussing some of 
the claims of isolationists; specifically that the United States could never be attacked, and 
if it were, that it possessed enough resources and natural advantages of distance that any 
invasion would be quickly defeated. Therefore, the isolationists argued, the only risk to 
the United States was that ofbeing dragged into an overseas war. The isolationists 
buttressed this assertion with a supposedly moral argument that United States should not 
be compelled or induced to fight for the benefit of "The British Empire", whose 
detractors insisted was an oppressive force which "owned" places such as Canada26. 
Angell refuted this by drawing on an argument similar to that advocated by Charles 
Fenwick when he discussed Germany's proclivity to violate other states' neutrality at 
will. The United States, Sir Norman contended, would not necessarily have the luxury of 
deciding when or if it would join the conflict. On the contrary, this choice would be made 
by Germany, which had "decided" when neutral states such as The Netherlands and 
Norway should enter the war, based upon its own calculations. Thus, the United States 
already had a vested interest in the course of the war in Europe, as the potential fall of 
Britain would make the Americas Hitler' s next target27. 
26 Angell, Norman: America's Dilemma: Alone or Allied? Harper and Brothers, New York, 1940, chapters 
1 & 2, passim. 
27 Ibid., p. 38-42. 
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The author returned to a familiar argument at this point, noting the frequency with 
which Germany had utilized the insistence of states to stand on their own without either 
alliances or collective security as a means of conquest. Consequently, one powerful state 
was able to overwhelm an assortment of other states that were unable to unite around a 
sense of common interests28 . Angell had plenty of evidence to draw upon as a means of 
underscoring this point. Firstly, he cited the recent example of the Winter War between 
Finland and the Soviet Union. Angell noted that Helsinki, which possessed a cohesive 
population, an efficient military and a government alert to threats, could not rebuff the 
Soviet invasion of its territory. Angell maintained that this stemmed from the lack of a 
collective security system which could have parried the aggression of a major power. As 
he noted, not only Finland but also Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands had been 
exceedingly willing to pour large sums into defense of their own territory, but never to 
adhere strictly to a collective security regime that could have really saved them from 
conquest. Herein lay the crux of the problem: all these expenditures had been wasted in 
the absence of a powerful security system to utilize them to the best advantage against 
aggression29 . Britain and France had committed a similar error, Angell asserted, and had 
also evinced a considerable amount of moral confusion regarding the morality and 
efficacy of defense through military action: 
28 Ibid., p. 84. 
As a matter of fact French and British collective action 
broke down precisely because the countries concerned 
rejected, at crucial moments and crucial points, the obvious 
truth that unless each unit of the collective system is 
prepared to fight for others, as well as himself, that this 
29 Ibid., p. 170-172. 
system cannot exist at all. From the moment that it became 
a question of defending the combination, and not merely 
each his own country ... it was found that war was a wicked 
thing; not wicked when used to defend ourselves, wicked 
only when used to defend others, the combination or 
constitution under which others as well as ourselves might 
find defense. It is the denial of this truth that we are 
members one of another which explains the failure of the 
democracies to meet the Nazi power30. 
Angell, then, clearly saw the calamities of 1940- the fall of France, Norway, 
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Denmark and the Low Countries as well as the Soviet victory over Mannerheim's Finnish 
army- as an ample basis to vigorously renew his attack on international anarchy, the 
doctrine of strict self-help, and opposition to his cherished vision of collective security. 
The war only served to intensify Angell's commitment to his previous arguments, and he 
clearly viewed the troubling course of events as a comprehensive vindication of his 
earlier works. He continued to utilize similar logic from his interwar publications 
throughout America 's Dilemma, such as his perceived parallel between municipal and 
international law and the ability of an aggressive state to exploit a fragmented series of 
potential conquests in succession31 . In addition, Angell also discussed the moral and 
logical fallacies he believed lay at the root of Britain's bankrupt interwar foreign policy. 
He blamed the failure to apply the collective security principles of the post-World War 
One system on public confusion as to what these principles really entailed. The political 
right viewed it as messianic nonsense, and the left eschewed collective security in favor 
ofthe theory that capitalism was the real cause of war. He also condemned the tendency 
30 Ibid., p. 173 . 
31 Ibid., p. 179 and 200. 
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of Britons to view collective security as an alternative to an active defense policy rather 
than the means of ensuring the effectiveness of such a policl2• 
Already looking to a hopeful postwar era, Angell predicted that the United States, 
regardless of whether it entered the current war, would be in a commanding position with 
respect to the postwar peace settlement, as Britain would be economically exhausted even 
if it prevailed over Germany a second tiri:le. At such a juncture, Anglo-American 
cooperation would become more important than ever before, and, Sir Norman predicted, 
" It may take some permanent form33 ." Angell warned that the victory over Hitler should 
not conclude with another punishing peace on the model of 1919, but rather with a 
demand that Germany should submit to an international rule of law to which the victors 
would also be bound. He concluded with a haunting meditation on the titular dilemma he 
sought to explicate: 
The lesson which Europe failed to learn is the lesson of the 
necessary co-operations. Each nation refused that co-
operation on the ground that its fust duty was to its own 
people. By that error, which it called "realism", each 
destroyed its own people. Will the same "realism" destroy 
the United States? America has now the chance to learn 
from the errors of others, to avoid the pits in which they 
have fallen. But it is almost certainly the last chance to 
learn34. 
Speaking on similar topics, Gilbert Murray delivered a lecture on the heels of 
Britain' s declaration of war that later appeared in a collection of his works from this 
period. His address discussed the failure of collective security and the means by which 
32 Ibid., p. 182-184. 
33 Ibid., p. 214 and 223 . 
34 Ibid. , p. 226. 
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Britain had once again found itself at war against Germany. Noting the tendency of 
interwar leaders to seek reward without risk, Murray laid the blame for World War Two 
squarely on the unwillingness of the great powers to enforce the Covenant: "Step by step 
it has been the betrayal, or at least the non-fulfillment, of the pledges of the great 
European nations that have led to the disaster ofthis war35." 
His passion for collective security remained undiminished, however. In addition, 
Murray addressed the burning question of sovereignty in his analysis of alternatives to 
the self-destructive policy Britain had pursued throughout the 1930s. The first alternative, 
a 201h -century Pax Romana under the hegemony of a superpower, had been impossible. 
No single state had the power to become preponderant, and the fragmented states of 
Europe retained the sovereignty to make war. The second alternative mandated the 
removal of this stumbling block, involving "one vital reduction of sovereignty": the right 
to make war. In addition, states would have needed to commit to defending victims of 
aggression. In brief, Murray maintained that loyalty to the Covenant would have averted 
the present disaster36. The United States deserved a portion of the responsibility for 
refusing to join the League at all. The rest of the blame fell upon states that had assented 
to the Covenant and proceeded to violate its strictures (Germany, Japan and Italy) and the 
myriad others who stood idly by and watched this deterioration accelerate. Murray 
35 Murray, Gilbert. From the League to UN Oxford University Press, London, 1948, p. 65 
36 
"We had to demand at least one vital reduction of sovereignty; the nations must agree in the first place to 
renounce war among themselves, and, in the second place, to use their united strength to defend any 
unoffending member against an aggressive attack. It was no use agreeing to live in peace unless that peace 
was to be defended." Ibid., p. 65-66. 
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attributed states' willingness to disregard the Covenant when it suited them to their 
continued misplaced belief in unrestricted sovereignty37. 
Murray also spoke about an essential factor that contributed to Britain's 
unwillingness to face the risk of war in defense of international law or collective security. 
He cited "the profound war-weariness of England, France and all the law-abiding or 
progressive nations" as an indispensable component of their aversion to confront the 
dictatorships. Calling their desire to avoid conflict "selfish", Murray lamented that they 
put the strict national interest in maintaining peace above all: "No public injustice which 
did not directly strike their national interests could goad them into facing trouble or risk. 
Consequently a free path lay open to all ambitions that were bold enough38." Murray next 
discussed a broad array of factors in Britain's refusal to uphold its commitment to 
collective security in a nearly comprehensive passage that merits direct quotation: 
War weariness was the main motive, but, speaking of this 
country in particular, it was reinforced by two curiously 
unrelated currents of opinion. Entrenched in high places 
were the old traditional diplomatists, who thought always 
in terms of' British interests', disliked the whole 
conception of the League, and resented the intrusion of 
moral ideals into politics. On the whole they sought the 
friendship of the aggressors rather than the victims because 
the aggressors were usually the stronger, and a strong 
friend is better than a weak [one]. These people received 
the support not only of the pacifists, who were opposed to 
any armed resistance whatever, but also of a wider class 
who were troubled in conscience about the supposed 
harshness of the peace treaties, and were anxious to show 
penitence for their own sins - or more often for those of 
37 
"the sacrifice that was asked of them was, I still think, an irreducible minimum. The continuance of 
absolute sovereignty, together with the prevailing emotion on which it rested, was what made permanent 
world order impossible." Ibid., p. 67. 
38 Ibid., p. 70. 
their political opponents - by a belated and often excessive 
indulgence towards Germany39. 
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This quotation, in relatively few words, isolated the numerous strands of 
appeasement thought that underlay practically the entire literature examined in chapters 
two and three of this study. In one brief statement, Murray managed to rebuke power-
oriented realists such as Carr, the pacifist movement that aroused the ire of Angell, and 
the widespread desire to placate Germany that the liberal realists so thoroughly argued 
against. Only a short time into a war that would ultimately drag on for nearly six years, 
Murray had proven able to put his finger squarely on the convergence of disparate 
streams of thought that had bedeviled him and his colleagues for so long. So thoroughly 
were these ideals discredited that, like Norman Angell, Murray believed that a simple 
restatement of his interwar belief in the need to put force behind international law 
sufficed to rebut the various views of his rhetorical antagonists40. Murray also continued 
to condemn specific acts of the 1930s, such as the failure to address Japan's annexation 
of Manchuria and the ltalo-Abyssinian War41 . 
Finally, Murray addressed the rebuttal put forth by critics of his ideas that 
collective security asked too much of states and their populations. This assertion was 
frequently supported by the reminder that the governments of France, Britain and the 
39 Ibid., p. 70-71 . 
40 
"I do believe, first, that you cannot prevent war by simply running away from it. It was our duty under 
the Covenant not merely to avoid war but to prevent war. And the obvious way to prevent war in a world 
where the vast majority of mankind wants peace is for the Peace Forces to be ready to deal in time with 
every threat of war, whether due to genuine grievance or to mere ambition; and, if all else fails, to show 
that they will by united action protect any nation unjustifiably attacked ... in the last resort, there must be 
the possibility of coercion." Ibid., p. 72. 
41 
"Our civilization had announced to the world and to history that it had not the necessary sense of 
corporate duty, not the necessary strength of mind, to defend itself" Ibid., p. 75 . 
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United States had generally enjoyed the support of the voting public in their refusal to 
commit to collective security. Murray seemed too dispirited by this thought to 
contemplate a direct response, remarking only, "If that is so, I can only say again that 
civilization is doomed." Murray ended his speech by drawing an analogy to prohibition-
era America, wherein the citizens of Chicago had been unable to put an end to incessant 
gang warfare and extortion. The citizenry far outnumbered the gangsters, he noted, but 
none of them, even among the police, would take the risk of being the first to stand 
against Al Capone42• Thus, Murray offered a fairly downcast vision of mankind's ability 
to act collectively, but warned that no alternative existed if civilization was to have any 
future. 
International Affairs published an article in its periodic review of contemporary 
international relations literature that addressed the numerous ideas regarding the postwar 
world that had already entered circulation in Britain by June 1940. Even as the British 
Expeditionary Force and its French allies were running headlong toward the Channel en 
route to Dunkirk, multiple British writers in addition to Angell had the confidence to plan 
for the aftermath of an Allied victory. As noted by the article's author, Helen Liddell, 
these publications suggested a widely divergent range of opinion on the subject of war 
aims. Some authors argued for a division of Germany and a long-term occupation by 
Allied armies in an attempt to forever extirpate German nationalism and militarism. 
Others promoted the abandonment of capitalism and a revolution in international and 
private life. In the wide gulf between these views contemporary readers could fmd many 
42 Ibid., p. 76. 
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who supported the idea of "federation"43 . One example of the federation line of thinking 
could be found in Sir William Beveridge' s pamphlet Peace by Federation. He argued that 
arms could be surrendered along with sovereignty and security would develop as a result. 
Other members of this school, such as the prominent academician Sir William Ivor 
Jennings, maintained that a federation of Europe would quickly allow spending on 
armaments to fall to virtually nothing, while others suggested that a federation would 
present a solution to the question of national minorities by ensuring that all Europeans 
would enjoy equal status in a continental polity. Additional advocates of federal solutions 
to European strife included League advocate Lord David Davies, who had famously 
endowed the world's first professorship in international relations after the First World 
War, and Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, a longtime supporter of a pan-European union44. 
Among authors examined in this study, the International Affairs review noted that 
Norman Angell had argued against the feasibility of a continental federation in For What 
do we Fight? Angell had maintained that creating such an organization would prove 
impossible in light of the fact that the much more unified Commonwealth had never 
achieved such a sweeping transformation, and that therefore a search for unity among the 
much more disparate states of Europe would prove fruitless . Sir Norman did, however, 
endorse the idea of a federal arrangement between Britain and France that would remain 
open to additional members. Harold Nicolson, conversely, believed in the feasibility of a 
loose European federation policed by an internationally controlled air force45. 
43 Liddel, Helen. "War and Peace Aims". International Affairs Review Supplement, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Jun., 
1940), p. 11. 
44 Ibid., p. 3. 
45 Ibid. , p. 13. 
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Former League ofNations Secretary Maxwell Garnett published one of his 
numerous books on international affairs in 1940. Like so many others, he also cast his 
eye toward a future in which the Allies had proved victorious. Early in the book, entitled 
A Lasting Peace, he criticized E.H. Carr's argument that utopia and reality existed on 
their own skew planes. Utilizing his own geometric analogy, Garnett remarked, "It seems 
to me that Reality (or the imperfect world about us) may approach Utopia (or the 
Commonwealth of God in which all nations are provinces) as a curve may draw ever 
nearer to a straight line until they meet and coincide at long last, infinitely far away 46." 
As an aside, Garnett next made one of the greatest understatements of the entire century 
when discussing the nature of the Nazi regime, remarking, "Indeed, [Hitler] would have 
his Germans fall down and worship the State that he, Hitler, has set up. Like 
Nebuchadnezzar, he is a little mad [my emphasist7." 
Demonstrating his accord with other internationalists of the period, Garnett 
embarked on a lengthy discourse concerning collective security and its relation to the 
interconnected nature of the modem global economy. Drawing on an illustration of 
contemporary economic exchange that repeated Angell's description of trade in The 
Great illusion almost word for word, Garnett examined the means by which the 
prosperity of Lancashire textile workers relied on a multiplicity of factors beyond their 
control in numerous comers of the world48 . He contended that as two great powers 
continued to act according to conflicting interests as sovereign states in the increasingly 
46 Garnett, Maxwell. A Lasting Peace. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1940, p. 14. 
47 Ibid., p. 26. 
48 Ibid. , p. 43 . 
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interconnected world, the likelihood of conflict grew. Collective security, however, 
offered the opportunity to end this conflict of interests: "if to the deterrent effect of fear 
of war were added a fear of collective action backed by overwhelming force, ready to be 
used against any State whose armaments increased beyond an agreed limit ... military 
preparations would be checked and reversed before that limit was reached. The 
international equilibrium would then become stable49." 
This passage contained an interesting adaptation of collective security logic to 
address the question of disarmament, as it suggested automatic collective action not only 
against aggression, but also against any state whose armed forces exceeded a 
predetermined level of strength. This would discourage the very ability of states to make 
war independently, as well as the act of aggression itself. In addition, this idea suggested 
the use of collective action to maintain parity of armed force among the states of the 
world, indicating that Garnett envisioned the possibility that collective security might 
thus ensure a sort of universal power balancing. Indeed, his idea represented a fascinating 
and seemingly unique confluence of the two security paradigms. 
The author then availed himself of the opportunity to criticize British policy over 
the previous decade, as well as opponents of collective security in general. He discussed 
the means by which League members' refusal to reverse the Japanese fait accompli in 
Manchuria resulted in the cascade of crises throughout the 1930s despite the League's 
possession of the necessary strength to act effectively. A robust commitment to the 
49 Ibid. , p. 62. 
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League would have minimized the dictators' threats and averted the current catastrophe50. 
With particular regard to Anglo-German relations, Garnett condemned the tendency for 
. his countrymen to blithely assume that Britain and France could ably defend themselves 
behind the Maginot Line and allow Germany to direct its aggression toward central and 
Eastern Europe51 . France and Britain, Garnett continued to assert, had not realized that 
their refusal to make an effective stand against Hitler while they still possessed the power 
to .do so, and while the League's collective security apparatus stood a chance of 
recovering its prestige, meant that the western democracies would be faced with even 
more sericms threats from Hitler "at a less favourable moment when the forces of 
'aggression were relatively far stronger". Like Angell, Garnett noted that such a prediction 
· could have been derived from a familiarity with Me in Kampf, in which Hitler noted his 
·admiration ofthe Socialist political tactic of hounding the opposition into believing that 
yielding some concession would quiet their attackers, only to renew the drive toward new 
concessions afterward52. Garnett had certainly not been among those who ignored the 
Nazi peril prior to the outbreak of war. 
In describing peace aims at this early phase in the war, Garnett echoed his 
internationalist counterparts in calling for a postwar international organization that would 
prevent the reemergence of interstate anarchy and encompass the Allied victors as well as 
50 
"Another result of Japan' s success on the continent across the water was Signor Mussolini's desire to 
follow suit. But whatever excuses there may have been for the League' s failure to stop Japan's aggression 
in Manchuria, they did not apply to Italy's attack upon Abyssinia. In particular it was plain from the start 
that the Members of the League were amply strong enough to stop Italy. The knowledge that Britain would 
rather fight, unassisted if need be, than permit the occupation of Malta or Egypt, caused Signor Mussolini 
to look further afield for a less attractive but perhaps more easy prey. Had he known for certain that Britain 
and France would rather fight than allow him to annex Abyssinia, he would have 'renounced any offensive 
action."' Ibid., p. 107-108. 
51 Ibid., p. 118. 
52 Ibid., p. 119. 
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the vanquished Germans. Garnett went the extra mile in this regard by asserting that this 
would also include the transfer of sovereignty regarding "matters of common concern" to 
the new body. Such an organization would be built on the foundation of various regional 
groupings, each of which would provide the immediate response to cases of aggression 53 . 
This loosely defined vision possessed clear similarities to that advanced by Brecht in his 
1943 APSR article which also advocated a patchwork quilt of regional organizations 
functioning within a global apparatus. On the other hand, the vision of a regional group 
offering immediate defense against aggression in its own sphere also suggests the 
emergence ofNATO in the aftermath of World War Two. Such specifics, of course, 
remained unthinkable during the trying year of 1940. 
Ardent socialist and prominent academic Harold J. Laski published Where Do We 
Go From Here? in 1940, offering his insight into what course the future of Britain and 
the world should take. The book primarily consisted of Laski's call for a socialist 
revolution in the United Kingdom, which he envisioned as a critical component of victory 
in the war. The revolution he foresaw would not stem from a violent outburst, but rather 
from a conscious shift in policy brought about by the electorate and government as a 
means of securing victory. The advent of socialism, to which he frequently referred as the 
"democratization" of the economy, would give the common people of Britain a vision of 
how they would benefit from winning the war, and would likewise encourage the workers 
of the continent to rebel against fascism. Though certainly a harsh critic of British 
capitalism, Laski entertained no illusions about the need for an Allied victory over 
53 Ibid. , p. 142-143 and 152. 
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fascism. He wrote that fascism, should it triumph in Europe, would assail the western 
hemisphere in short order in its attempt at world conquest: "There is clearly no limit to its 
ambition. Were it successfully to complete its conquest of the Old World, it is certain, if 
anything is certain, that it would move forward to the conquest of the New54." 
Laski therefore eschewed neutrality and advocated a largely collective security 
solution to international anarchy. With regard to the former, he condemned neutrality as 
"obsolete" and blamed the outdated belief in its virtue for enabling the rapid collapse of 
such a large portion of Europe before the Nazi onslaught55 . In this sense, Laski paralleled 
many writers across the Atlantic such as Fenwick and Morgenthau, as well as his British 
liberal realist counterparts. Laski also blamed the outbreak of war, unsurprisingly, on the 
inability of the National Government and its leader, Chamberlain, to comprehend the 
dread threat of fascism. Noting the Prime Minister's call for the British people to fight 
against "'evil things'", he remarked that this realization had come too late for 
Chamberlain and his followers. Their refusal to admit the inherent evil of the fascist 
dictatorships led them to accept the course of events in Abyssinia, Ethiopia and Central 
Europe which had by 1940 proved disastrous for Britain56. 
Having disposed of neutrality and appeasement, Laski discussed the moribund 
League ofNations and posited some reasons for its failure. In doing so, he touched upon 
the ongoing and intensifying debate concerning the question of state sovereignty. Laski 
asserted that the League failed because it remained stuck in a no-man's-land between an 
54 Laski, Harold J. Where Do We Go From Here? The Viking Press, New York, 1940, p. 12. 
55 
"The overruning of Scandinavia and the Low Countries can be attributed to their tragic faith in an 
obsolete system of neutrality; but that still leaves unexplained why, despite its obvious obsolescence, they 
still clung so pathetically to their faith in its validity." Ibid., p. 19. 
56 Ibid., p. 20-21. 
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ironclad military alliance ofthe Great War victors and a functional global or pan-
European government. An alliance might have suppressed German expansionism through 
power-oriented, realist means and succeeded in restraining Berlin. As a federative 
government, the League would have been able to "legislate" for the common good of its 
members. This, of course, would have required a cession of at least some of the 
prerogatives of state sovereignty to Geneva. Laski maintained that none of the League 
members wished to take this crucial step as this proved impossible, according to his 
socialist worldview, "without solving the central contradiction within [member states] 
between capitalism and democracy57." Though he condemned this shortsightedness, 
Laski admitted that the National Government's policy at least reflected the democratic 
will of British voters. Chamberlain, in the fmal analysis, had only acted on the anti-war 
beliefs of his citizenry, whose commitment to democracy heightened their detestation of 
war. In this sense Laski proved willing to grant Chamberlain a measure of clemency: "No 
one, I think, who is aware of either the nature of modern war or the grim responsibilities 
which decisions to embark upon it must cast on the statesmen who have to take them can 
fail to understand why they should have shrunk from those responsibilities58." 
Returning to his concept of the contradiction between democracy and capitalism, 
Laski argued that the capitalist class in the democratic powers viewed Hitler and 
57 Ibid., p. 29. From this point, Laski detailed what he envisioned as the essential paradox between political 
democracy and capitalism as a mode of production. Essentially, he argued that political liberalization and 
its attendant expansion of the franchise do not, at the outset, threaten to undermine the privileges that the 
rich derive from capitalism. However, as the political power of the working class expands, they begin to 
demand a "democratization" of the economic system, prompting a backlash by the forces of privilege, and 
generating growing insecurity and resultant fear which manifest themselves as fascism with all its 
destabilizing and expansionist impulses. Ibid., p. 29-37. 
58 Ibid., p. 42. 
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Mussolini as a bulwark against communism, not only in the geopolitical sense of standing 
between the west and the USSR, but also politically and ideologically. They feared, Laski 
asserted, that should the dictators' regimes collapse Bolshevism would surely take their 
place in Germany and Italy. Laski accused them of believing that by greasing the treads 
of Hitler's armies, appeasement might at best lead to the destruction of Stalinism, or at 
least prevent the plague of communism from spreading closer to London and Paris. The 
proof of the capitalist class' sympathy with fascism for these reasons manifested itself, 
according to Laski, with their reaction to the Spanish Civil War, when the government of 
Britain and the right wing of France demonstrated their willingness to risk vital lines of 
communication to their treasured overseas empires rather than oppose the spread of 
fascism. The risk posed by Mussolini and Hitler's involvement in Iberia seemed the 
lesser evil to them than the survival ofthe leftist Spanish Republic in Western Europe59. 
In addition, the failure of France and Britain to secure an alliance with Moscow against 
Hitler and Mussolini stemmed from the harsh anti-Soviet policies adopted by the west 
prior to 193360• Among the authors cited in this study, Laski most strongly gave voice to 
the Marxist-oriented critique of appeasement that British and French policy of the 1930s 
originated from bourgeois class solidarity between the capitalist and fascist powers. 
Following this Marxian explanation for the failure of interwar Franco-British 
policy, Laski gave his full endorsement to the value of collective security as a concept 
despite the fact that Britain and France had made a shambles of it during its first 
incarnation. "Only collective security could have saved Europe from war," said Laski, 
59 Ibid., p. 43-45 . 
60 Ibid., p. 48. 
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but London and Paris' unwillingness to bear the thought of making common cause with 
the Soviets or eliminating the anti-communist firebreak of the Third Reich prevented this. 
Continuing with his socialist critique, Laski maintained, "They feared the first because 
they saw in its ideas a threat to the vested interests they represented, and they feared the 
second because they saw in it implications of social revolution they were not prepared to 
confront61 ." Later, Laski renewed his assault on state sovereignty, decrying the fact that it 
meant individual state interest could override the collective interest of the international 
community62. The remainder of the book largely focused on Laski's argument in favor of 
a socialist revolution that he envisioned as a critical component of victory, as a 
prerequisite for triumph over the Axis and as a political and social shift which would 
bestow a deeper meaning upon victory which the triumph of 1918 lacked63 . 
If that bleak year of 1940 proved to be Britain's finest hour, the United 
Kingdom's intellectuals deserve praise for their commitment to maintaining an incisive, 
comprehensive analysis of global politics and British foreign policy even as the fascist 
threat became most acute. Writers such as Angell and Laski offered possible moral bases 
for the British war effort and, along with their colleagues discussed here, continued to 
examine the theoretical aspect of international relations with regard to the paradigms at 
the heart of this study. These international relations thinkers upheld the faith in liberal 
61 Ibid., p. 51. 
62 Ibid., p. 65. 
63 The first part of this argument is encapsulated in the lines, "in effect, the purpose of this war is the 
revolution to which British success will give rise. The power to make it will come in part from the impact 
of British victories themselves, in part from the hope these victories will arouse in the victims of Fascism. 
My argument here is the vital one that this power depends on beginning now the transformation of Great 
Britain into a more equal and more just society, that, as this is accomplished, it at once steels the endurance 
and resolution of the masses, and, as knowledge of it permeates the countries now under the Fascist yoke, it 
will light flames there that no terrorism will be able to quench." Ibid., p. 31. 
502 
democracy they had displayed throughout the late interwar period and placed this 
commitment at the center of their analysis of Britain' s politics and its war effort. This 
sounded an all-important note of continuity. However, their dedication to preserving what 
they viewed as best about the British way of life and government did not, even in 
Albion' s darkest hour, prevent them from continuing their harsh condemnation of the 
policies and leaders that had drawn Britain to the brink of catastrophe. Laski in particular, 
with his continued demand for a complete overhaul of the British economic system, 
demonstrated that the importance of national unity did not overrule these writers ' sense 
of wisdom and folly. In the same vein, Garnett advanced a comprehensive criticism of 
Britain' s inadequate interwar foreign policy and implicitly denounced its leaders as 
ignorant for their failure to understand the message of Mein Kampf The British analysts 
examined in this study, then, demonstrated equal devotion to their country and their craft, 
offering important intellectual support for British democratic values while continuing to 
emphasize the need to learn from the errors of the past. 
The Great Debate Rejoined 
E. H. Carr added a new chapter to the "great debate" with another major work in 
1942. Conditions of Peace contained more of Carr' s analysis regarding the collapse ofthe 
interwar diplomatic and economic framework and articulated his vision of a postwar 
world. Resuming his discourse with a point he had emphasized throughout The Twenty 
Years ' Crisis , the introduction discusses the author' s view that the western powers 
overwhelmingly retained nineteenth-century conceptions of the international state 
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system, military strategy, and domestic politics which had prevented the victors of World 
War One from being prepared for the onset of the challenge against their supremacy. As 
the rest of the book reveals, Carr again interpreted this failure with regard to economic 
dogma as well, citing what he viewed as the bankrupt idea that small nation-states could 
achieve economic prosperity and stability while contributing to a broader upward trend. 
The introduction also witnessed a renewal of Carr's rejection of interwar 
"idealists", including Norman Angell and Aristide Briand. Firstly, Carr quoted Briand's 
plea to the League that any policy seeking justice which might upset world peace should 
be abandoned. Carr replied sardonically, "Let injustice persist rather than that the sacred 
rights of the existing order should be infringed", again demonstrating that he viewed war 
and the application of force as preferable to the maintenance of an ossified status quo. He 
then quoted Angell from his 1936 writing in The Future of the League ofNations, as 
remarking, "The first purpose of the League is the defense of its members - self-
preservation which is the first law oflife of any organization." Carr subsequently 
remarked, "The obsession of' security' hung like a millstone about the neck of the 
League and excluded every breath of life and freshness from its bodl4." Carr interpreted 
this obsession as the concern of privileged states with protecting their positions of power, 
safety and prestige. This, Carr argued, overshadowed the imperative for "reform, or even 
progress65". In this manner, Conditions of Peace paralleled his earlier, more famous 
64 Carr, E.H. Conditions of Peace. MacMillan, New York, 1942, p. xvi. 
65 
"In light of this outline ... we now review the whole psychological background of the past twenty years, 
we shall see that the attitude of the satisfied Powers was stultified by two defects of outlook common to 
almost all privileged and possessing groups. In the first place, the privileged group tends to idealize the 
period in which it has risen to the height of its power, and to see its highest good in the maintenance of 
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work. Carr's new book also furthered his realist concept of states struggling amidst global 
anarchy, as he reminded his readers, "neither security nor peace can properly be made the 
object of policy ... it cannot be achieved by the signing of pacts or covenants 'outlawing' 
war any more than revolutions are prevented by making them illegal. .. The only stability 
attainable in human affairs is the stability ofthe spinning-top or the bicycle.'' The only 
hope of ensuring peace and prosperity lay in continually adjusting to a dynamic array of 
circumstances: "the condition of security is continuous advance66.'' 
This concept of continual motion and unstoppable change in international 
relations harkens to Carr's previous advocacy of "peaceful change" that led to his 
embrace of appeasement. During the middle of World War Two, Carr continued to assert 
that the postwar world would require even further modification if Europe were to avoid a 
repetition of the interwar experience. He illustrated this concept by arguing that trying to 
recreate the Europe of 1938 in the wake of the war would be akin to rebuilding London 
exactly as it stood before the Blitz without attempting to make improvements where 
possible. He remarked, "Whether we like it or not, we are in the midst ofa revolution. 
Any attempt to ignore it, or to stem it by a restoration of the past, is futile and disastrous. 
We need a policy which is both positive and revolutionary67.'' Returning to his previous 
denunciations of laissez-faire capitalism that had figured so prominently in The Twenty 
those conditions. Secondly, the privileged group is preoccupied with the question of its own security rather 
than with the need for reform or even for progress." Ibid., p. xxi. 
66 Ibid., p. :xxxiii-xxiv. 
67 Ibid., p. 6. 
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Years ' Crisis, Carr attributed Soviet and German advances during the interwar period to 
their adoption of planned economies68 . This initiated the revolution of which he spoke. 
Carr's disapproval of capitalism, especially in its recent incarnation during the 
post-World War One period, dominated his analysis throughout the remainder of 
Conditions of Peace. Shortly after his assertion that abandoning capitalism had allowed 
Germany and the Soviet Union to increase their relative levels of power, Carr embarked 
on an interesting discourse concerning Hitler: 
Hitler's relation to the Bolshevik Revolution matches in 
many respects Napoleon's relation to the French 
Revolution. Just as Napoleon exploited the demand for 
liberty and equal political rights expressed in the French 
Revolution, so Hitler exploits for his purposes the demand 
for social equality and equal economic rights expressed in 
the Bolshevik Revolution. 
This statement can only be understood in the context of a later remark on the same page 
relating Hitler's fascist behemoth to the Marxist system the Fuehrer battled against. 
"Hitler has consummated the work, which Marx and Lenin had begun", Carr wrote, "of 
overthrowing the nineteenth-century capitalist system"69 . Readers are left to wonder 
exactly how the oppressive nature of the Nazi regime bore any relation to "the demand 
for social equality and equal economic rights", but Carr maintained his comparison 
between Hitler and Napoleon by insisting that Hitler's "work in spreading revolution, like 
that ofNapoleon, cannot and will not be undone"70. 
68 Ibid. , p. 8. 
69 Ibid., p. 9. 
70 Ibid., p. 10. 
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Carr further clarified this statement by remarking that Hitler and the anti-
democratic strand of European politics repeated at least part of the Marxist critique of 
liberal democracy- that the freedom it purported to ensure constituted only an illusion 
and served as a mere veil for plutocracy71 • Although he manifestly displayed a certain 
respect for Hitler's apparent success in demolishing the decrepit foundations ofthe 
capitalist system, Carr himself had not undergone a conversion to fascism. Regarding the 
future of democracy, which he continued to support, Carr wrote that political equality 
mandated an advance toward "social and economic equality". This would require a 
reduction in the influence of fmance capital and organized labor alike, and would embody 
the increased inclusion of ordinary citizens in state administration72 . In this sense, Carr 
displayed an unsurprising similarity with Harold Laski, a fellow opponent of capitalism 
who also called for economic "democratization". In addition, he echoed Angell's clarion 
call for generating a true liberal democratic ethos that the Allies might utilize to bolster 
their morale and inspire others. 
This would prove the only similarity between the two authors, as Conditions of 
Peace demonstrated that Carr and Angell remained diametrically opposed with regard to 
what would constitute a properly functioning global economic and political system. 
Carr's continuing discourse on national self-determination and sovereignty, topics he had 
shown interest in during the Munich crisis, demonstrates to modem readers the 
continuing wide gulf between Carr and his liberal realist countrymen. In discussing the 
former, Carr maintained that the claims of nationalities seeking to form new states must 
71 Ibid., p. 11-12. 
72 Ibid., p. 37. 
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be weighed against the well being of existing states "which already enjoy an independent 
existence". As examples he cited the difficulties that would ariseifWales, Catalonia or 
Uzbekistan were to separate themselves from the states that currently exercised 
sovereignty over them 73 . Why this judgment did not apply to the Sudetenland and 
Czechoslovakia during the Munich crisis remains a mystery. However, as Carr frequently 
reiterated, the definition of "self-determination" must remain flexible and able to adapt to 
changing military and economic conditions74. Perhaps this provides the sort of 
justification for the type ofterritorial transfers he supported in 1939. Indeed, because 
relative levels of power are constantly in flux, it blends well with his assertion that power 
disparities must constitute an important, if not dominant, factor in determining the 
outcome of such clashes of national interest. Yet, it is difficult to see whether Carr 
believed this flexibility or the needs of existing states should take precedence when the 
matters of self-determination or territorial transfer are raised. The author did not indicate 
which of the two imperatives ~ stability of existing states or the need to ensure dynamism 
in international relations - was paramount. 
The next component of Carr's vision for the postwar world involved the fate of 
small states. One might impute some similarity between his analysis in this vein and the 
conclusions of The Twenty Years ' Crisis discussed in chapter three, as Czechoslovakia 
certainly occupied an important place among the ranks of Europe's small and middle 
powers. As part of a discourse on the neutrality of small states, Carr took up the matter of 
collective security. He cited three flaws. Firstly, that claims regarding the universal 
73 Ibid., p. 50. 
74 Ibid., p. 51 . 
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characteristic of the collective system constituted a fallacy as some of the great powers 
remained outside the League. Secondly, that the "criterion of 'aggression'" could not be 
applied fairly and had little claim to moral validity in any case. Finally, and most 
importantly, Carr argued against collective security on the grounds that modem warfare 
required years of preparation and collaboration with allies to be effective, and that the 
instantaneous declaration of war against the "aggressor" of the moment could not be 
properly organized to any effect. Waiting for the war to begin before deciding the identity 
ofthe enemy, he asserted, would lead to certain disaster for any state involved. "The only 
conception of collective security which was not hopelessly unrealistic was the French 
conception of a European alliance against a specific enemy under French leadership", he 
concluded. This, of course, does not seem to be the same type of collective security that 
League advocates had in mind- rather, it describes a balance-of-power system. He also 
remarked that this conception proved unacceptable to small powers, which seems 
incorrect as the Little Entente of Yugoslavia, Romania and Czechoslovakia acceded to 
ie5• 
Carr also overlooked the important role of sanctions in the League's collective 
security·framework. He certainly made a valid point when he noted that modem warfare 
required continuous, long-term collaboration with allies against a specific, predetermined 
threat in order to have any hope of success. The Nazis' quick victories in the years prior 
to this publication demonstrate the strong basis of this assertion. However, in spite of his 
frequently expressed belief in the centrality of economic policy, he neglected to consider 
75 Ibid., p. 54-55. 
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the impact that sanctions could have against an aggressor. Sanctions could indeed be 
immediately directed against a particular state, as indicated by the League's fairly rapid 
response to the Italo-Abyssinian War. While the will to adhere to sanctions over the long 
term was undermined by various other factors during that episode, economic sanctions 
constitute a theoretically important weapon in the arsenal of collective security to which 
Carr paid no heed. Otherwise, he reflected the argument of Borchard and the American 
isolationists who likewise argued that designating an "aggressor" remained at best an 
exercise in futility. 
Carr also leveled economic arguments against the sovereignty of small states, 
blaming them for the economic hardship of the interwar period. Again, he gave a nod to 
the role of Hitler in clearing away the debris of what Carr saw as the defunct capitalist 
system, writing that, "the satisfaction given in the name of self-determination to national 
aspirations had aggravated the economic problems; and the economic crisis of 1930 
revealed the hollowness of the structure long before the iron hand of Hitler supervened to 
dash it brutally in pieces." He concluded that granting economic sovereignty to so many 
small European states "had become incompatible with the survival of civilization"76. 
Carr then sought to redefine self-determination and sovereignty by breaking the 
link between nation and state, arguing that national identity does not necessarily confer 
the right to possess a state that encompasses that nationality within its borders. He argued 
that Europeans must in future place emphasis on the limitations of self-determination 
rather than its reckless implementation, asserting his theme of the importance of 
76 Ibid., p. 62. 
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obligations as well as rights, "The right of self-determination must carry with it a 
recognized responsibility to subordinate military and economic policy and resources to 
the needs of a wider community 77." The responsibilities he spoke of fell on large and 
small states alike. Small states, he wrote, must abandon the nineteenth-century vision of 
neutrality as the only prerequisite of sovereignty. Simply remaining uninvolved in the 
affairs of larger powers no longer guaranteed security for weak states. As discussed 
throughout the chapter "The Crisis of Self-Determination", the disregard for neutrality 
and the inability of small states to defend themselves displayed in 1914 and 1940 had 
fatally undermined that concept. Small states could no longer rely on their irrelevance to 
ensure their safety as the great powers battled for supremacy among themselves. 
Likewise, great powers had the responsibility to protect small powers from enemies that 
threatened common interests. He mentioned the Belgians, Dutch and Danish in this sense 
in regard to the United Kingdom, but only in an economic contexe8. Crucially, Carr 
failed to explain why this sort of noblesse oblige did not apply to the earlier victims of 
the fascist powers' expansionist program. Perhaps Abyssinia, Austria and 
Czechoslovakia were too remote from Britain. Indeed, the states he specifically 
mentioned all lay within Britain's most critical area of interest on the shores ofthe North 
Sea. Nevertheless, this glaring contradiction between Conditions of Peace and The 
Twenty Years ' Crisis remained unresolved. 
Carr's discussion of the economic future of Europe, which dominated much of 
Conditions of Peace, continued with his assertion that larger units than the existing 
77 Ibid., p. 65. 
78 Ibid., p. 67-68. 
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national state would become necessary in the postwar period to ensure economic 
stability79. He followed this with a restatement of his claim that self-determination must 
be reinterpreted from the perspective of responsibilities as well as rights. Again, Carr 
failed to provide any detail regarding the nature of these responsibilities. They seem to 
lie, however, in ensuring that self-determination as a principle would not block the 
formation of economically viable units which would establish financial security and 
economic growth. This seems to be reflected in his argument earlier in the chapter 
regarding how the creation of many small European states had fragmented the economy 
and worsened the "crisis of 1930". He subsequently lamented the lack of Allied 
theorizing toward this end, remarking, "We fight to restore the independence of nations, 
though we know well that this independence is impracticable and disastrous80." 
Certainly, modern readers could easily interpret this conclusion in light of Carr' s 
economic argument. This would indicate that the independence to which he referred was 
of the economic kind. Such an interpretation would remain consistent with Carr' s interest 
in the formation of larger economic units and the concept of international 
"responsibilities" that might negate the idea of complete freedom in the formulation of 
state economic policy. However, this leads to yet another point of conflict with Norman 
Angell. For at a certain level, this chain of logic demonstrates that Carr continued to 
accept a key premise of Germany's expansionist argument. Germany had continually 
argued, in both the pre-World War One and interwar periods, that it required a greater 
economic sphere to ensure its survival and stability. These claims received extensive 
79 Ibid., p. 69. 
80 Ibid., p. 111 . 
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treatment from Angell in the original version of The Great illusion. Carr continued to 
contend, however, that the profusion of small states in Europe had been "disastrous". 
How so? Perhaps Carr was attempting to imply that the small states contributed to the 
outbreak of war. The logic of this seems clouded. Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, 
Denmark and other small states did not provoke the war: that responsibility rested on 
German expansionism and the assertion that Germany could not prosper within the 
borders created by the Versailles Treaty. This interpretation of Carr's remark seems too 
simplistic to attribute to him. 
Contemporary readers are therefore left with the alternative, previously suggested, 
that the "disastrous" nature of the situation stemmed from the economic chaos Carr 
attributed to unchecked state sovereignty and national self-determination. This conforms 
to Carr's logic in calling for the creation oflarger economic units and his appreciation of 
Hitler's demonstration ofthis imperative. Angell, however, illustrated the fallacy of the 
self-sufficiency argument throughout his earlier works. Firstly, because no state would 
ever attain self-sufficiency no matter how large, and secondly because certain states 
which "suffered" from higher population densities, small land area, and dependency on 
trade income such as The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg (some ofthe same 
states to which Carr directly referred) actually enjoyed higher standards of living than the 
already resource-rich and expansive Germany. Thus, Carr's continued acceptance of 
Hitler's basic assertion that Germany needed to expand or perish indicates that the noted 
realist remained completely at odds with the liberal realist view. It also indicates a shift in 
perspective from his argument in favor of the Munich agreement from The Twenty Years' 
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Crisis. In 1939 he had defended the cession of the Sudetenland to the Reich on the basis 
of Berlin's military might and the principle of self-determination. In 1942, Carr seems to 
have shifted to a justification of the economic necessity to create wider areas of 
unfettered exchange within a large economic unit to explain the impact of Hitler's foreign 
policy. 
In discussing the war itself, Carr continued to mount an incessant attack against 
what he viewed as the moribund structure of the western capitalist world. Due to the 
bankruptcy of every other institution, Carr wrote, "War is at the present time the most 
purposeful of our social institutions; and we shall make no progress towards its 
elimination until we recognize, and provide for, the essential social function which it 
performs81 ." He maintained that nineteenth-century conflicts had their roots in 
imperialism stemming from a fear of scarcity. Modem conflict, on the other hand, 
derived from the "maldistribution of wealth: the two great enemies are unemployment 
and inequality. Against these evils, which liberal democracy and laissez-faire capitalism 
cannot cure, large-scale war provides an effective, if short-term, antidote [my 
emphasis]82." Addressing the benefit of full employment that came with the prosecution 
of modem conflict, Carr continued, with a direct attack on Angell's logic: "The familiar 
argument that war 'never pays' fails to impress an age which no longer believes that what 
'pays' is always and necessarily right83." Carr ended this piece ofhis overall argument by 
warning that because the "old peace" was "dead", mankind would not experience relief 
81 Ibid., p. 116-117. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid., p. 117-118. 
514 
from conflict until it "found some other moral purpose powerful enough to generate self-
sacrifice on the scale requisite to enable civilization to survive." He noted that 
Christianity and communism offered themselves as two possible alternatives84. 
It is difficult not to interpret this passage as· Carr's conclusion that the complete 
worthlessness ofinterwar:European.society and politics had resulted in Europeans' desire 
to make war on each other for war's sake, or at best to end the misery of the Great 
Depression that Carr blamed on capitalism and national self-determination. One would 
hope, of course, that states and individuals did not enter into the Second World War for 
·.no better reason than to secure full employment. This passage also contains a troubling 
echo of the fascist argument that war possesses same intrinsic value and offers 
empowerment through a struggle that generated a requisite level of"self-sacrifice". 
With regard to other facets of the contemporary argument over the future of 
international relations, Carr had much to say. He appeared to refer to Clarence Streit and 
his proposed federal union of democracies when he wrote about a "constitutional 
framework for the whole world or for whole continents". He referred to this as "naive 
arrogance" based on the assumption that mankind could solve the eternal problem of 
human governance at a single stroke. Carr criticized .this plan and its proponents as "[a] 
paper construction of a few simple-minded enthusiasts". Such ideas, he said, exerted 
"pernicious influence by grossly over-simplifying the p:toblem"85 . Carr also discussed the 
84 Ibid., p. 119. 
85 Ibid., p. 167. Carr later had extremely harsh words for proponents of such ideas, writing, "It is a source of 
strength as well as of weakness that in America, more than in Great Britain, any crank can obtain a friendly 
hearing if he presents his case attractively enough. The popularity recently enjoyed by schemes for the 
incorporation of Great Britain and the British Dominions in the American Federation or for still wider 
unions with foreign states should not mislead the observer into taking them seriously." Ibid., p. 183. 
515 
idea that states must cede sovereignty to a supranational organization as a means of 
securing peace, providing more evidence of the popularity of this concept at the time. He 
rejected this with the assertion, "What we are required in fact to surrender is not a 
mythical attribute called sovereignty, but the habit of framing our military and economic 
policy without regard for the needs and interests of other countries86." While it may 
sound as if Carr had attempted to strike a conciliatory note with this remark, one can 
easily hear an echo of appeasement policy in it as well, reflecting the idea that 
concessions to Germany amounted to nothing more than taking Germany' s "needs" into 
account. 
In the chapter "Britain and the World", Carr discussed at length the decline of 
Britain and the ascendancy of the United States during the twentieth century. The transfer 
of supremacy from London to Washington suffered from an unwillingness of the United 
States to accept the mantle of world leadership, and Britain's refusal to relinquish its 
central role. This resulted, throughout the interwar period, in "a constant failure on both 
sides to make the necessary adjustments to the changed situation87" . Happily, Carr wrote, 
the United States' acquisition of military bases outside its traditional defensive area 
signaled the likely end of American isolationism. A new era of Anglo-American 
cooperation thus seemed likely, as Carr argued this would result in a "mixing up" of 
relations between the two countries that would offer a more concrete suggestion than any 
al f . . 1 . 88 paper propos s o constltutwna urnon . 
86 Ibid., p. 169. 
87 Ibid., p. 173 . 
88 Ibid., p. 185. 
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Turning from Anglo-American ties to the broader concept ofthe balance of 
power, Carr linked his belief that only large powers could compete in the modem world 
to what he viewed as reduced opportunities for power balancing. Because only very large 
states would have any impact on the future of international relations, there would no 
longer be "room in Europe to-day for those three or four important and strong countries 
whose more or less equal rivalries enabled Great Britain in the past to secure herself 
through the policy ofthe balance of power". The days ofBritain acting as the balancing 
agent in European power politics had vanished forever, according to Carr, due to the 
disappearance of a multipolar European system. The obsession of British opinion with 
resurrecting its nineteenth-century balance policy rivaled interwar liberalism in its 
muddled simplicity, Carr wrote. For, without multiple powers to juggle in shifting 
alliance combinations, such a policy would prove impossible89. 
Carr also dealt at surprising length with the possibility that after the war Britain 
and her allies would again face an antagonistic, resurgent Germany seeking to redress 
another military defeat. He discussed the means by which a third German attack against 
other European powers might be met. He ruled out a rejuvenated balance-of-power 
alliance between France and Central European states on the interwar model because, as 
he frequently reiterated throughout the book, small states had proven militarily 
worthless90. Carr promoted the interesting idea that, as a means of avoiding the mistakes 
of Versailles, the postwar peace conference should take place only after a fairly lengthy 
interval following the conclusion of hostilities. This, he suggested, would allow the 
89 Ibid., p. 194. 
90 Ibid., p. 200. 
517 
antagonism of wartime to recede and relatively normal conditions to reappear. This 
passing of time would reduce the desire for vengeance. In addition, the relationships 
between states that develop organically in such an interval would provide a framework to 
which a peace treaty could be applied. This reflected Carr' s insistence that constitutions, 
treaties and written settlements must stem from existing conditions, not attempt to 
fashion the world after their own image. Thus, the form of the new international order 
. would precede its codification in a written document91 . 
In a final reflection on interwar policy, Carr remarked that policymakers and 
analysts of the 1930s were constantly at odds with themselves. Firstly, they promoted 
national self-determination and the fragmentation of the international system into small, 
theoretically economically self-contained, sovereign states. Secondly, they then hoped 
that while all of these units followed their own self-interest, the nascent European states 
would still somehow unite around the banner of the covenant and put their hard-won 
security in the hands of Geneva. These opposite poles of thought undermined the interwar 
system, according to Carr. Of course, Angell and the liberal realists would reply that the 
League, by promising to repel aggression, would provide the emergent states of the world 
with the security they required to fashion useful policies free from the fear of attack. 
Therefore, according to Angell, Carr's political paradox constituted nothing of the sort, 
but rather supported the assertion that states should have fostered the protective power 
the League proposed to afford instead of viewing League membership as a surrender of 
91 He concludes, "After the present war it will be wise to recognize that peace-making is not an event, but a 
continuous process which must be pursued in many places, under varying conditions, by many different 
methods and over a prolonged period of time; and anyone who supposes that it will be complete within six 
years should be regarded with the utmost suspicion." Ibid., p. 244-245. 
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sovereignty. In an amazing conclusion, however, Carr surprisingly came full circle. In the 
penultimate paragraph of Conditions of Peace, he warned, "No durable peace can be 
made unless those who have the power have also the will in the last resort, after having 
tried all methods of persuasion, to take and enforce with vigour and impartiality the 
decisions which they think right92." Astoundingly, these words sound as if they flowed 
from the pen of an interwar liberal realist arguing in favor of "putting force behind the 
law". Though it certainly reflects Carr's concern with power, this statement regarding 
"impartiality" and right thought seems to stand in stark contrast against Carr's other 
writings of the period. 
Ending the War and Beginning a New Era in British Foreign Policy 
Conditions of Peace, appearing in print in 1942, came at the conclusion ofthe 
most uncertain phase ofthe long turbulent era under focus in this study. By the end of 
that year, the fascist menace had been blunted by several decisive defeats, and the Allied 
powers had taken the initiative for the first time, never to relinquish it. Battles from 
Moscow to Midway and El Alamein put the Allies firmly on the road to victory. Carr's 
wartime work thus came off the presses at a time when the course of the war was in 
dramatic flux. Its content seems to reflect this transition. While much British writing of 
the early war years focused on the policies and events that brought about World War 
Two, Conditions of Peace offered a comprehensive look at the author's vision of a future 
world. Although previous authors mentioned in this chapter had also made remarks 
92 Ibid., p. 280. 
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concerning their vision of the postwar period, Carr's book embodied this intellectual 
quest as a central component of a lengthy study in conjunction with his own offerings 
regarding the recent past. In this sense Carr's writing perhaps reflected the Allies' 
improving fortunes on the battlefield. 
His liberal internationalist counterparts soon joined Carr in this endeavor. In a 
BBC radio interview in February 1943, Gilbert Murray expressed his belief that are-
forged international organization "on the lines of the League ofNations, is absolutely 
inevitable". He continued, "Of course it all depends on whether we have learnt our 
lesson, whether the unspeakable misery caused by this War [sic] shows that war has 
grown more and more intolerable and incompatible with civilization ... As the Prime 
Minister used to say again and again in the old days: 'There is no security except 
collective security93 . '" In a lecture on November twelfth of the same year, Murray 
implored his audience to think of future struggles for international order from a new 
perspective. Rather than interpreting the search for international order as an attempt to 
escape "oppressive laws" and domination by unwanted powers, Murray expressed the 
perceived need to envision international relations as a continuous process of attempting to 
restrain the destructive frenzy of anarchy with international law. "This point most people 
who think freely have recognized", he wrote, "but it means an enormous change of 
attitude%'. 
In June of 1945, with the nightmare of war in Europe having fmally come to a 
close but with the Pacific campaign still awaiting its nuclear climax, and with delegates 
93 Murray, From the League to UN, p. 85. 
94 1bid., p. 113. 
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from around the world set to converge on San Francisco for the first meeting of the UN, 
Murray returned to the subject of international organization in detail. Addressing a theme 
that would achieve prominence in the field within the next several years, Murray 
discussed the functional advantages of the resurrected global organization. The League' s 
successor, he wrote, would have the advantage of taking the League model for 
cooperation in the fields of economic development, labor, health, education and other 
issues. These appendages of the League had proved effective and beneficial even in the 
darkest days of the interwar period. Therefore, improving on this record of success during 
. the postwar period would confer upon members of the nascent United Nations material 
benefits they would be loathe to surrender by leaving the organization. Murray predicted 
that petty squabbles and resignations from the UN would decline relative to the interwar 
period, as the incentives to cooperate would be greater than ever before95. He 
optimistically wrote that the UN would have the power to "spread truth" and awaken the 
conscience of mankind96• This would allow individuals of charitable and noble spirit to 
finally contribute to the functioning of a better world97• 
In a final retrospective on the interwar period, Murray also stated in 1946 that the 
lack of unity among peaceful states enabled the fascist expansionary programs. The 
adoption of an alliance between Britain, France and USSR, on the other hand, had been in 
the interest of all three states and might have prevented the war98 . Yet again, a member of 
95 Ibid. , p. 148-149. 
96 Ibid., p. 152. 
97 
"I see here the field of work for those individuals and voluntary societies in this country and elsewhere 
who have so often longed to contribute to the great world crusade against war and international violence, 
but have found themselves without weapons, impotent and dumb." Ibid. , p. 154. 
98 Ibid., p. 180-182. 
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the liberal realist school demonstrated the remarkable flexibility that characterized their 
stream of thought. Murray never ceased to extol the virtues of collective security and 
greeted the creation of the United Nations with enthusiasm. In fact, rather than 
succumbing to cynicism and dwelling on the failure of the League, Murray adopted the 
optimistic perspective that the new organization could learn from the axiomatic failure of 
Geneva, as well as its notable successes in certain areas. Despite its manifest 
shortcomings, then, the League offered a foundation on which to build. Conversely, 
Murray also retained his clique's approval of power balancing as an alternative means of 
ensuring peace. Continuing to reflect on events of the previous decade, Murray lamented 
the absence of an increased commitment to power balancing. 
Just as Norman Angell published a book concerning American foreign policy, so 
too did an American publish an engaging work in 1944 dealing largely with the recent 
international relations of Britain. The New York Times' European correspondent Harold 
Callender's A Preface to Peace, finds a place in this section for two reasons. Firstly, 
though its author came from the United States, the subject matter of much of the book 
hews closely to the topics discussed by the British writers of the period reviewed in this 
study. Secondly, the book provides an example of transatlantic intellectual cross-
pollination that demonstrates the obverse side of British interest in the United States 
expressed by writers such as Angell, but also by Carr in Conditions of Peace. 
Callender, like his British counterparts such as Carr and Laski, wrote that the 
Allies' impending victory must carry some deeper meaning than the triumph of 1918. 
Victory over the fascist powers would be incomplete in the sense that, on one level, it 
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would only once again rebuff a threat of regional domination by hostile powers. To be a 
real step toward a better future, the Allies would need to imbue their success against 
Germany and Japan with a positive, constructive meaning that would outlast the hollow 
promises of the interwar period99. The upcoming peace settlement needed to succeed in 
all the ways Versailles proved an utter failure. It would need to inspire the next 
generation ofleaders to view it as worthy. The settlement "must provide some reason for 
believing, in spite of all the evidence to the contrary, that civilized men can manage the 
society which- perhaps in a fit of absent-mindedness- they have created". Because the 
Versailles settlement did none of these things, even those who stood to benefit from it 
despised its strictures and refused to uphold the type of international state system it 
embodied. This lack of willpower on behalf of the democratic powers to enforce and 
perpetuate the peace they made led to the rise of Hitler, and must not be repeated100. 
Emphasizing some themes discussed in earlier chapters of this study, Callender 
discussed various contradictions in Anglo-American interwar policy under the heading 
"Having it Both Ways". He noted that the British attitude toward Germany was one of 
"easy-going, idealistic confusion" in which the British people held contradictory beliefs 
about world security. These included those revealed by the 1935 League ofNations 
Union "Peace Ballot" survey, which demonstrated that Britons wished for "forcible 
collective resistance to aggression", but simultaneously sought to reduce spending on the 
99 
" It is potentially positive in the sense that it gives us the opportunity to do more than to beat back an 
aggressor, more than to crush a kind of revolution against the existing order of power and wealth, more 
even than to insure peace by overwhelming arguments. Like victory itself, none of these things can be 
enough because none can be permanent and none is positive in the sense of being constructive All were 
necessary because of the short-sightedness of the democracies in the twenty inter-war years . .. " Callender, 
Harold. A Preface to Peace. London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1944, p. 9-10. 
100 Ibid., p. 28. 
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armaments their country would need to enforce such a policy. Likewise, the United 
States, in the years preceding its entry into the war, "thought to prevent war by 
threatening to be neutral if aggression took place", and hoped to see the British win 
· without making any sacrifices to ensure this end 101 . Returning to the subject of Britain, 
Callender wrote that Prime Minister Baldwin' s refusal to advocate rearmament in the 
1935 election demonstrated sound political sense which reflected the mood of the British 
people, but complained that the electorate was "in one of its most careless moods". Thus, 
Baldwin neglected his role as a national leader to seek the best policies and explain them 
to the voters, not merely to pander to their shortsighted desires. Callender also returned to 
the complete lack of confidence displayed by Britain in the Versailles Treaty: 
It seems incredible today that the first great strategic move 
towards world war, Hitler's re-militarization of the 
Rhineland in 1936, should actually have been applauded by 
the majority of the British people. The explanation is to be 
found in the sympathy towards Germany and the remorse 
over the peace treaty which had colored British views of 
Europe for fifteen years102. 
Beginning his plea against what he viewed as the common folly of Anglo-
American isolationism, Callender considered what he interpreted as a parallel "lack of 
policy" in Washington and London in the years preceding the war. Britain abjured 
continental commitments beyond the French frontier, while the United States did not 
maintain requisite military strength to defend its Pacific empire that stretched to distant 
Manila. However, in the course offighting .World War Two, the United States and 
101 Ibid., p. 139. 
102 Ibid., p. 140-141. 
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Britain both extended their overseas commitments, influence, and power to a level that 
would have probably prevented the outbreak of war if only these actions had been 
undertaken prior to 1939. Callender reasoned that "Britons and Americans have much in 
common, including the blunders they have made." He also called on his American 
audience to remember Pearl Harbor not only as a motive for fighting the war, but also as 
the price the United States had "paid for attempted isolation in a time when isolation had 
become an absurdity. It was, in other words, the price of not having a foreign policy103." 
Callender criticized Britain for attempting to further its national security by sacrificing 
third parties during the 1930s, and for failing to capitalize on the opportunity to rearm104. 
Postwar Britain 
The war years had witnessed a continually high output of international relations 
literature from some of the most prolific writers of the interwar period. Angell, Laski, 
Carr and Murray had all made their reputations long before 1939, and their writing of the 
war period demonstrated strong continuity with the arguments they had made previously. 
The postwar British debate witnessed continued contributions from some of these 
individuals and their contemporaries, while a chorus of new voices joined them in a 
continuing discussion of foreign policy that became refocused on broad theoretical issues. 
Much of this renewed debate and space for emerging contributors appeared in the pages 
of International Affairs, which had suspended publication following the outbreak of the 
103 Ibid., p. 146-149. 
104 Ibid. , p. 155. 
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war (though Chatham House maintained its book review supplement)105 . International 
Affairs renewed publication in 1944, but like the APSR, it tended to focus on specific 
matters. Its first new issue that opened the momentous year which witnessed, among 
other things, the Normandy landings and the sanguinary struggle for Warsaw, included 
articles such as "Manchuria Today" and "International Aspects ofNorwegian Economic 
Reconstruction"106• Discussion ofthematic international relations concerns remained 
absent, but would reemerge as the war years faded and the citizens of Great Britain, along 
with the country's intellectual elite, faced a new array of challenges . 
. Sir Norman Angell addressed these emergent postwar concerns in his 194 7 book 
The Steep Places; the title taken from a Biblical tale concerning a shepherd leading his 
flock near a dangerous precipice. Though Angell needed to adapt his perspective to the 
deepening Cold War, the introduction saw him restating some of his earlier points, such 
as the primacy of security rather than peace in the matter of policy planning that he 
discussed in Peace With the Dictators? He once again asserted that it would make more 
sense to state one's commitment to defense beforehand rather than to maintain a self-
proclaimed interest in peace above all, for this would offer a deterrent effect against 
aggression which might prevent war. Maintaining "peace above all" simply encouraged 
aggression that ultimately made peace impossible107. Angell also forwarded a realist 
105 Editorial Foreword. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 20, No. 1, 
p. 1. 
106 Getz-Wold, Knut. "International Aspects ofNorwegian Economic Reonstruction".lnternational Affairs 
(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 54-67 and Stewart, John. "Manchuria 
Today". International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 68-80. 
107 
"If our real intention had been plain to ourselves so that we could have made it plain to the potential 
aggressor earlier than we did, he would not have gambled on not being resisted." Angell, Norman. The 
Steep Places. Harper & Brothers, New York, 1947, p. 7. 
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interpretation of the origin of conflict early in the book, arguing that individuals and 
groups display the tendency to turn their beliefs into articles of faith - a claim E.H. Carr 
doubtlessly would have seconded. Because each group believes in its own outlook as "the 
truth", wrote Angell, the tendency to spark conflict remained ever-present108• Shying 
away from the combative nature of international relations had proved counterproductive, 
argued the author. Tackling one's problems directly would have saved much suffering in 
the long run: 
The very genuine fear of war which marked the years of 
appeasement (and of American Neutrality Acts) should 
warn us that an indiscriminating fear of war may help to 
bring it on. Had we been less afraid to challenge the 
aggressors when they were weak instead of waiting until 
they were strong ... the chances of peace may have been 
increased. We hated the thought of war in those days. But 
the emotion did not always prompt the policy most likely to 
prevent it. It usually prompted the least likely109. 
Although Angell had long hoped for a logical revolution that would make his 
interpretation of the futility of conflict obvious to all, it seems that in the aftermath of 
World War Two he had tempered his hope of this occurring in the near future. Again 
contradicting interpretations of his work as utopian, Angell warned that human nature 
would not change quickly enough to avoid war simply due to the advent of atomic 
weapons110. Though Sir Norman did note that "Any discussion ofthe place ofpower in 
the organization of society must raise the question of whether the coming of the A-bomb 
has not eliminated the use of physical force in international relations altogether", he 
108 Ibid., p. 18-19. 
109 Ibid., p. 40. 
110 Ibid., p. 41-42. 
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seemed to implicitly answer that question in the negative. Angell continued to emphasize 
themes similar to his argument in America: Alone or Allied? but with the logic applied to 
Britain rather than the United States. Britain, he wrote, could not follow a path of 
neutrality because such a path would be quickly blocked by assumptions prevalent in the 
Kremlin, which had quickly replaced Nazi Germany as the potential source of aggression 
in Angell's analysis. In the past two world wars, Britain had become an invaluable 
staging ground for American military might. Even if Britain tried to embrace neutrality 
and find a middle ground between the USSR and the USA, the Soviets could never take 
the risk that Britain would subsequently decide to oppose them at the last minute, as 
Britain did twice against Germany. Thus, the Soviet Union would be greatly tempted to 
make a preemptive strike against the United Kingdom. Angell underscored this argument 
with a repetition ofhis assertion that the policy of neutrality had tempted Hitler into 
expansionism during the 1930s111 . 
The Soviets' conflict-oriented view made it imperative that Britain and the rest of 
the western world quickly create a defensive alliance of some kind in order to prevent 
Soviet expansionism. Angell forwarded an intensely realist argument that any state, 
particularly one such as the USSR, abhors a vacuum and that if instability presented itself 
on their frontier, a powerful state would always expand to fill that vacuum. Given the 
Soviets' proclivity to augment their power through political as well as military means, 
Ill Ibid., p. 129. 
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this generated the need for the democratic world to coalesce quickly, lest the Soviets be 
tempted to take advantage of the first sign of weakness 112. 
Angell also proceeded on a fairly lengthy discourse regarding the importance of 
shared national interests. The United States had long decried the British Empire, wrote 
Angell, and his personal nemesis of Anglophobic rhetoric was, according to him, part and 
parcel of American political dialogue. Similarly, isolationism continued to maintain a 
strong appeal, particularly when war elsewhere seemed likely or was actually underway. 
Yet, the United States actually abandoned its neutrality and went to war alongside the 
Commonwealth twice in a single generation. Angell explained this with reasoning highly 
reminiscent of Walter Lippmann's, writing that America realized that the hegemony of 
another power, such as Germany, posed a greater threat to its interests than did the United 
Kingdom, which had coexisted peacefully with the United States for a century or more113 . 
Reprising yet more themes of Angell's past writing, and providing a concise 
synthesis of the liberal realist argument, the chapter "Power as the Guarantor of Reason" 
discussed the criticism leveled by liberals against the purported importance of military 
power. Angell argued that the mere presence of armaments meant little compared to the 
policies for which they are applied. Nobody argued, for instance, that the police should 
be deprived of power, because it is their presence which made the calculations of 
democracy possible by restraining and suppressing conflict. Similarly, military power on 
the world stage could play a prominent role by preventing aggression and allowing 
112 Ibid., p. 131. 
113 Ibid., p. 132. 
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rational calculations to take place114. Focusing on the most important development in the 
British Empire that year, Angell remarked that Mohandas Ghandi's pacifism had no place 
in international affairs, writing that if it were applied internationally it would only 
embolden those who had no use for peace and who wished to employ force as a matter of 
course
115 
Toward the end of The Steep Places, Angell once again had warm words for both 
the balance of power and collective security. He noted that on both occasions, American 
intervention in European affairs during the twentieth century had taken place to ensure 
that no dictatorial state should achieve hegemony. Importantly, Angell wrote: 
Both wars represented an effort by threatened states to 
ensure by their own power what in a properly organized 
[my italics] international society would be ensured by the 
collective power of society. 'Balance of power' has an ugly 
name, almost as ugly as that of 'power politics.' But the 
balance of power and some 'playing of power politics' 
were the only available substitute in international society 
for the defense of that right of free discussion which is the 
basis of Western democracy116. 
Once more, contrary to a strictly "utopian" interpretation of his work, Sir Norman offered 
a defense of the importance of force. But, like his liberal realist counterparts, Angell 
remained thoroughly devoted to the idea of using force for the defense of principles such 
as democracy and freedom of expression rather than a Machiavellian interpretation of 
national interest. Yet Angell also displayed a healthy respect for the role played by 
national interest as well as the ideals he held so dear. As an example of the importance of 
114 Ibid., p. 133-136. 
115 Ibid., p. 137. 
116 1bid., p. 138. 
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national interest in determining the shape of foreign policy, Angell cited the Anglo-
French defense of Poland at the outbreak of World War Two. Had ideology been more 
important than the shared national interest of confronting the Reich, liberal-democratic 
France and Britain would never have gone to the aid of the reactionary regime in 
Warsaw117. In general, however, Angell remained committed to his liberal interpretation 
of realist security principles until the last, concluding with a strong endorsement of 
collective security. Speaking of the recently-won victory over dictatorship, Angell 
reminded his readers that "the purpose of our victory should not be to give power to the 
fifty-odd United Nations to bring about a world revolution and build some brand new 
society on its ruins, but, as far as is humanly possible, to make sure first of all peace, the 
prevention of aggression, by defending in common the victims of aggression118." 
One of the most famous publications of this period also falls within the scope of 
this study. "The Functional Approach to World Organization" by David Mitrany has 
made its author's influence felt in various fields of political science throughout the 
decades since its publication and maintains a high status for its innovative approach to the 
subject of international relations. Indeed, the article represented Mitrany' s attempt to 
avoid the many pitfalls of security organization paradigms that had dogged his peers for 
so long. As we have seen, some writers in the liberal realist camp frequently sought to 
combine elements of collective security and power balancing, while others advocated 
some sort of federative solution. Mitrany's "functionalist" method eschewed all ofthese 
alternatives. At the outset of the article, the author noted the flaw that had doomed the 
11 7 1bid., p. 148. 
118 Ibid., p. 152. 
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League and threatened to weaken the United Nations. Because they lacked the possession 
of their own tools to address threats, collective security organizations could not enforce 
h . d . . 119 t eu ec1s10ns . 
The inadequacy of such bodies had prompted interest in the idea of federation. 
However, "The will to unite is not self-evident. Indeed most of these ideas, like that for 
European federation, are pressed from outside upon countries which themselves have 
shown no sign of taking the initiative120." Mitrany argued that federations suffered from 
an inherently brittle and rigid nature. Of necessity, the slowest and most recalcitrant 
member of any federative body had the prerogative to set the pace of change. Issues that 
threatened to fatally weaken federations might remain ignored rather than confronted 
directly due to the danger they presented to federal cohesion. Furthermore, Mitrany wrote 
that the framework for any type of international government must conform to "the will 
for national distinctness and the need for social integration" -two possibly conflicting 
goals. All of these characteristics, according to Mitrany, meant that federal structures had 
little to recommend them in an era of rapid change121 . 
Mitrany illustrated that the most effectively functioning federations, such as the 
United States and Canada, tended to be the oldest. As a result, they had the time to forge 
a national community during an historical period in which the overall role of government 
remained small, non-intrusive and less controversial relative to the modem era. In 
addition, the recent successes gained by federations, such as the Tennessee Valley 
119 Mitrany, David. "The Functional Approach to World Organization". International Affairs , Vol. 24, No. 
3 (Jul., 1948), p. 351. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid., p. 353-354. 
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Authority, came about through the circumvention of federal structures. Rather than 
adapting federal constitution, new functions had been assigned to the federal government 
· with "tacit national consent" by "functional accretion, not by constitutional revision". 
Indeed, the United States found it easier te undertake joint ventures with neighboring 
states such as the Alcan Highway .and joint management of the Rio Grande than it did to 
implement various New Deal programs over the objections of member states of the 
American federation. Dealing with sovereign entities in this manner proved simpler than 
organizing among federal units in a constitutional framework. Lastly, any new 
international federation would Jack the historical sense of unity that existed in the 
federations of the new world, and would therefore face even greater obstacles in effecting 
change122 . 
. ·. Having thoroughly analyzed the drawbacks inherent in federal- organization, · 
Mitrany turned to the promotion of his "functional" approach: "The truth is that by its 
very nature the constitutional approach emphasizes the individual index of power; the 
functional approach emphasizes the common index of need." Therefore, international 
·government should focus on needs that promote a unity of states rather than on the 
prickly issues of sovereignty and identity which divide them. Mitrany argued that the 
Marshall Plan provided an excellent example of how this might succeed 123 . The creation 
of a "Ruhr Valley Authority" could represent another manifestation of this concept, 
modeled on the TV A. Such a body, owing to its nonpolitical nature, would face fewer 
obstacles to its creation and smooth operation than the Herculean prospect of creating a 
122 Ibid., p. 355. 
123 Ibid., p. 356. 
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western European federation. Functional associations would also benefit from operating 
independently from one another, wrote Mitrany. Thus, while schemes for federal 
arrangements competed with one another to organize the same units (i.e. the states of 
western Europe), functional bodies could adopt different forms appropriate to the tasks 
they sought to undertake. As a result, Mitrany believed it should prove easy to broaden 
them as time progressed in the event that new units wished to become involved. In 
addition, states could choose to participate only in the functional arrangements they 
deemed necessary, whereas federation presented an ali-or-nothing proposition. Finally, 
the scope of functional bodies could be adjusted to fit the scope of the task they were 
designed to undertake based on objective measurement, rather than subjective political 
th . . 124 eonzmg . 
Mitrany therefore sought to neuter the potentially acrimonious and contentious 
debate over the thorny issue of sovereignty by completely sidestepping politics. This 
approach, so different from every other one outlined in this study, offered a new path to 
global organization. A comparison between Mitrany's functionalist theory and the 
constant, arduous wrangling with concepts such as federalism, sovereignty and 
organizing for security so, intently engaged in by a multitude of other scholars, indicates 
the truly revolutionary nature ofMitrany's thought. Functionalism promised to slowly 
ease states into a future of normative cooperation without threatening the values they held 
dear: "the true choice is not between the present competitive nationalisms and a lame 
international federation, but between a full-fledged and comprehensive world government 
124 Ibid., p. 357-358. 
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and equally full-fledged but specific and separate functional agencies." This sort of 
Fabian approach would allow mankind to put aside the passionate debate and weak 
institutions that had precluded progress toward world peace for so long by advocating the 
embrace of thoroughly technocratic, apolitical structures of management- not 
governance. Yet, the Fabian description remains an accurate one. As the discussion 
following Mitrany's presentation of the article to an audience at Chatham House 
demonstrated, the author envisioned the functional approach as an evolutionary rather 
than revolutionary path toward the eventual formation of federal institutions 125 . 
International Affairs published several more articles on subjects related to this 
study over subsequent years. In 1948, it discussed how the Commonwealth countries 
might react to the creation of the Western Union, an organization linking the United 
States and Europe that preceded the formation ofNATO. As a result, Nicholas 
Mansergh's article focused mostly on the politics of the Commonwealth, but it included 
an important comment on power balancing. The author wrote that British foreign policy 
remained predicated for centuries on the security of the Low Countries from domination 
by a great power, naval supremacy, and on the balance of power on the continent. He 
suggested that some readers would be surprised to read yet another remark about power 
balancing and that Britons might find it difficult to believe that their nation' s defense still 
rested on such an ancient concept. Could finding a balance of power really still be the 
aim of British foreign policy? Mansergh responded, "the answer is that, if not the aim, it 
is at least a condition ... a balance of power may not in itself be sufficient to preserve 
125 Ibid., p. 358-360. 
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peace [but] without any semblance of a balance on the Continent there will almost 
certainly be war" due to the desire of a preponderant European power to attempt the 
domination ofEurope126. Indeed, considering the threat posed to Britain by Napoleon, the 
Kaiser, Hitler, and now Stalin's Soviet Union, such a conclusion might have struck 
Mansergh's readers as more sensible than he predicted. Despite the birth of the United 
Nations and the memory of two exhausting wars, power balancing retained its place in 
the minds of at least some British foreign policy analysts. 
As NATO came into existence, Kathleen D. Courtney discussed why the United 
Nations had seemed to fall so short of the expectations that it had inspired at the time of 
its formation. In International Affairs, she wrote that the UN Charter had been conceived 
with the assumption that its signatories would continue the united front they had 
displayed during their fight against the Axis. The downfall of the United Nations, noted 
Courtney, stemmed from the fact "that it has to function in a world which is rent from top 
to bottom, divided on every subject which is of importance to human beings127." The 
provision of the great power veto appeared as a particular concern in the British as well 
as the American literature on the subject. Courtney paraphrased Lord Cecil on the 
subject, who argued that "if you had goodwill the veto would not matter at all, and if you 
have not goodwill the best instrument in the world will not serve your purpose; I believe 
that is true." The creation of the veto, like the rest of the Charter, of course, had been 
126 Mansergh, Nicholas. "Britain, the Commonwealth, and Western Union". International Affairs, Vol. 24, 
No.4 (Oct., 1948), p. 491-492. 
127 Courtney, Kathleen D. "The United Nations in a Divided World". International Affairs. Vol. 25, No 2 
(Apr., 1949), p. 169. 
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promulgated during the San Francisco Conference, when the unity of the Allied powers 
was largely taken for granted128. 
Courtney did note that in the realm of human welfare, the UN could play a great 
role though its specialized (one might say "functional") organizations such as the Food 
and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization. In the realm of 
"security against war", however, the Charter left mankind wanting. Thus, the main 
question regarding the United Nations remained whether it could provide security against 
aggression. Again discussing the ideas of Lord Cecil, Courtney detailed a plan whereby 
states could accede to a new treaty that would mandate a collective response to 
aggression outside the United Nations. This seemed to suggest that potential aggressor 
states - by implication the Soviet Union- would decline to add their signature but would 
not be able to veto a collective defense as they could do within the United Nations129. 
Regional pacts offered a possible alternative. Courtney specifically mentioned NATO, 
which would shortly make the transition from an idea to a reality. The author put her 
hope in such organizations, concluding, "I believe that the development of regional pacts 
is at the moment the most hopeful policy since its realization now seems only a matter of 
A few months later, International Affairs published an article that challenged the 
dream of many who supported the idea of creating an international federation. "World 
Government- In Whose Time?'' by Percy E. Corbett discussed many of what the author 
1281bid., p. 170. 
129 Ibid., p. 172-173. 
130 Ibid., p. 173-174. 
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perceived as flaws in the proposals of Streit and his adherents. Corbett wrote that world 
government could not be created ex novo because government is a manifestation of an 
existing society. The will to have world government must precede its creation. This 
willpower did not exist, argued Corbett. Furthermore, he maintained that allusions to the 
example of the United States as a template for how such a federation might emerge 
overestimated the solidarity between states in the modem international system 131 . Even 
the time for collective security had not yet arrived. According to Corbett, the eventual 
formation of world society would take place, like the formation of society within states, 
slowly and in an evolutionary manner: 
But when the fallaciously simple proposition of the 
Federalists, that our problem is merely the establishment of 
a mechanism for keeping the peace, is considered, it must 
be realized what is proposed is that the States should 
subordinate their discretion and should rely upon an 
international authority to protect and administer those very 
interests and values for which they primarily exist as 
political communities. That will take a great deal oftirne132. 
If states could not even be expected to submit to a collective organization for 
security, the days of a future world federal government would surely lie far in the future. 
Indeed, Corbett used the very arguments of some collective security proponents who 
sought UN reform against the concept of collective security itself. "To complain that it 
[the UN] has not the power to enforce its will and to prevent aggression by its members", 
Corbett wrote, "is to point to the very deficiencies which I have emphasized, namely, the 
131 
"there were present, it seems clear to me, in the hands of the fathers of the American constitution, 
elements of a society between the thirteen colonies which do not exist between the countries of the world at 
large." Corbett, Percy E. "World Government- In Whose Time?'' International Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 4 
(Oct., 1949), p. 427. 
132 Ibid., p. 428 
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absence of agreed fundamental values ... 133" Yet, the global organization had the potential 
to serve as the basis for improving in the future as consensus among states grew. Corbett 
therefore deprecated proposals for a world federation by warning that they threatened to 
undermine the United Nations, which would "remove the center of gravity in world 
affairs" and prevent the global body from gaining the loyalty of humanity it needed to 
fulfill its task134. With regard to the increasingly popular topic of regional organizations, 
Corbett wrote that NATO and similar proposals were defensive in nature and neither 
contributed to nor detracted from the possibility of a future world federation. However, 
he maintained, their basis in free institutions could form the necessary foundation of such 
0 0 0 th fu 135 an orgaruzatwn m e ture . 
As the writing ofMitrany, Corbett and Courtney suggests, even those who 
remained doubtful of dramatic proposals such as world federalism, or even of the more 
limited promises of collective security embodied by the UN, still maintained their hope 
for continued progress toward a more cooperative future. The United Nations maintained 
an important place in the vision of such writers, although they recognized its present 
limitations. In the British as well as the American literature, fervor for world government 
had gone the way of Allied wartime cooperation. Yet, this did not spell the end for 
dreams of increased international collaboration. Mitrany' s vision of functional 
organizations seems to have had some influence on Kathleen Courtney, whose approval 
of power-balancing regional organizations was shared by Corbett. Though the 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid., p. 429. 
135 Ibid., p. 429-430. 
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evolutionary means toward a more harmonious future differed, all three authors persisted 
in their hope for eventually brighter days through means that did not involve the 
disappointing morass of the Security Council. Though such postwar writers had become 
somewhat skeptical, they seemed to respond to contemporary challenges with innovation 
rather than pessimism. 
Duff Cooper, MP, friend and cohort ofHarold Nicolson, did react to the postwar 
realities of British international relations with a measure of regret, though he did not 
succumb to despair. Writing in International Affairs after the outbreak of the Korean 
War, Cooper reflected on the recent history of British foreign policy and the chain of 
events he had witnessed from his seat in the House of Commons. He noted the serious 
losses Britain had sustained as a result of the Second World War, such as the diminution 
of its overseas empire and investments, and the loss of naval supremacy. This had, he 
wrote, served to make Britain part of the continent of Europe for the first time. The 
USSR, by contrast, had gained immense power as a result of the war. Cooper noted the 
multiple states that the Soviet Union had annexed or forced into its orbit and remarked, 
"This has been the rich reward of the contemptible and cowardly policy pursued by Stalin 
from before the outbreak ofwar136." Conversely, Cooper described the United States as a 
young man who had looked forward to inheriting a great estate with a certain reluctance, 
but whose "elderly cousin" had finally died. Cooper wrote, "The heir has inherited, and 
136 Cooper, Duff. "The Plough and the Furrow". Foreign Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Oct., 1950), p. 1-2. 
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the coming half century will show how America fulfills the great task, the high duty that 
has been laid upon her. She has begun well137." 
Regarding the reduced circumstances of his own country, Cooper discussed his 
belief that at the end of the war, Britain may have had the opportunity to make common 
cause in a European program with the goal of making Western Europe a fulcrum between 
Washington and Moscow. He noted that with the might of colonial empires still in 
British, French, Dutch and possibly Spanish and Portuguese hands, this combination may 
have been able to wield considerable power. However, "Five years have passed, and with 
them has passed also Britain's great and, it is to be feared, her last opportunity" to 
reclaim the status of a great power, as the British government of the postwar era took no 
steps to create a united Europe. Cooper cited London's refusal to join the European Coal 
and Steel Community as an example of its failed postwar policy. By its refusal to join the 
new economic organization, Britain had "forfeited her right and her opportunity to lead 
Western Europe", and had undermined the scheme's hope of success138• 
Returning to his earlier comments about the United States, Cooper indicated his 
belief that although Britain had fallen from the pinnacle of power, not all was lost for the 
west thanks to American leadership. The United States' immediate willingness to engage 
the communists in Korea had, he wrote, relieved Europeans of their burden of fear that 
the new superpower might recommit the mistakes of the 1930s. Cooper also expressed 
his belief that the United Nations could undoubtedly rebuff the North Koreans' attack. 
However, envisioning a protracted struggle against the Kremlin and its allies, Cooper 
137 Ibid., p. 3. 
138 Ibid. , p. 5. 
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warned, "the danger does not lie there [in military strength] but rather in the possibility 
that after that victory people may be inclined to believe that the war is over when in fact 
it will have been hardly begun139." Cooper interpreted the Korean War as merely one 
chapter in what would prove a lengthy struggle between the forces of communism and 
liberal democracy140. The conflict in Korea stood in stark contrast to the west's 
willingness to let Stalin "take" Czechoslovakia and Poland in a manner he suggested 
proved reminiscent of appeasement. The author compared this vision and the immediate 
response against North Korea's violation of its southern neighbor to the west's failure to 
arrest the ltalo-Abyssinian conflict. Britons, wrote Cooper, had proved too willing to 
rationalize Mussolini's actions as similar to those of the ascending British Empire and 
took no pity on the Ethiopians141 . The failure to stop Mussolini's Ethiopian adventure 
stemmed from these beliefs, wrote Cooper, as well as the additional failure to understand 
that it in fact represented the dictators' challenge to the forces of international order. 
Cooper enjoined his readers not to have the same lack of foresight with regard to Stalin 
and the USSR, and therefore to support the UN action in Korea. He remarked of the 
Soviet leadership, "with those men there can be no peaceful settlement any more than 
there could have been a peaceful settlement with Hitler142." 
139 Ibid. 
140 
"When people ask me whether I think there will be a war I tell them there is one already, and when they 
explain that they mean a world war I say that it has broken out. The war in Korea is not between Northern 
and Southern Koreans, it is an attack launched by the totalitarians against the forces of freedom. It is the 
first fought battle in a world dispute." Ibid., p. 6. 
141 
"When Mussolini attacked Abyssinia there were many people who felt that he was only doing what 
Great Britain had often done before, that the expansion of his colonial empire had rendered it necessary for 
him to teach a lesson to some backward, barbarous, slave-trading tribes and that the Abyssinian people 
themselves would probably benefit in the long run ... This feeling was widespread in Great Britain and 
would have made it very difficult for the government to have gone to the help of Abyssinia." Ibid., p. 7. 
142 Ibid., p. 7-8. 
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With the contest between Moscow and the west now joined, Cooper offered a 
series of policy recommendations. Firstly, the democratic powers should not admit 
Stalin' s UN delegate, who had been boycotting the body' s proceedings, to New York 
should he desire to return. Secondly, Cooper argued that the UN should quickly boost its 
military capabilities and make known its willingness to use them for defensive purposes. 
Cooper drew the parallel with the appeasement era by expressing his belief that if Hitler 
had known in advance the full might of the powers which would have been arrayed 
against him, he would not have risked war. This, of course, was the same argument made 
by collective security advocates in the 1930s with regard to World War One. According 
to Cooper, Stalin should be under no illusion that he might attain his aim of world 
communist domination without opposition. If the democratic powers prepared for a third 
world war, their combined might could persuade the Kremlin against attempts at 
expansion, and thus render another conflict unnecessary. Therefore, Cooper favored a 
continuation of massive rearmament143 . But, maintaining the thread of optimism that ran 
through works of the previous two years, Cooper foresaw the possibility of coming to 
terms with the communist world once they had come to an appreciation of western 
power: 
143 Ibid., p. 8-9. 
144 Ibid., p. 10. 
Let them be assured that the strength of the armed forces 
will not be diminished nor the will to use them relaxed until 
we are satisfied that the threat to freedom has passed away. 
Then it may well be that they will abandon their ambition 
to conquer or convert the world by force. When that time 
comes there can be peace with Communism, but not until 
then144. 
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Norman Angell returned to the realm of international politics one fmal time 
within the course of this study, and for one of the last times of his long life, with the 
publication of his autobiography After All in 1951. As he approached his eightieth 
birthday, Sir Norman sought to provide a retrospective and comprehensive defense of his 
analysis and the policies he advocated throughout his career. As a result, most of After All 
revisited the many points of Angell's approach already documented in detail throughout 
the course of this study. Certain points remain worth considering, however, as evidence 
that the author remained committed to his earlier beliefs. For example, he once again 
advanced the argument - so popular among internationalists - that the Kaiser would 
never have initiated an attack on France and Russia in 1914 had the powerful Anglo-
Saxon states made their willingness to fight Germany known beforehand. Thus, he 
continued to assert, commitments did not lead to war but offered the promise of 
dissuading aggression145• The discourse in this section of After All again demonstrated 
Angell ' s basic approach to ensuring global stability. Contrary to interwar appeasers, who 
feared that threatening potential or actual aggressors would only provoke international 
tension and make peace more remote, Angell concurred with Cooper in his belief that 
taking a resolute stance against aggression could blunt reckless expansionism. The 
recognition ofthis imperative was paramount; the means could take various forms. 
145 Angell, Norman. After All. Farrar, Straus and Young, New York, 1951, p. 262-263. 
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One passage of After All, more than any other, encapsulated the broad themes of 
Angell's vision in a concise paragraph146. In it, he reiterated numerous arguments that 
emerged throughout the previous two decades of his work. Firstly, he maintained that the 
only means of ensuring state security lay in upholding collective security. Otherwise, a 
single aggressor could subdue its targets successively in turn. To illustrate this concept, 
Angell again turned to the conflict between law enforcement and criminals in the 
metropolitan sphere. Furthermore, he harkened to his earlier clash with E.H. Carr by 
maintaining that such a method of minimizing international conflict did not merely 
ensure the survival of a potentially unjust status quo. Rather, as he repeatedly asserted 
during the great debate, it ensured that the rights and security of all states would be 
respected. Therefore, states would prove more willing to allow potentially threatening 
alterations to the status quo, secure in the knowledge that a global collective security 
organization would protect their interests147. 
Angell also indulged in a few fmal words of criticism for his interwar 
contemporaries on the opposite side ofthe collective security debate. He claimed that the 
primary difficulty facing British League partisans lay in the need to confront multiple 
sources of criticism simultaneously. The first he described as the "old type Nationalist 
146 
"I have tried during thirty years to show that there can be no defence which is not collective defence; 
that if each nation is left to be its own sole defender then the nations can be picked off one by one, by any 
aggressor that manages to make himself stronger than the single victim of the moment; just as a bandit 
gang that made itself stronger than a single household could have a whole countryside at its mercy unless 
the organized power ofthe community in the shape of the police stood ultimately behind each household. If 
we won't defend others- by, say, paying our police rate for the defence of neighbours we may not like-
then in the end we shall be unable to defend ourselves. Thus to organize the power of the community does 
not mean perpetuation of an unchanging status quo. It is the necessary foundation of peaceful change; the 
means by which the rights of the community can be asserted against individual anarchic violence; the 
necessary basis oflaw and its peaceful evolution." Ibid., p. 263. 
147 Ibid. 
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Conservative". These individuals Angell caricatured as archetypical Colonel Blimps, who 
eschewed all types of internationalism as pacifist gabble: "Dear old Blimp was far too 
muddle-headed to distinguish between pacifism and internationalism; or to see that 
sufficiency or effectiveness of national arms would depend on who was with us and who 
against." The second, and more troublesome, fount of opposition came from the socialist 
camp, which believed that the key to peace lay only in socialist revolution or evolution, 
not in any kind of combination among "capitalist" states, collective or otherwise148. On 
such ideological rocks, the concept of collective security had foundered, much to 
Angell ' s lasting dismay, as indicated by his lengthy commentary on this matter over the 
previous twenty years. Sir Norman continued to expound on what his writings ofthe late 
1930s revealed as his preferred solution to Europe' s woes. Once again, he insisted that an 
alliance of the western great powers within the structure of the League could have 
successfully contained the late dictators149. In retrospect, this assertion seems perhaps to 
have foreshadowed the provision of Article 51 of the UN Charter and the NATO alliance 
that coalesced within the confmes of the United Nations. 
Finally, in an interesting aside that demonstrates the close association between the 
internationalist writers discussed in this study, Angell recalled that upon his receipt of the 
1933 Nobel Peace Prize he received congratulatory notes from Gilbert Murray, Arthur 
Salter, Lord Robert Cecil and Harold Laski, among others150. Although Norman Angell 
lived until 1967, Ceadel' s biography notes that his health had been in decline since the 
148 Ibid., p. 266. 
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"it soon became evident that the League itself could only be an effective instrument of collective 
defence if within it there existed an alliance of the great powers along the lines of Clemenceau' s suggested 
Tripartite Guarantees." Ibid., p. 267. 
150 Ibid., p. 324. 
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publication of The Steep Places in 1947. In the latter stage of his life, Angell put 
increased emphasis on writing his autobiography, which devoted little space to this 
period relative to its length, and to organizing his extensive archive of personal papers. 
He began to drift rightward and into the Conservative Party, and increasingly turned his 
attention to British domestic politics. After publishing The Steep Places, his interest in 
international affairs diminished. But, outside the scope of this study, he maintained his 
approval of collective security well into advanced age. He again supported the idea 
during the 1956 Suez Crisis, with particular regard to the State of Israel whose cause he 
had long supported. Angell argued that the credibility of the United Nations lay at stake 
in the months before the Sinai War, remarking that because the UN had created Israel, it 
had the obligation to defend the Jewish state or risk falling into disrepute as the League 
had done151. 
Once and future Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden examined the subject of 
collective security in a 1951 Foreign Affairs article in which he placed emphasis on the 
importance of military might and the willingness to use force in defense of international 
law. Echoing the many liberal realists among his contemporaries, he wrote that attempts 
to forge international peace "must have the backing of arms. Only in such a way can 
collective security perform its essential function, which is to avert war instead of merely 
permitting some to survive it152." Drawing on his long experience in foreign affairs since 
the 1930s, Eden clearly put a premium on deterrence rather than simply defense: an 
imperative that took on increased importance in the era of nuclear weapons. Like so 
15 1 Ceadel, p. 382-391 and 393 . 
152 Eden, Anthony. "Britain in World Affairs". Foreign Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Apr. , 1951), p. 341. 
547 
many others, he blamed the failure of the League on the unwillingness of its backers to 
employ force at critical moments - a failure he called "understandable enough though 
misguided" 153. 
With regard to the title subject of "Britain in World Affairs", Eden called on his 
country to exert itself to the maximum in supporting collective security despite the 
economic strain it endured in the postwar period. He pointed to the ongoing conflict in 
Malaya as well as the presence of British occupation troops in Austria and Germany to 
buttress his case that Britain remained extensively engaged around the world154. 
Regarding criticism from the United States that Britain had not contributed according to 
its potential with regard to the Korean conflict, Eden defended Britain' s record, citing 
high levels oftaxation as proof of the United Kingdom's commitment to its role as a 
member of the UN coalition. More importantly, Eden stressed that London and 
Washington must not let such sniping mar their relationship, as "The whole trend of 
events, whether we view them from Europe or America, points to the supreme 
importance of Anglo-American unity. This is no longer an idealistic conception of small 
groups but a practical policy of governments155." 
The last word on the subject from a British source during this period appropriately 
belongs to Gladwyn Jebb, then the British delegate to the United Nations156• His 1953 
contribution to Foreign Affairs, "The Free World and the United Nations", traced part of 
the history of collective security and the challenges facing it in the year of publication. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid., p. 342. 
155 Ibid., p. 9. 
156 Rappard, William E. "The Quest for Peace Yesterday and Today" The David Davies Memorial Institute 
of International Studies, 1954, p. 44. 
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According to Jebb, Anthony Eden and other members of the British policymaking 
establishment began to consider the form of postwar international organization in 
1942157. He noted the earlier conundrum during the League period regarding the 
importance of collective security relative to so-called peaceful change, and noted, with 
pointed understatement, that "how exactly this [peaceful change] was to be accomplished 
was never, I think, finally determined". He also expressed his opinion that collective 
resistance to Italy' s invasion of Abyssinia and the remilitarization of the Rhineland would 
have succeeded 158• 
Jebb then turned to what he called "the central political issue of our time", the 
Cold War, which he described as "the friction created by the resistance of the free world 
to Stalinist plans for world domination159" . He evinced skepticism of collective security, 
not due to his lack of faith in its theoretical underpinnings, but because he feared it might 
prove impossible in the face ofthe communist hordes. Jebb warned that the communist 
states possessed a population of about 800 million, making them ten times as populous as 
the German Reich. Thus, even if collective opposition to aggression by the communist 
bloc materialized, preponderance for the democratic forces was by no means assured. As 
a result, Jebb claimed, there could exist no real security against "Stalinist imperialists", 
collective or otherwise. Collective resistance remained possible, but not security160• The 
existence of a numerically powerful nonaligned bloc complicated the matter 
considerably, according to the author, because its influence might prove decisive while 
157 Jebb, Gladwyn. "The Free World and the United Nations". Foreign Affairs, Vol. 31 , No. 3 (Apr., 1953), 
p. 382. 
158 Ibid., p. 383. 
159Ibid., p. 382. 
160Ibid., p. 384. 
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the democratic states could have great difficulty winning their allegiance in the event of 
war161 . This fear had particular relevance within the United Nations, where within the 
Security Council any resolution demanding action against aggression might fall to a 
Soviet veto. However, a General Assembly resolution that member states should offer all 
possible support to a victim of aggression, while not binding, would carry great "moral" 
weight and could conceivably influence some of the nonaligned states to join against the 
aggressor162. Mobilizing support among nonaligned members could therefore prove of 
cardinal importance. 
Thus, wrote Jebb, although the United Nations suffered from considerable 
deadlock and flaws in its institutional design, it may yet prove able to make a 
contribution in the event that war erupted between the western and communist powers. 
However, in the event of such a crisis, Jebb believed that action in the UN would not 
decide the outcome of the conflict. Alternatively, if the west hoped to avoid war entirely, 
the use of the UN for diplomatic purposes would be critical. It had already proven its use 
in multiple circumstances, such as by helping to reach a decision regarding the disposal 
of the Italian colonial empire, and in pressuring the Soviets to withdraw from Iran. The 
use of the UN in this capacity could allow for a period of coexistence between the 
western and communist spheres that promised to allow international relations to 
normalize and thus offered the promise of preventing World War Three163 . This 
reasoning echoed that of Duff Cooper several years earlier, who wrote that if the Soviet 
16 1 Ibid., p. 385. 
162 Ibid. , p. 386. 
163 Ibid. , p. 387. 
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Union could be convinced after a period of effective containment to abandon its 
expansionist dreams, enduring peace would become a possibility. Jebb, however, placed 
increased emphasis on diplomatic rather than military means of generating this period of 
stabilization. 
While Jebb recognized the limitations of the United Nations, he remained 
optimistic about its future. Rather than abandon the global organization as a response to 
· its numerous drawbacks, Jebb reminded his .readers that the world' s problems layj nits 
lack of cohesion, not in whatever problems arose regarding the functionality ofthe UN. 
As he put it, "after all, the United Nations is only a mirror of the world political situation, 
and although the reflection may be ugly there is singularly little sense in smashing the 
glass164." The following year, William Rappard cited Jebb in his remarks to the David 
Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies. Quoting the British delegate, Rappard 
argued that the Security Council had proved itself a useless instrument and that the "free 
world" must establish mutual support under the banner of regional organizations such as .· 
NAT0165. Returning to Jebb' s analogy of the mirror, however, his own words reflected a 
more hopeful outlook: 
164 Ibid., p. 390. 
So, while acknowledging its due role in the organization of 
collective resistance to aggression, let us try to use the 
United Nations for its most useful purpose, namely a place 
where the thorniest of international problems may at least 
be debated and where, with infinite patience, a fairly 
satisfactory solution may sometimes be hammered out . . . 
Why, indeed, lose heart in an organization that has these 
great possibilities166? 
165 Rappard, "The Quest for Peace Yesterday and Today", p. 44. 
166 Jebb, p. 391. 
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The End of an Era 
With these words, the British discussion of competing security paradigms since 
.1939 came full circle. The beginning of World War Two witnessed the many interwar 
proponents of the League forcefully condemning the various trends which had led to the 
outbreak of war against the Axis. The year in which fighting in Korea ended 
demonstrated that while collective security advocates had a new appreciation for the 
weaknesses of the imperfect United Nations, even gentle critics such as Gladwyn Jebb 
and Percy Corbett retained an appreciation for the concept of collective security in 
general. 
In the first years of World War Two, the British liberal realists devoted a great 
deal of their attention to analyzing their country's failures of the previous decade. 
Simultaneously, they continued to favor both collective security and power balancing. 
The discussion analyzed in this chapter sheds a great deal of additional light on Arnold 
Toynbee's claim documented in chapter three; specifically, that the collapse of 
appeasement and British isolationism from continental politics had thoroughly debunked 
the arguments of their advocates. As previously indicated, Toynbee maintained that a 
thorough rejection of these ideas was in order, as they had resulted in conflict rather than 
peace. As a result, liberal realists such as Angell and Murray continued to unrelentingly 
argue in favor of their preferred policies. In their opinion, the outbreak of conflict only 
added to the weight of their case. The impact of this analysis on the concurrent 
development of power balancing and collective security as theories in international 
relations will receive more extensive treatment in the conclusion ofthis study. 
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From the perspective of continuity and change, the course of events throughout 
1939-1941 demonstrate, as indicated by Toynbee's critique of Carr, that continuity had 
prevailed. The close similarity between Angell's wartime writing to that ofhis interwar 
publications demonstrated that the advent of war had virtually no impact on his views 
regarding international relations. He continued to favor collective security while arguing 
that a power-balancing alliance between the democratic powers and the Soviet Union 
would have successfully contained the Third Reich. Other collective security advocates, 
such as Maxwell Garnett, also reflected on the events of the interwar period with 
certainty that their preferred solutions to the crises of that time would have averted the 
ultimate catastrophe. Suggestions to the contrary prompted disconsolate pessimism from 
Gilbert Murray, who remained so committed to his position in support of collective 
security that he believed the only possible alternative in the event of its continued failure 
would be the downfall of western civilization. 
The liberal realists' condemnation of interwar policy continued unabated and took 
virtually no heed of the outbreak of conflict. These authors continued to advance the 
same arguments and seemingly viewed the war itself as only another point in support of 
their wider argument as they had viewed the continual crises of the thirties. In this 
manner, the course of this discussion in Britain reflected the debate entertained in the 
United States in the wake of America's entry into World War Two. As demonstrated in 
chapter five, the voices of American academia's interwar debate deviated little from their 
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established policy preferences as a result of Pearl Harbor. For internationalists such as 
Charles Fenwick, Clyde Eagleton and Walter Lippmann, continuity proved the order of 
the day, and the coming of war signaled only an intensified attack on isolationism. 
Likewise, isolationists such as Edwin Borchard and John Bassett Moore continued to 
believe that their favored policies would have kept America free from the worldwide 
conflagration, and viewed the events of late 1941 as yet more evidence of the accuracy of 
their predictions. Likewise, their British counterparts also proved able and willing to 
interpret the greatest armed conflict in history in light of their preexisting ideas. On both 
sides of the Atlantic, World War Two seems to have prompted a retrenchment of 
scholars' confidence in their own judgment rather than a critical reevaluation of their 
beliefs. 
This proved true on both sides of the debate concerning collective security. While 
its proponents remained loyal to its precepts, so too did E.H. Carr continue to reject 
collective security, and even the concept of planning for global security in general. He 
interpreted the outbreak of World War Two as a vindication of his own previous beliefs 
in the moribund nature of laissez faire capitalism in the twentieth century, the inability of 
"privileged" states to indefinitely maintain any status quo, and the primacy of force in 
international politics. This prompted his interpretation of Hitler' s conquest of Europe in a 
Napoleonic context, as he equated the German dictator's purported destruction of 
capitalism to Napoleon's attempt to brush aside the pre-Enlightenment European system. 
It also underlay his continued deprecation of small states as simultaneously irrelevant in 
terms of organizing for security and potentially threatening to the overall stability of the 
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international system. Just as American isolationists believed their country's entry into the 
war proved the need for increased isolationism rather than the concept's bankruptcy, so 
did E.H. Carr interpret the beginning of the Second World War as proof of his previous 
assertion that any attempt to enshrine perpetual global security would lead only to a 
violent backlash. 
However, it would be incorrect to interpret Conditions of Peace as an indication 
that Carr remained completely static in his beliefs and focused only on the past. On the 
contrary, he proved the first major British author of the period to attempt a detailed 
application of his beliefs to a possible postwar era. This led to a set of predictions that 
modern readers could interpret in disparate ways and that lead to differing conclusions 
regarding the fmal round of the great debate. Throughout his 1942 work, Carr 
vociferously argued that the economic sovereignty of small states had crippled the 
international economy. Carr blamed what he saw as the plethora of small states and their 
self-interested economic policies for the depth and length of the Great Depression, adding 
another dimension to his call for statesmen to formulate their national policy with the 
needs of other states in mind. This led to Carr's judgment that the postwar era would not 
- and should not- witness the resurrection of a world with numerous small nation-states. 
Their strategic worthlessness and economic jealousy had rendered them too dangerous 
for the international system to tolerate. Instead, Carr argued, the future would belong to 
increasingly large polities shorn of the laissez-faire capitalist tradition, such as the 
expansive Third Reich of 1942 and Stalin's Soviet Union. These bold predictions 
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demonstrated Carr's willingness to move beyond the emotionally wrought debate of the 
interwar period. 
It also lead Carr directly into another clash with his antagonists, as these 
predictions contradicted the liberal realists' conclusion, based on their experience with 
both Imperial Germany and the Reich, that simply granting additional territory and 
resources to aggressive states would do nothing to mitigate their desire for yet more 
concessions. While Carr maintained his belief that the supposed necessity of satisfying 
the demands of the most dynamic and powerful states would give rise to the type of 
economic and strategic structure best designed to ensure peace, liberal realists continued 
to reject this view. This provides another indication ofthe prevalence of continuity over 
change as a lens through which to interpret the events ofthis period. Furthermore, Carr's 
economic argument in favor of large, self-sufficient economic units continued to 
contradict Angell's argument from an even earlier phase of Sir Norman's career; 
specifically, that small states had proven more than capable of economically 
outperforming their larger competitors. 
The history of international relations since 1945 suggests that aspects of both 
· approaches proved correct. To the benefit of Carr's legacy, the second half of the 
twentieth century witnessed the emergence of increasingly large free trade areas, such as 
the European Union, that have conformed to his emphasis on the need for international 
collaboration in the formation of state policy, as well as his belief that larger economic 
units would ensure a smoother functioning of the global economy. Likewise, the 
emergence and endurance ofNATO demonstrated that perhaps postwar planners 
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converged on Carr's belief in the inadequacy of small states for defensive purposes. The 
coalescence of so many small powers into an alliance that dwarfed their individual 
defense capabilities speaks to the prescience of Carr' s analysis in this regard, as well as 
his emphasis on the primacy of power over idealism. It is worth noting, however, that 
such an event also vindicates the arguments of Angell, who continually pointed to the 
fallacy that small states could defend themselves without joining with each other and 
their larger neighbors in a collective effort to repel aggression. 
Furthermore, the emergence of global free trade in later decades also redounds to 
the benefit of Angell's argument. His interpretation of a system of transnational exchange 
as the basis of the world economy, as well as his argument regarding the illusory nature 
of autarky, has been embraced by successive generations ofworld leaders. His beliefthat 
small states could maintain high standards of living has also been vindicated by the 
course of history since 1945. The emergence of a profusion of sovereign states in the 
wake of decolonization, as well as the downfall ofthe USSR and Yugoslavia, perhaps 
most strongly demonstrates the inaccuracy of Carr' s wartime prognostications. The 
modem existence of hundreds of independent states coexisting within a system of free 
exchange under the umbrella of a global organization such as the United Nations suggests 
that even in consideration of Carr' s later writing in Conditions of Peace, Angell and his 
cohorts continued to get the better of the great debate. 
British writers also tended to share the conclusions of their American counterparts 
during the immediate postwar period. As demonstrated by the writing of Percy Corbett, 
Kathleen Courtney (and, by extension, Lord Cecil), Duff Cooper and Nicholas Mansergh, 
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British analysts became skeptical of the United Nations after the collapse of Soviet-
American goodwill. They lamented the degeneration of overall international cooperation 
and became inclined toward alternatives. These included not only the ultimate formation 
ofNATO, but also Lord Cecil's proposed international collective defense treaty. Like 
American writers, these individuals tended to focus the majority of their criticism on the 
Security Council in particular. However, their writing also demonstrated their overall 
commitment to the general principle of collective security and the eventual emergence of 
an improved, increasingly peaceful and organized international system. These beliefs 
unsurprisingly manifested themselves in the The Steep Places and After All. However, 
even Duff Cooper, who took arguably the most militaristic approach toward the Soviet 
Union among the writers discussed in this chapter, maintained hope in an eventual future 
of cooperation with Moscow. With regard to transatlantic interaction, even David 
Mitrany derived his uniquely innovative approach from the example of Franklin 
Roosevelt's Tennessee Valley Authority. In addition, although he expressed serious 
reservations regarding the practicality of the widely discussed concepts of collective 
security and international federative government, Mitrany still believed that his 
alternative of functionalism would eventually lead to greater international cooperation 
over the long term. He undoubtedly had the same desired ends as his internationalist 
counterparts, although his proposed means differed widely from the collective security 
vision that animated League and UN supporters. 
This confluence between British and American thought demonstrated multiple 
aspects of continuity with the past. Despite the great upheaval of the war years, British 
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and American thinkers alike demonstrated an overwhelming tendency to remain 
committed to the same precepts they held prior to the watershed years of 193 9 and 1941. 
The ultimate direction of the debate regarding collective security and power balancing in 
Britain, however, also reveals a highly important manifestation of change. As discussed 
in the opening of this chapter, the British internationalists' devotion to these principles 
during the interwar period reflected their understanding of Britain's preeminent role 
among the western democracies. The contribution these individuals hoped their country 
would make was one of leadership, as well as of potentially preponderant force in the 
creation of a global collective security organization or power-balancing alliance. By the 
middle 1950s, Britain's reduced circumstances had forced the still-resolute proponents of 
such ideas to view the United Kingdom's contribution to the defense of the democratic 
values and rule of law they so treasured in a different light. Rather than emphasizing the 
centrality of Britain's potential contribution to such policies, writers such as Angell, 
Cooper and Eden instead found themselves discussing how Britain could best contribute 
as a middle power to a United Nations wrought between two foreign superpowers, or as a 
junior member of the American-dominated NATO alliance. While the liberal realists' 
logic of the interwar period suggesting that small democratic and status quo powers 
should band together with sympathetic great powers had been vindicated, their country's 
position in such a constellation had been eclipsed. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusion 
The course of this study has demonstrated the complex, robust nature of the 
debate that occurred regarding multiple international relations theories and practices 
during the middle twentieth century. In addition, it has yielded sufficient insight to 
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provide answers to the three questions posed in the introduction: how did thinking with 
regard to the principles of collective security and power balancing develop at the elite 
level in Britain and the United States at this time? How can the thinkers of this era help 
modem scholars understand the apparently simultaneous popularity of two ideas that 
seem to contain conflicting elements? And, how can the answers to these two questions 
shed light on the actual relationship between collective security and power balancing? 
The answer to the first of these questions is the most straightforward. If scholars 
examine the entire period between 1933 and 1953, the enduring popularity of the two 
ideas is readily apparent at a basic level. Despite the disappearance of the League of 
Nations, the ideal of collective security remained attractive enough to spawn the United 
Nations as a new institution to embody and improve upon the legacy ofWilsonianism. 
Concurrently, the discussion of alliance politics remained vibrant within an easily 
accessible strand of British political and academic thought, and it maintained the 
allegiance of a small subset of American thinkers. The "grand alliance" concept found 
visible expression in the coalition of Allied powers that united to defeat the Axis. 
Following the war, NATO and the Warsaw Pact resuscitated alliance formation and once 
again made power balancing an important component of international relations. Both this 
renewed emphasis on power balancing and the collective security dream of the United 
Nations played critical roles for decades. 
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A closer examination of these ideas' historical development, however, has 
revealed that they did not evolve precisely simultaneously. Although collective security 
and power balancing gained strength during this period, they did so during alternating 
bursts of enthusiasm that seem to have displayed an inverse correlation in important 
ways. Most simply, collective security prevailed as the more powerful concept prior to 
1936, whereupon it was supplanted by a renewed faith in power balancing. During the 
war years, internationalist authors once again turned to collective security as a means of 
escaping the cycle of twentieth century conflict, only to resurrect power balancing in the 
form ofNATO when the United Nations did not live up to the hopes so many had placed 
in it. This study's examination of elite writers from the period demonstrates the sporadic 
evolution of both concepts along these lines. Clearly, as discussed at multiple points in 
preceding chapters, the late interwar discussion of foreign affairs in the United States 
proceeded upon a different path than that which this dissertation sought to explore. 
Although the judgment that the American foreign policy debate prior to Pearl Harbor 
assumed a different form, emphasizing the broader concepts of isolationism and 
internationalism, is an important one, it offers poor grounds for drawing conclusions 
regarding the questions this study has posed. British writers, conversely, played an 
essential role in advancing the development of power balancing and collective security 
during the 1930s. 
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Their works indicate that enthusiasm for collective security remained most 
pronounced in the first half of the decade. During these years, even a skeptic of 
internationalism and a future appeaser such as Lord Lothian wrote that collective security 
had "come to stay". His endorsement of British isolation was framed, however curiously, 
as a means of provoking other powers toward greater cooperation that would foster the 
increased strength of collective security in the future. Alfred Zimmern, a passionate 
League advocate, offered an early interpretation of the Geneva organization as an 
emergent power-balancing organization when he discussed the existence of a 
preponderance of peaceful states within the League that could utilize their power to 
restrain potential aggressors within and without the League Assembly. Events of 1935, 
however, enabled him to temporarily return his focus to the League as an organization 
dedicated strictly to collective security. The cooperation of a vast majority of states in 
attempting to restrain Italy's invasion of Ethiopia generated a short-lived moment in 
which pure collective security seemed to have gained the upper hand in the struggle 
against international anarchy. 
During the same phase, League partisan Lord Cecil joined his internationalist 
cohorts in hailing the march of progress as the force that would signal the merciful end of 
warfare as a means of settling disputes. He even lauded the Kellogg-Briand Pact, today 
the very symbol of interwar liberalism's overoptimistic excess, as a source of moral 
opprobrium against war that had brought humanity yet another step further in its advance 
toward a peaceful future. Norman Angell's original writing of 1933, despite emphasizing 
the importance of traditional alliances in formulating British foreign policy, also 
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maintained his faith in the League at this relatively early phase. W. Arnold-Forster, 
though he placed a higher emphasis on the coercive power of the League, still praised 
collective security as the best means of ensuring peace and stability, arguing that it 
offered the only hope of escaping the security dilemma. Although League advocates 
differed on the precise means by which collective security should operate, a critical mass 
of internationalist thinkers seemed to agree with Professor Zimmem's conclusion during 
the latter phases of the Abyssinian crisis that although "No one would say that the sky is 
clear; but the watchword is 'Forward."' Collective security maintained its allure until this 
point. 
In discussing the intellectual development ofNorman Angell, biographer Martin 
Ceadel noted that the events of 1936 had a profound impact on his outlook regarding the 
course of international relations in the 1930s. Indeed, this annus horribilis for liberal 
internationalists seems to have had a similar impact on the course of the collective 
security and power balancing debate within the entire "liberal realist" clique. With the 
edifice ofthe League suffering a severe blow with Italy's final victory over Ethiopia and 
the world's quiet acquiescence to Mussolini's triumph, in addition to the lack of any 
reaction against Hitler's forceful repudiation of the Versailles Treaty, discussion of pure 
collective security based on the League came to an abrupt halt. Though Angell continued 
to advocate the formation of a new organization to embody Wilsonian ideals, he now 
envisioned the future of collective security as a long, hard road toward the development 
of a different vehicle for its realization rather than as a means of making Geneva 
functional in the present. His calls for a traditional alliance between Britain and other 
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great powers, namely the Soviet Union, only intensified throughout the following years. 
Zimmem, who had only recently been ebullient- seemingly against all logic- over the 
prospect of League action prevailing in favor of Ethiopia, also abandoned any hope in 
institutional collective security over the near term. Instead, he sought hope in the bromide 
that appealing to individual humanitarian virtue might restrain the warlike impulses of 
mankind. Failing this, he also embraced the idea that Britain and like-minded states could 
simply impose their vision of "international standards" on potential disruptors. This quite 
clearly indicated how far he had strayed from the vision of collective security and the 
League in two short years. 
Arnold Toynbee joined Zimmern in these depths of disappointment. Whereas he 
had previously placed his faith in the use of regional autonomy as a means of resolving 
international disputes without putting the stamp of British approval on any controversial 
transfers of territory, by 1938 he felt compelled to suggest that Britain make common 
cause with the Kremlin. Although he also advocated seeking some means of resurrecting 
the potency of the League, he could not proffer any specific suggestions as to how Britain 
might accomplish this goal. Lord Cecil found himself facing the same complicated 
dilemma. Though he remained committed to the League idea, he could not co~ure any 
means by which British policy might regenerate international support for Geneva other 
than the essentially meaningless path of"leading by example". On the eve of the seminal 
Munich crisis, several key members of the internationalist camp had certainly not 
abandoned the League, but had found it necessary to include appeals to other forms of 
international security organization among their visions for the future. This took place 
alongside a simultaneous atrophying of robust, dynamic ideas to advance the League. 
Those who remained supportive of it had, it seems, either lost their enthusiasm for 
creatively engineering possible methods for it to remain functional, or had become so 
depressed by the course of events they could only maintain a vestige of their faith and 
hope against hope that the deteriorating international situation might reverse itself. 
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While enthusiasm for League-based collective security had weakened, modem 
scholars should not conclude that it had evaporated entirely. As the All Souls Foreign 
Affairs Group demonstrated, it retained some appeal. Yet, a reflection on the pivotal year 
of 1938 amply demonstrates that such support only existed within a wider framework of 
other ideas not connected to the League. Basil Liddel Hart's contributions to the group 
provide an excellent illustration of this dynamic, as he called for a continued British 
commitment to the League, but also emphasized rebuilding Britain's own power with a 
rearmament program and making a show of force against the fascists. According to him, 
this should have taken the form of forcing a withdrawal of Italian forces from the support 
of Franco in the ongoing war in Spain. Liddel Hart and others, such as Harold Nicolson, 
became ever more acutely aware of the threat posed to Britain by the possible German 
domination of central and Eastern Europe, which threatened to give Germany military 
and industrial preponderance. In this sense, even though sympathy for the League 
endured, it by no means remained the preeminent concern of British internationalists. 
Calculations based on the balance of power continued to gain in importance. 
The group's founder, Sir James Arthur Salter, also demonstrated the emerging 
prevalence of power balancing at this time. Though he remained committed to the League 
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over the long term as the best means of securing any hope for permanent peace, he found 
himself forced to admit that Britain's current League policy had essentially ceased to 
function. His next inclination, importantly, was to ponder whether Britain and its 
potential continental allies could achieve preponderance for themselves in the face of 
fascist expansionism. Salter's conclusion that such preponderance laid beyond London's 
grasp led to his embrace of appeasement, despite the many risks that he identified with 
following the National Government's policy. Nonetheless, the fact that he would 
immediately reconsider the deteriorating situation from the perspective of alliance 
formation demonstrates the increasing appeal of power balancing as an alternative to the 
moribund League. Lord Allen provides possibly the best illustration of the extent to 
which faith in the League had eroded by 1938. His "Foreign Policy Now" proposal 
pressed for British adherence to the League, but cautioned that a full rebuilding of such a 
policy would be a lengthy undertaking. Only months later, Allen justified his full 
embrace of appeasement by arguing that the League had become "depleted" and that a 
new era of"power politics" had dawned in which Britain would need to tread carefully. 
Thus, while men such as Allen, Toynbee and Liddell Hart disagreed on the proper 
response to the shifting currents of international affairs in the last years of the 1930s, they 
agreed that strict adherence to collective security no longer represented a viable option. 
The majority ofliterature from the years 1938 and 1939 proceeded along these 
lines. The leftist journal Tribune favored an alliance between London, Paris and Moscow, 
while Norman Angell maintained his call for a grand alliance in his works throughout 
these two years. Sir Norman, as has been discussed at length, continued to demonstrate 
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his support for collective security as an idea by maintaining that any such alliance should 
remain open to admitting the powers it would currently be formulated to oppose should 
the fascist dictatorships eventually reconcile themselves to living within a peaceful world. 
In the meantime, Angell' s program would offer the best of both worlds: protection from 
aggression by marshaling preponderant power on the side of the law-abiding alliance, and 
the prospect of regenerating, or possibly generating for the first time, a true collective 
security system. 
Angell's logic provides the clearest demonstration of a fact illustrated by the vast 
majority of sources examined in this study from the years between 1936 and 1939: while 
interest in power balancing had grown among British internationalists who remained 
opposed to appeasement, belief in the promise of collective security never flagged. It 
remained a key component of these writers ' vision of the future. In this, they were even 
joined by some appeasement supporters who hoped that, to borrow a phrase from Thomas 
Jefferson, once the reign of the fascist witches had passed over, the era of true collective 
security would finally begin. This, of course, raises the question of why these individuals 
maintained their faith in a process that had so demonstrably failed by the late 1930s. This 
question is thrown into stark relief by contrasting a pair of quotations contained in 
Chapter Three. E.H. Carr discussed what he viewed as the bankruptcy of"utopianism", 
and posited that its adherents lacked a sense of self-critical reflection. As he wrote, "The 
breakdown of the post-War utopia is too overwhelming to be explained merely in terms 
of individual action or inaction. Its downfall involves the bankruptcy of the postulates on 
which it is based ... It may be not that men have stupidly or wickedly failed to apply right 
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principles, but that the principles themselves were false or inapplicable." As a retort, 
League supporter Leonard Woolf attempted to draw attention to a contradiction in Carr' s 
argument, prompting Woolfto write, "ifthe collapse of Mr. Chamberlain's policy of 
appeasement does not prove that it was utopian, the collapse of the League does not 
prove that the League was utopian." 
Herein lies the crux of the entire matter. Although the League seemed only to be 
marking time until its eventual collapse throughout the late thirties, the tone of its 
supporters' writings clearly suggest they did not believe the ideal of collective security 
had ever really been applied with rigor. Therefore, they did not connect the failure of the 
League with any possibility that the assumptions that underlay Wilsonian 
internationalism had demonstrated their general inapplicability. Their continual pleas for 
Britain and its citizens to undertake some sort of action in the face of the dictators' 
flagrant violations of international law indicated their belief that appeasement policy 
represented the opposite of dynamic engagement. Carr correctly ascertained, therefore, 
that these writers believed recent history had not unmasked collective security as a policy 
doomed to failure, but rather that since appeasement had precluded the application of any 
alternatives, their preferred path of collective security had simply not been taken. 
According to this logic, collective security could therefore not assume any of the blame 
for the long slide into conflict. Woolf, likewise, accurately pointed to Carr's hypocrisy 
regarding the relative value of appeasement and collective security. More importantly, his 
remark also adds to the evidence that collective security proponents simply did not 
believe that the events of 1936 and afterward undermined the validity of their cause. 
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While The Twenty Years' Crisis contained multiple weaknesses that have been the 
subject of earlier chapters of this study, modem scholars could easily sympathize with 
Carr' s frustration with the ' 'utopians" on this account. The events of that turbulent decade 
might have suggested to collective security advocates that their beloved ideal had not 
failed to prevent war simply because it had not been properly implemented, but perhaps 
that its implementation remained impossible due to reasons stemming from international 
anarchy, to name but one possibility. But, as Carr lamented, the liberal realists never 
stopped to ponder whether collective security "asked too much of too many", as Norman 
Angell wrote about anarchy. It was this tendency of collective security proponents to 
insulate Wilsonianism and the League from the many blows which afflicted it throughout 
the 1930s that allowed them to maintain their faith in the conceptual validity of collective 
security even as its institutional manifestation endured utter collapse within a world that 
was indifferent to it at best. 
As indicated by the previously examined reactions of men such as Toynbee, 
Angell and Woolf to Carr' s The Twenty Years ' Crisis, the liberal realists believed that 
virtually every other possible approach to the politics of the era, such as appeasement, 
isolationism and Carr's power-oriented approach had been discredited by the outbreak of 
World War Two, instead of their own beliefs. The internationalist literature that emerged 
in the wake of Germany's initiation of conflict supports this conclusion. In For What do 
we Fight?, Norman Angell claimed that the war now being fought, as he interpreted it, to 
establish the primacy of international law, represented the first attempt in human history 
to place the concept at the center of international relations. The League' s attempt to do so 
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over the previous two decades seems to have not been intense enough to count in this 
regard, according to Angell's analysis. Later in the same book, he attributed the rise of 
fascist militarism to the Europeans' failure to erect an effective collective security 
system. As Carr would indicate, Angell did not consider the reverse proposition that the 
appeal of fascism and Nazism indicated a widespread lack of enthusiasm for collective 
security. Taking his argument to its logical conclusion, Sir Norman expressed his hope 
that the conclusion of the present conflict would result in the actual manifestation of the 
better world that had been promised, but not realized, at the end of the First World War. 
Again, he did not consider that the course of events had proven the impossibility of such 
an outcome. 
Other authors reflected this tendency. The International Affairs literature review 
of 1940 illustrates the profusion ofbroadly liberal internationalist literature that occurred 
in the first year of the war. Harold Nicolson had expressed during the depths ofthe 1930s 
that "the fact that universal peace will only be attained after the passing of many human 
generations, does not detract from its validity as an objective." This belief also found 
voice in the writing of Maxwell Garnett, who spoke of a world in which the imperfect 
governance of man would eventually converge on the perpetually peaceful 
"Commonwealth of God" at some distant point in the future. He also went a step further 
than many of his contemporaries, calling for automatic collective action not only against 
incidences of international aggression, but in the event that future states' militaries 
exceeded levels deemed acceptable by a revitalized collective security organization. The 
only author analyzed here who followed Carr' s call for a reassessment of his frrst 
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principles was Gilbert Murray. Though he considered the possibility that collective 
security might in fact lay beyond humanity' s grasp, he concluded that if such a judgment 
proved valid, it signaled only the impending demise of civilization. That it might only 
demonstrate that mankind would continue to labor under the security dilemma and other 
constraints of the anarchic world as it had throughout the entire history of the state 
system did not, apparently, cross his mind. As these and other writers analyzed in the 
beginning of Chapter Six indicate, British internationalists' response to the outbreak of 
World War Two involved their calling for more collective security, not less. Their 
conviction that a reversion to anarchy was the true cause of World War Two only 
emboldened their stance with regard to collective security. 
Gilbert Murray' s comments in the middle and late phases of the war demonstrate 
the sense of vindication felt by the liberal realists. According to him, the massive 
suffering wrought by the war demonstrated the increased need for collective security in 
the postwar world. For him, the war continued to represent the epitome of international 
anarchy which mankind needed to restrain by collective action. Yet after the war, Murray 
also reflected on the politics of the late 1930s and echoed his colleagues' refrain of those 
years that an ironclad power-balancing alliance between the western democracies and the 
Soviet Union might have prevented the war. This faith in the balance of power would 
strongly reemerge following the war, beginning in the sources examined by this study 
with Norman Angell ' s The Steep Places, in which he remained true to his earlier writings 
in favor of power balancing by calling for a western alliance that might contain the Soviet 
Union. This book also expressed a realistic perspective toward concepts such as the 
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national interest and the fear of a continental hegemon arising in Europe. Nicholas 
Mansergh's International Affairs article of 1948 advanced a similar argument, while 
Kathleen Courtney's discussion of Lord Cecil's postwar disappointment in the United 
Nations struck at the central reason for continued reliance on power balancing despite the 
reemergence of a collective security body. 
Courtney related Lord Cecil's frustration that the absence of great power unity, 
the presence of which had been taken for granted at the end of World War Two when the 
UN Charter received approval from the many members of the Allied coalition, had made 
the new organization unworkable. Lord Cecil approved of the formulation of a secondary 
collective security pact among whatever nations might wish to seek safety through that 
avenue, while Courtney herself put her faith in the emergent NATO. Percy Corbett, who 
reflected Carr's call for a critical examination of collective security as a precept, cited a 
lack of universally held values as the source of weakness in the United Nations. He also 
supported what he viewed as the defensive NATO alliance, and lauded its basis in the 
belief in free institutions shared among its members which, he felt, might point the way 
to a future of increased global cooperation. Duff Cooper voiced simultaneous approval 
for the United Nations' collective defense of South Korea and for massive rearmament by 
the western powers as a means of containing the Soviet Union during the foreseeable 
future. Though he compared Stalin to Hitler, he nevertheless maintained his optimism 
that once the Soviet dictator realized the limits of his country' s power, he might come to 
terms with coexisting alongside the west. Yet again, a prominent British writer and 
foreign policy analyst evinced simultaneous support for collective security in addition to 
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a regional, power-balancing concept of a dichotomy between the democratic west and 
communist east. At about the same time, even Norman Angell, who had long supported 
the concept of alliances as a means of self-defense, reminded those who read his 
autobiography that collective security offered an important means of ensuring that 
aggressors would not succeed in isolating their victims. Angell also upheld his faith that 
only a global collective security organization could ensure the rights of all states. 
Reflecting on the failure of the League, Anthony Eden echoed the many 
comments of late League supporters who cited the west's lack of willpower in enforcing 
the League' s mandate as the cause of its collapse. This buttressed Eden' s call for the 
strenuous application of force in defense of the United Nations. As a result, he conformed 
to Carr's critique of interwar "utopians" in his unwillingness to consider whether 
collective security had any shortcomings as a principle. Gladwyn Jebb demonstrated a 
similar outlook. His primary doubts regarding the efficacy of the United Nations lay in its 
lack of power relative to the possible forces that potentially lay at the disposal of a united 
communist offensive. He feared not that collective security had become a morally 
bankrupt policy, but simply that it suffered from a numerical disadvantage vis-a-vis those 
who might wish to destroy it by force of arms. This caused him to interpret the United 
Nations as a possible power balancing alliance against the forces of global communism, 
even as he continued to support its existence as a forum for debate. 
The late wartime and postwar evolution of collective security and power 
balancing, therefore, continued in tandem. Just as the outbreak of World War Two 
resulted in the further strengthening ofbeliefin collective security among its interwar 
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proponents, so did the emergent Cold War struggle prompt increased fervor for the 
United Nations as a means of defending against putative aggressors. But, because the 
structure of the UN generated an impasse between the capitalist and communist states, 
British writers once again began to interpret the supposedly global organization as a 
starting point for organizing their own security against an implacable foe. In this way, the 
evolution of support for the United Nations in Britain mirrored the fashion in which the 
liberal realists came to envision the League as a possible basis for formulating an anti-
fascist alliance. As during the interwar period, an initial burst of enthusiasm for collective 
security began to yield ground to consideration of alternatives without disappearing 
entirely. 
The belief of so many writers that continued global instability reflected the 
unsuitability of anarchy rather than the weakness of collective security as a principle 
explains the means by which belief in collective security weathered the many setbacks 
the concept endured during this period. An important piece of the answer to the first 
question of this study, then, relies on envisioning faith in collective security as a 
foundational belief regarding the proper organization of the interstate system, even as 
power balancing gained appeal during moments in which collective security seemed 
unattainable in the near term. How can this interpretation of the dual development of 
collective security and power balancing shed light on the second and third questions 
posed by this study? 
Another important component of these individuals' views can help illuminate 
answers to these two questions, as well as provide important detail regarding the first. 
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Collective security and power balancing developed contemporaneously in the minds of 
these elite thinkers because they viewed the strategies as means, not as ends. Chapter 
Three discussed how E.H. Carr erred when he condemned the "utopians" for putting 
greater emphasis on their desire to reshape the international system according to their 
own preferences than on making accurate observations about reality. Although this 
approach caused Carr to overlook the many accurate observations that the subjects of his 
critique made about the international system, the internationalists indeed had political 
ends in mind. These did not, however, involve the pursuit of collective security for its 
own sake. Rather, the "liberal realists" viewed collective security as a means of securing 
their higher goals of enforcing a system of international law while defending Britain. 
Numerous sources cited in this study support this conclusion, beginning from the 
earliest parts of the 1933-1953 period. This reasoning, for instance, lay behind Alfred 
Zimmern's emphasis on the preponderant power of peaceful states, even as he de-
emphasized the machinery of the League. His 1934 analysis in International Affairs 
presents an early example of the liberal realists continually placing the empowerment of 
peaceable, status-quo states above the means by which such supremacy would be assured. 
Defending the League itself mattered far less than marshaling an insurmountable 
coalition of law-abiding powers. This concept inspired Lord Cecil's advocacy of"pooled 
security" as a means of overcoming anarchy as written in his contribution to The 
Intelligent Man's Way to Prevent War. Norman Angell's submission to the same work, 
as well as the entirety of his oeuvre and its continual support for alliance formation, also 
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demonstrated this principle. His aforementioned quotation illustrates the concept 
perfectly: 
So long as nations arm there will be alliances. The real 
question is whether the alliance shall be for the purpose of 
creating a preponderance of irresponsible power over a 
rival group so that when we have beaten him he is at the 
mercy of our group, as was the case with Germany ... or 
whether our alliance shall be for the predefmed purpose of 
supporting a common rule of the road. By using arms for 
defence in that way, everyone, the weak equally with the 
strong, is defended. 
Even though Angell continually sought a path toward collective security over the long 
term, such as by advocating the "open" alliance concept later in the interwar period, 
considerations of form mattered far less than considerations of function. Angell 
demonstrated his constant willingness to embrace a variety of security paradigms as long 
as they fulfilled the paramount objective of"supporting a common rule of the road". 
Later expressions of this concept sometimes appeared in differing guises. Harold 
Nicolson's famous "Foreign Office Mind" soliloquy embodied the emphasis on the 
primacy of international law, or at least norms of upright behavior, in his remark on 
Britain's historic mission. He described this as the imperative "to maintain moral 
standards in Europe, to maintain a settled pattern of international relations, not to make 
friends with people whose conduct is demonstrably evil. .. but to set up some sort of 
standard by which the smaller Powers can test what is good". The importance of putting 
force behind the law- any law- also emerged in Alfred Zimmern' s lament on "The 
Decline of International Standards" in 1938, wherein he maintained that upholding 
normative British policy, imperfect though it may always have been, remained preferable 
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to accepting the inevitability of anarchy and surrendering to the demands ofHitler. It was 
at this point that he renewed his plea for reduced emphasis on diplomatic machinery and 
called on the application of force by law-abiding states as a means of restraining the 
expansionary dictators. 
Adopting this interpretation of collective security and power balancing as means 
rather than ends enables modem scholars to understand the flexibility which British 
thinkers of this period displayed with regard to their support of the two concepts. It 
explains cyclical popularity of power balancing as an alternative to collective security. 
Whenever the prospects for collective security looked bleakest, these individuals 
retreated to the fortress of power balancing. To them, any distinctions between the two 
mattered far less than the level of power which either paradigm might bring to bear 
against the forces of disorder and violence. The recurrent popularity of power balancing 
in the form ofNATO that emerged in the late 1940s conforms to this framework. As 
writers such as Duff Cooper came to view Stalin's USSR as a malign force similar to that 
of Hitler's Germany, and as the UN became increasingly fragmented between the 
western, communist and non-aligned worlds, power balancing reemerged as a possible 
means of safeguarding the ideals that Britons held dear. This interpretation also enables a 
synthesis of the liberal realists' aim of putting force behind international law with the 
admiration men such as Nicolson and Zimmem expressed for Britain's traditional foreign 
policies. Their zeal for international law combined with their vision of the United 
Kingdom as a force for upholding the status quo and defending "international standards". 
As discussed in the introduction to Chapter Six, these twin beliefs informed one another. 
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To defend international law meant improving the security of Britain as well as other 
states; to defend Britain meant securing what these writers viewed as a, or perhaps the, 
traditional fount of justice and the protector of "what is good" in the world. Theoretical 
concerns regarding collective security and power balancing paled in comparison to this 
sense of obligation and pride in their interpretation of Britain's legacy, enabling thinkers 
of the period to explore both in equal measure as they saw fit. Concerns with security 
paradigms remained functional, not ideological. 
Returning to a view of the subject through the lenses of continuity and change, 
British thinking about security examined in this study emphasized the former over the 
latter. Although power balancing and collective security were ascendant at different 
times, neither ever became entirely marginalized. Moreover, the primary influence 
behind their relative popularity remained consistent between 1933 and 1953. The 
relationship between power balancing and collective security existed mostly in 
connection to the overarching concern with international law. As a result, the ideas never 
seemed to contradict one another in the view of the innovative "liberal realist" school. 
British thinkers' motivation to use power for the enforcement of"international standards" 
or law prevailed throughout the middle twentieth century, allowing both concepts to 
develop alongside one another when the relative chances for their success seemed best. 
International relations thought in the United States, conversely, demonstrated a 
much stronger emphasis on change. It also diverged from British thinking in other key 
areas. With regard to the American discussion of security paradigms, this study has 
previously discussed at several junctures the sea change that occurred as a result of 
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American entry into World War Two. Prior to Pearl Harbor, the American academe 
entertained a debate that displayed a central concern with the strictly interpreted national 
interest of the United States. The concept of "putting force behind the law" that so 
motivated many prominent British writers appeared only rarely in the United States. 
Among the authors cited in this study, only Felix Morley explicitly stated his belief that 
"power and responsibility are inseparable", and called on his countrymen to make a 
moral distinction between aggressors and their victims. The majority of other interwar 
authors preferred to emphasize the American national interest, regardless of whether they 
interpreted it as demanding an isolationist or interventionist policy. 
The isolationists such as Moore, Borchard and Beard, viewed the American 
national interest and legacy as one of strict separation from the politics of Europe, and 
sought ways to insulate the United States from turmoil abroad. Their antagonists, most 
notably Walter Lippmann, interpreted the traditional interest of the United States as one 
inextricably bound with that of the British Empire. His argument regarding the security 
that British naval supremacy had provided for the young American republic directly 
contradicted that of the isolationists, yet he explicitly rejected any possibility of 
Washington and London forging an alliance. More generally, internationalist Americans 
emphasized what they viewed as their country's long history of international engagement 
in general, particularly with Latin America and Asia. However, aside from Secretary Hull 
and his enthusiasm for the outcome of the Buenos Aires Conference, discussion of 
worldwide collective security remained conspicuously absent. Criticism of the Neutrality 
Acts cited in Chapter Four, for instance, focused on questions of national interest rather 
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than international security or law. Opponents of the legislation criticized it as either 
ineffectual, in the case of Charles Warren, or as unduly restrictive of presidential 
authority in foreign affairs as argued by Armstrong and Dulles. Aside from a handful of 
references to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, discussion of American collaboration in a 
worldwide security system never emerged in the late interwar literature. 
After the attack on Pearl Harbor, however, a lively debate on numerous world 
security concepts flourished. This had already begun to a limited extent with Clarence 
Streit's Federal Union concept in 1939. This idea, existing on a separate plane from any 
discussion of international security that embodied the continued sovereignty of member 
states, inaugurated discussion of a diverse array of ideas. Many of these, as we have seen, 
including Streit's union of Atlantic democracies, would have demanded a reduction or 
abrogation of sovereignty. The American wartime discourse embraced this contentious 
subject with enthusiasm. Clyde Eagleton discussed the idea of reducing sovereignty as 
early as Aprill942. His call to organize the international system for security began to 
reflect that of the British liberal realists, as Eagleton argued in favor of utilizing force to 
"uphold the law of the community". Quincy Wright, among others, introduced the 
concept of an international police force, loyal to a global security organization, to enforce 
the will of a collective security body against its members should one of them violate 
international law. This, of course, would have involved an extreme redefinition of 
sovereignty. Wright also embraced a somewhat popular contemporary idea with his 
endorsement of an internationally-controlled air force as a means of executing justice 
against aggressors. Samuel Fels proposed making service to the emergent United Nations 
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the new primary task of state militaries. Others, such as Walter Sharp and Arnold Brecht, 
rejected these concepts. With regard to more conventional interpretations of collective 
security, John J. Herz provided a realistic endorsement of the idea in which he argued 
that the destructiveness of modem warfare made all conflicts the concern of every state. 
This profusion of new ideas regarding sovereignty and the enforcement of 
international law, and the rapidity with which they rose and fell from favor between the 
years of 1942 and 1947 indicate the dominance of change over continuity in American 
thinking about foreign affairs. More generally, the wartime experience seems to have 
reoriented the American interpretation of its national interest. No longer did 
internationalism simply mean a preference for engaging with other states as a means of 
securing the United States alone. In the interwar period, even avid internationalists such 
as James Shotwell tended to minimize the extent to which the United States would need 
to become involved in global affairs when he described the American position in world 
politics in On the Rim of the Abyss. During and after World War Two, American 
internationalists began to identify the American national interest less as simply securing 
its own territory and that of its neighbors in the Western hemisphere, and instead 
interpreted American security as dependant on global stability. Herz' writing provided an 
early example of this shift, as he argued that even the United States could not remain 
immune to the incomparable destruction of major conflicts elsewhere. Clyde Eagleton's 
1945 work, The Forces That Shape Our Future, put the matter most explicitly when the 
author wrote, "even if we should wish it, we would not be permitted to live alone" due to 
the increasing interconnectedness of states, the increased puissance of airpower, and the 
concomitant end of American isolation. He interpreted the American mood of 1945 as 
one which demanded "an international order strong enough to control war". This 
provided the foundation of his call for an international organization that would require 
firm commitments from its members to react with force in the event of a breach of 
international peace. 
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By applying a similar approach to the American literature as was utilized to 
evaluate British internationalists, modem scholars can see that global stability emerged as 
the primary American concern with regard to international organization, and played a 
role similar to the discussion of enforcing international law and standards in the British 
debate. This conclusion poses a particular problem, however, as it seems to beg the 
question of this entire study. After all, collective security and power balancing are, by 
definition, theories which offer certain means of achieving stability and security. Stating 
that American writers sought to employ the two ideas in their search for worldwide 
stability could easily appear as a simple truism. Such reasoning, however, ignores an 
important point that this work has attempted to emphasize. A detailed examination of 
power balancing and collective security could, and did, take place only after Americans 
had identified their national interest with stability in global affairs. During the interwar 
period, when the national interest was generally defined as keeping the United States in 
isolation from overseas turmoil, discussion of collective security and power balancing 
hardly occurred at all. The budding concern with global security resulted in both the 
demise of isolationism as a policy (and as a framework against which internationalist 
582 
authors expended most oftheir energy), and the emergence of a brisk new discussion of 
security paradigms. 
Examining the subsequent development of power balancing and collective 
security by American writers in this light reveals an important parallel to their 
counterparts in the United Kingdom. As in Britain, support for collective security 
endured, but its strength relative to power balancing strengthened and withered in direct 
proportion to the perceived probability that the United Nations could ensure the 
realization of a broader goal - in this case global stability- in the short term. The initial 
enthusiasm for collective security owed a great deal to the strong expectation that 
wartime Allied collaboration would continue well into the future. The primacy of this 
concern emerged in 1944 with the writing of Sharp, who warned that if the Big Three 
became divided amongst themselves, "the whole system will break down. At best, the 
world will then revert to a new balance of power situation, with the maintenance of peace 
a precarious thing indeed." This would ultimately prove an accurate assessment. Clyde 
Eagleton's late wartime work also emphasized this concept, as did those of Frederick 
Schuman, Grayson Kirk and Herbert W. Briggs. 
These elevated hopes for continued great power cooperation coincided with the 
renaissance of collective security and general enthusiasm for the United Nations in 1944 
and 1945. As noted in Chapter Five, this period proved short-lived. Authors such as 
Pitman Potter and George Kennan quickly began to discuss the emergent reality of the 
Cold War schism between the previously united great powers. To a greater extent than in 
Britain, an analysis of the role ofthe Soviet Union's veto power within the Security 
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Council prompted an erosion of faith in the United Nations to establish stability and 
protect the new expansive American interest in global order. Potter made an early 
contribution to the discussion of alternatives by suggesting that the western powers 
maintain sufficient military strength to oppose any Soviet aggression by force, lest they 
fmd themselves forced to tread a similar path to the British interwar appeasers. Kennan 
followed this call with his famous piece on containment the subsequent year. The 
American interest in global stability endured, as demonstrated by Stimson's reminder that 
"The troubles of Europe and Asia are not 'other people's troubles;' they are ours." His 
call for continuing the Marshall Plan also mirrored this concern. The former Secretary of 
War and State also enjoined his readers to continue their support for the United Nations 
at this time, calling it the foundation of hope for international unity. Nonetheless, even so 
redoubtable an internationalist as Stimson warned that the Soviet veto might make the 
United Nations a poor embodiment of international security at times. 
Hamilton Fish Armstrong' s "Coalition for Peace" proposal stemmed from the 
same concern. His advocacy for a new pact of status-quo states outside of UN auspices 
paralleled Norman Angell's idea of an open alliance from the interwar period. 
Armstrong' s idea demonstrated increasing skepticism that the United Nations might 
fulfill its collective security role, but his previously-analyzed attempt to connect the new 
"Coalition" to the structure of the United Nations also illustrated the continuing 
adherence to collective security as an ideal and the UN as an institution. Although the 
discussion of alternative means of organizing global stability continued to strengthen, 
enthusiasm for the United Nations did not suffer a corresponding decline. Rather, as 
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discussed in Chapter Five, American analysts, like their British counterparts, tended to 
envision employing power balancing as a means of generating global peace that would, in 
turn, foster the growth of collective security. Edgar Answer Mowrer offered a similar 
interpretation of the preference for power balancing and regional arrangements in the face 
of frustration with the Soviet Union's veto, but in describing the UN as "an unfinished 
bridge leading nowhere" demonstrated less support for collective security in general. 
Nevertheless, his writing provides another demonstration of the extent to which power 
balancing emerged with diminished faith in collective security. 
Senator Douglas perhaps bridged the gap most effectively in 1951 when he 
discussed his belief that the formation of the Rio Pact and NATO enabled "peaceloving" 
states to build "practical structures outside the U.N." as a means of ensuring security 
while continuing "to pursue the goal of collective security inside of the United Nations". 
This continued the trend of blaming the Soviet veto for the lack of effective action in the 
United Nations. Yet, the Senator also related his fear that the profusion of regional pacts 
might ultimately undermine the United Nations and reduce its relevance- a prospect he 
clearly hoped to avoid. He placed his emphasis on the future of the global organization: 
"To give the United Nations added determination and strength today is an all-important 
objective ... because if the United Nations is to survive and develop to meet future 
challenges it must in truth be determined and strong." Among American writers of this 
period, A.H. Feller came closest to expressing the sentiments of the British liberal 
realists, arguing that morality remained an essential component of American foreign 
policy. Like both his British and American colleagues, he also voiced his simultaneous 
585 
support for the UN and regional security organizations. The end of this era once again 
saw Hamilton Fish Armstrong stating his preference for the global scope of the UN, and 
while Vera Dean called for an American understanding of power balancing in Foreign 
Policy Without Fear, she also noted that only the United Nations offered hope to small 
states seeking to evade the pull of their larger neighbors. Supporting collective security, 
then, would broaden the United States' appeal worldwide. 
This analysis, then, hopefully provides a conclusion with regard to the first two 
questions posed by this study. Collective security and power balancing developed 
simultaneously among the elite of the Anglo-Saxon great powers, though there were clear 
alternating bursts of relative enthusiasm for each. Despite their supposedly contradictory 
bases, the two ideas were able to develop in tandem because during the period of their 
intellectual growth, they appeared only as means to certain broader ends. In the United 
Kingdom, they served as possible paths to the enforcement of international law, whereas 
in the United States they offered two means of achieving global stability. For the majority 
of internationalist writers, only the relative possibility of their immediate success, rather 
than any doctrinal contradictions or preferences, served to encourage or moderate interest 
in collective security and power balancing. A protracted battle between collective 
security and power balancing as organizing principles in and of themselves did not seem 
to emerge, as most thinkers proved willing to shift between them as conditions dictated. 
Returning to the analysis oflnis Claude will help to provide an answer to the third 
question contained in this study, as his writing already attempted to grapple with what the 
historical debate over collective security and power balancing has yielded regarding the 
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actual relationship between the two theories. The analysis provided by this study 
validates certain of his conclusions. Claude argued that both paradigms reflect the fear 
that one state might gain preponderant power over the entire system. The writings 
analyzed in this study clearly demonstrate the accuracy of this point. The extent to which 
the writing of the British liberal realists and American internationalists embodied this fear 
is highly evident, placing Claude on solid ground in this regard. With regard to power 
balancing, Claude's discernment between the belief that it offers stability by generating 
equipoise between rival blocs and the belief that it can maintain stability even while 
tolerating occasional outbreaks of conflict also proved incisive. Norman Angell's 
frequent emphasis on the point that states elevated their security from domination above a 
straightforward quest for peace illustrates this point. Likewise, the British liberal realists' 
and later advocates of containment on both sides of the Atlantic all expounded on the 
ability of a strong alliance bloc (such as the proposed alliance between Britain, France 
and the Soviet Union during the 1930s, and NATO) to give possible aggressors pause and 
deter them from upsetting the balance. The prevalence of this logic in their analyses 
provides support for another of Claude's points. 
Finally, Claude related the criticism that collective security and its advocates 
tended to ignore the critical function of power in international relations. Among the 
authors discussed in this study, E.H. Carr most vociferously espoused this notion. Claude, 
as mentioned in Chapter One, offered another interpretation: that collective security 
embodied an appreciation of power by virtue of its promise to direct the combined power 
of the international community of states against aggression as a means of containing 
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drives for hegemony. Though this differed from the more traditional system of power 
balancing, it nonetheless illustrated a healthy respect for the role of power in international 
affairs. But making this counterpoint, Claude hoped to demonstrate that the two 
paradigms had more in common than their respective critics might have realized. The 
literature examined in this study demonstrates that this conclusion was probably the most 
important one formulated by Claude in his discussion of the subject. Instead of the 
theoretical incompatibility of ''utopian" collective security and power-oriented balancing 
strategies, the internationalist American and British writers of this period demonstrated 
that both in theory and in practice, the two concepts' appreciation for the primacy of 
power could work in unison for the achievement of wider goals. The importance these 
writers placed on the application of power in the pursuit of global stability or to uphold 
an international code of behavior, so evident throughout the many and varied writings 
analyzed here, demonstrates the accuracy of Claude's assessment. Power balancing and 
collective security indeed share a recognition of the utility of power in attempting to 
impose some form of order on an anarchic world. 
This might suggest, then, that the real controversy regarding these subjects exists 
on a higher level emphasized in the great debate between utopians and realists. If power 
balancing and collective security share a common appreciation for power that minimizes 
the differences between them, does the real conceptual conflict still exist between the 
influence of ideals and the putative primacy of power in the international system? Again, 
many of the writers examined in this study would suggest the contrary. To draw on the 
worldview of Norman Angell for the last of many times, ideas determine the ends toward 
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which power is applied. Therefore, the lesson modem scholars and statesmen can draw 
from the co-evolution of power balancing and collective security illustrated in this study 
is that, if we accept the argument that both are but interpretations of how best to apply 
power, their influence and utility will remain bound to the ends toward which they are 
employed. 
The introduction to this study discussed the usefulness of employing a perspective 
of continuity and change in examining this important subject, and also touched upon the 
many ways in which World War Two indelibly changed the world we inhabit. Though 
the realm of international politics and political thought changed a great deal as a result of 
the war, as discussed in the introduction, the body of this study revealed an important 
thread of continuity. Despite the temptation which must have undoubtedly existed during 
such a period of strife, upheaval and darkness to abandon hope for a better world and 
resign oneself to pessimistic visions of the future, the discussants who advanced our 
understanding of collective security and power balancing in this period never surrendered 
their dream of a brighter world. In demonstrating the shared essence of the two 
paradigms as tools for the accomplishment of wider goals, they embodied Leonard 
Woolf's argument that the basis of statecraft lies in the conceptualization of aims and the 
formulation of policies to achieve them. These thinkers, therefore, offer a tantalizing 
opportunity to contemplate the relationship between even broader concepts: the 
relationship between thought and action in international politics, and whether, or how, 
such potentially dangerous components of the international system such as power, force 
and coercion might be adapted to ensure peace and stability. 
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